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ABSTRACT 
The small, medium and micro enterprise (SMME) environment of South Africa 
contributes 42% to the national gross domestic product. This is a high number 
for a largely under-regulated environment. 
The corporate governance and IT governance standards that apply to South 
African companies are not feasible for SMMEs, and neither are they enforced, 
although 80% of failures of SMMEs are attributable to lack of enterprise 
management skill. 
The first objective of this dissertation is to examine the South African SMME, 
and in so doing determine whether local regulatory standards can be used for 
this unique enterprise formation. 
The second objective of this dissertation is to determine whether international 
methodologies for information security risk management, as an inclusive of IT 
governance, may be used in the unique local SMME formation. 
The result of these two objectives creates a gap in a typical information 
security risk management methodology that is suitable for the South African 
regulatory and economic environment for SMMEs. A model has been created 
as a possible answer for filling the gap. 
The dissertation includes the Peculium Model, which answers the regulatory 
and economic requirements that resulted from the second objective. The 
Model allows the small enterprise a simple but effective method for managing 
risks to its information assets, with the control of corporate governance and IT 
governance included in its framework. The Model answers the methods for 
identifying and assessing risk in a tradition-based but feasible new qualitative 
technique. 
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OPSOMMING 
Die omgewing van klein, medium en mikro-ondernemings (KMMO’s) in Suid-
Afrika dra 42% tot die nasionale bruto binnelandse produk by. Dit is ’n groot 
persentasie vir ’n omgewing wat nie veel regulering geniet nie. 
Die standaarde vir korporatiewe regering en IT-regering wat op die Suid-
Afrikaanse maatskappy van toepassing is, is nie noodwendig gepas vir 
KMMO’s nie en word ook nie afgedwing nie, al faal 80% van KMMO’s as 
gevolg van ’n gebrek aan bestuursvernuf. 
Die eerste doelwit van hierdie verhandeling is om die Suid-Afrikaanse KMMO 
te ondersoek en sodoende uit te vind of plaaslike reguleringstandaarde wel vir 
hierdie unieke ondernemingstruktuur gebruik kan word. 
Die tweede doelwit van die verhandeling is om uit te vind of internasionale 
metodologieë vir inligtingsekerheid-risikobestuur (ISRB) as deel van IT-
regering gebruik kan word in die unieke plaaslike KMMO-struktuur. 
Die uitslag van hierdie twee doelwitte skep ’n gaping in ’n tipiese ISRB-
metodologie ten opsigte van wat geskik is vir die Suid-Afrikaanse regulerende 
en ekonomiese omgewing van KMMO’s. ’n Model is as moontlike oplossing 
geskep om hierdie gaping te vul. 
Hierdie verhandeling sluit die Peculium-model in wat inpas by die regulerende 
en ekonomiese vereistes wat uit die tweede doel voortspruit. Die Model 
verskaf ’n effektiewe dog eenvoudige metode vir die bestuur van risiko’s wat 
inligtingsbates bedreig, terwyl die beheer van korporatiewe regering en IT-
regering in die raamwerk ingesluit word. Die metode behels die identifisering 
en assessering van risiko’s met behulp van ’n tradisiegebaseerde, maar 
bruikbare nuwe kwalitatiewe tegniek. 
 iv
Acknowledgements 
This has been both a stimulating and exciting adventure which can never be 
reduced in its meaning or importance in my academic career. I have been 
close to the plight of the SMME and as such, I am satisfied that I have 
contributed to the body of knowledge for the South African SMME community.  
I wish to thank my family and friends for their unwavering support in this 
journey. Your frowns and raised eyebrows spurred me ever on in trying to 
simplify my explanations. I have since given up that thankless route. The 
journey would have been a distinctly lonely path without you all. 
Thank you. 
 
The financial assistance of the South African Department of Labour (DoL) in this research is 
hereby acknowledged. 
Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not 
necessarily to be attributed to the DoL. 
 
 v
 
L1 Contents 
1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SMME ............................................................................. 1 
1.2 THE PROBLEM STATEMENT................................................................................ 4 
1.3 THE RESEARCH PROJECT OBJECTIVES ............................................................. 5 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY................................................................................ 5 
1.4.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .................................................................................. 6 
1.4.2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAPTERS ................................................................ 7 
1.5 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 8 
PART 1: THE HYPOTHESES .............................................................................................. 9 
2 DEFINING THE HYPOTHESIS ENVIRONMENT............................................... 10 
2.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 10 
2.2 COMPARISON OF THE SMALL ENTERPRISE IN DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES......................................................................................................... 11 
2.2.1 ECONOMIC DATA ON DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES..................... 12 
2.2.2 THE SMALL ENTERPRISES IN THE SAMPLE OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES............. 16 
2.2.3 THE SMALL ENTERPRISES IN THE SAMPLE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ........... 18 
2.2.4 SMALL ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPED VERSUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ........... 20 
2.3 DEFINING CORPORATE AND IT GOVERNANCE................................................ 21 
2.3.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE................................................................................. 21 
2.3.2 IT GOVERNANCE ................................................................................................. 23 
2.4 DEFINING INFORMATION SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT............................. 23 
2.4.1 RISK..................................................................................................................... 25 
2.4.2 RISK IDENTIFICATION.......................................................................................... 26 
2.4.3 RISK ASSESSMENT OR ANALYSIS........................................................................ 27 
2.4.4 RISK MITIGATION................................................................................................ 29 
2.4.5 RISK MONITORING .............................................................................................. 31 
2.5 SPECIALISING IN INFORMATION SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT.................. 33 
2.5.1 SECURITY ............................................................................................................ 33 
2.5.2 INFORMATION SECURITY .................................................................................... 33 
2.5.3 THE DEFINITION OF ISRM .................................................................................. 35 
2.6 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 35 
3 EVALUATING INDUSTRY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND IT 
GOVERNANCE FOR USABILITY AND CONFORMANCE............................... 37 
3.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 37 
 vi
3.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA COMPARED TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ........................................................................... 38 
3.2.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA ............................................................... 38 
3.2.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE AMERICAS, AUSTRALASIA AND EUROPE..... 40 
3.2.3 KING II VS. AUSTRALIAN STOCK EXCHANGE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
COUNCIL.............................................................................................................. 42 
3.3 THE USABILITY OF KING II IN SOUTH AFRICAN SMMES .............................. 49 
3.4 IT GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA ................................................................ 51 
3.5 USABILITY OF COBIT IN SOUTH AFRICAN SMMES ........................................ 54 
3.6 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 58 
4 INFORMATION SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT FOR SMALL 
BUSINESSES............................................................................................................... 60 
4.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 60 
4.2 FRAMEWORK FOR THE EVALUATION OF ISRM METHODOLOGIES............... 61 
4.2.1 THE FRAMEWORK EXPLAINED............................................................................ 61 
4.2.2 ELEMENTS OF THE FRAMEWORK......................................................................... 62 
4.3 OCTAVE-S EVALUATED .................................................................................. 68 
4.3.1 OCTAVE-S SUMMARISED.................................................................................. 68 
4.3.2 SCOPE OF APPLICATION ...................................................................................... 70 
4.3.3 PREPARATION GUIDELINES ................................................................................. 71 
4.3.4 IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES........................................................................... 72 
4.3.5 OCTAVE-S EVALUATION OUTCOMES ............................................................... 72 
4.4 CRAMM V EXPRESS EVALUATED ................................................................ 74 
4.4.1 THE CRAMM V EXPRESS TOOL......................................................................... 74 
4.4.2 SCOPE OF APPLICATION ...................................................................................... 74 
4.4.3 PREPARATION...................................................................................................... 75 
4.4.4 IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................................... 75 
4.4.5 COST.................................................................................................................... 75 
4.4.6 CRAMM V EXPRESS EVALUATION OUTCOMES................................................. 76 
4.5 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF OCTAVE-S AND CRAMM V 
EXPRESS ............................................................................................................. 77 
4.6 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 81 
5 REQUIREMENTS OF INFORMATION SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
FOR AN SMME .......................................................................................................... 82 
5.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 82 
5.2 SMME REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................... 83 
5.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REQUIREMENTS .................................................. 83 
5.3.1 GLOBAL REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................... 84 
5.3.2 PROCESS REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................... 86 
5.4 IT GOVERNANCE REQUIREMENTS ................................................................... 87 
RISK ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS OF COBIT FOR AN SMME............................................... 87 
5.5 INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARD REQUIREMENTS................................... 89 
RISK ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS OF ISO 17799 ................................................................. 90 
5.6 FULL LIST OF REQUIREMENTS AND REQUIREMENTS MATRIX ...................... 91 
5.7 GAP ANALYSIS ................................................................................................... 96 
5.8 REQUIRED INCLUSIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK ................................................. 97 
5.9 THE REQUIREMENTS FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION SECURITY RISK 
MANAGEMENT OF AN SMME ........................................................................... 99 
 vii
5.10 MEASUREMENT OF REQUIREMENTS .............................................................. 100 
5.11 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 103 
PART 2: THE PECULIUM MODEL................................................................................ 105 
6 PREPARATION FOR INFORMATION SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 106 
6.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 106 
6.2 OVERVIEW OF PREPARATION FOR RISK MANAGEMENT.............................. 107 
6.3 CONFIRM THE ORGANISATION IS AN SMME................................................. 109 
CHECKLIST 110 
6.4 OBTAIN SENIOR MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT ........................................... 110 
6.4.1 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SPONSOR AND THE BOARD .................. 110 
6.4.2 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 112 
6.5 IDENTIFY ORGANISATIONAL OBJECTIVES..................................................... 112 
6.5.1 STANDARDISING THE OBJECTIVES .................................................................... 113 
6.5.2 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 114 
6.6 IDENTIFY THE APPETITE FOR RISK ................................................................. 115 
6.6.1 DETERMINING THE APPETITE FOR RISK ............................................................ 115 
6.6.2 SELECTION OF THE APPETITE AMOUNT ............................................................ 116 
6.6.3 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 116 
6.7 IDENTIFY KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS ................................................. 116 
6.7.1 MINIMUM REQUIRED KPIS................................................................................ 117 
6.7.2 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 118 
6.8 ASSEMBLE THE RISK MANAGEMENT TEAM .................................................. 118 
6.8.1 RISK MANAGEMENT TEAM SIZE ....................................................................... 119 
6.8.2 RISK MANAGEMENT TEAM ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.............................. 120 
6.8.3 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 121 
6.9 CONDUCT TRAINING........................................................................................ 121 
CHECKLIST 123 
6.10 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 124 
7 RISK IDENTIFICATION........................................................................................ 125 
7.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 125 
7.2 OVERVIEW OF RISK IDENTIFICATION............................................................ 126 
7.3 IDENTIFY THE ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................ 127 
7.3.1 INFORMATION TO MAKE DECISIONS.................................................................. 128 
7.3.2 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 129 
7.4 DISTRIBUTE RISK MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES................................... 129 
CHECKLIST 130 
7.5 IDENTIFY TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS............................................. 131 
7.5.1 CREATING THE LIST OF ASSETS ........................................................................ 131 
7.5.2 CREATING THE ASSET REGISTER ...................................................................... 132 
7.5.3 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 133 
7.5.4 ASSET REGISTER ............................................................................................... 133 
7.6 EVALUATE ASSETS AGAINST WEAKNESS VALUE SCALE .............................. 133 
7.6.1 ASSET VALUATION SYSTEM.............................................................................. 134 
7.6.2 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 134 
7.6.3 ASSET REGISTER ............................................................................................... 135 
7.6.4 WEAKNESS VALUE CALCULATION ................................................................... 135 
7.7 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 136 
 viii
8 RISK ASSESSMENT................................................................................................ 138 
8.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 138 
8.2 OVERVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT .................................................................. 139 
8.3 IDENTIFY THREATS.......................................................................................... 141 
8.3.1 MATCHING THREATS TO THE ASSETS ............................................................... 141 
8.3.2 CREATE RISK REGISTER.................................................................................... 142 
8.3.3 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 143 
8.3.4 RISK PROFILE EXAMPLE.................................................................................... 143 
8.4 IDENTIFY VULNERABILITIES........................................................................... 144 
8.4.1 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 145 
8.4.2 RISK PROFILE EXAMPLE.................................................................................... 145 
8.5 CALCULATE LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURRENCE................................................. 146 
8.5.1 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 146 
8.5.2 RISK PROFILE EXAMPLE.................................................................................... 147 
8.6 PERFORM IMPACT MEASUREMENT................................................................ 147 
8.6.1 DETERMINING THE IMPACT AREAS................................................................... 148 
8.6.2 DETERMINING THE IDEAL IMPACT MEASUREMENT METHOD .......................... 149 
8.6.3 SCENARIO TESTS OF THE IMPACT MEASUREMENT METHODS .......................... 150 
8.6.4 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 152 
8.6.5 RISK PROFILE EXAMPLE.................................................................................... 153 
8.7 CALCULATE RISKS........................................................................................... 153 
8.7.1 THE STANDARD RISK CALCULATION METHOD ................................................ 154 
8.7.2 THE STANDARD RISK CALCULATION METHOD REVISITED .............................. 155 
8.7.3 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 156 
8.7.4 COMPLETE RISK PROFILE.................................................................................. 157 
8.8 INCLUDE RISK VALUES IN IT PLAN................................................................ 157 
CHECKLIST 159 
8.9 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 159 
9 RISK MITIGATION ................................................................................................ 161 
9.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 161 
9.2 OVERVIEW OF RISK MITIGATION .................................................................. 162 
9.3 IDENTIFY THE MITIGATION STRATEGY ......................................................... 162 
9.3.1 ASSIGNING A STRATEGY TO EACH TOP RISK.................................................... 163 
9.3.2 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 165 
9.3.3 RISK REGISTER.................................................................................................. 165 
9.4 SELECTING THE MITIGATING CONTROLS ..................................................... 166 
9.4.1 PERFORMING THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS .................................................... 166 
9.4.2 PARETO ANALYSIS OF CONTROLS..................................................................... 173 
9.4.3 BOARD APPROVAL OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES ............................................. 177 
9.4.4 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 177 
9.4.5 RISK REGISTER.................................................................................................. 177 
9.5 CREATE ACTION PLANS .................................................................................. 178 
9.5.1 THE MITIGATION DATE..................................................................................... 178 
9.5.2 RESOURCES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONTROL/STRATEGY.............................. 179 
9.5.3 THE EXPOSURE RESPONSE PROCEDURE............................................................ 179 
9.5.4 THE ESCALATION PROCEDURE.......................................................................... 180 
9.5.5 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 181 
9.5.6 RISK ACTION PLAN/REGISTER .......................................................................... 181 
9.6 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 181 
 ix
10 RISK MONITORING............................................................................................... 183 
10.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 183 
10.2 OVERVIEW OF RISK MONITORING ................................................................. 184 
10.3 INCLUDE RISK AWARENESS IN DAY-TO-DAY ACTIVITIES ............................ 186 
10.3.1 TASKS OF RISK MANAGEMENT TEAM............................................................... 187 
10.3.2 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 187 
10.4 MAINTAIN RISK REGISTER ............................................................................. 188 
10.4.1 TASKS OF RISK MANAGEMENT TEAM............................................................... 188 
10.4.2 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 189 
10.5 CONDUCT PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT ................................................... 190 
10.5.1 RISK MANAGEMENT SCORECARD..................................................................... 190 
10.5.2 DETERMINING DEPENDENCIES.......................................................................... 192 
10.5.3 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 192 
10.6 MEASURE MONITORING.................................................................................. 193 
10.6.1 REPORT.............................................................................................................. 193 
10.6.2 CHECKLIST ........................................................................................................ 194 
10.7 MAINTAIN BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLANS ..................................................... 194 
CHECKLIST 195 
10.8 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 195 
11 CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 198 
11.1 REVISITING THE PROBLEM STATEMENT ....................................................... 198 
11.2 STEPS TO PROVE THE HYPOTHESES AND PROVIDE THE REQUIRED 
METHODOLOGY............................................................................................... 198 
11.2.1 HYPOTHESIS ONE: SOUTH AFRICAN SMMES ARE UNIQUE.............................. 199 
11.2.2 HYPOTHESIS TWO: THE APPLICABILITY OF CORPORATE AND IT GOVERNANCE 
STANDARDS TO THE SMME.............................................................................. 200 
11.2.3 THE PECULIUM MODEL..................................................................................... 203 
11.3 ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS.................................................................... 207 
11.4 RESEARCH VALUE ........................................................................................... 208 
11.5 FUTURE RESEARCH ......................................................................................... 209 
11.6 CLOSING NOTE ................................................................................................ 209 
12 APPENDIX 1: AN EVALUATION OF KING II................................................... 210 
12.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ............................................................... 210 
12.2 CODE OF CORPORATE PRACTICES AND CONDUCT ....................................... 213 
12.2.1 BOARDS AND DIRECTORS.................................................................................. 213 
12.2.2 RISK MANAGEMENT.......................................................................................... 214 
12.2.3 INTERNAL AUDIT............................................................................................... 214 
12.2.4 INTEGRATED SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING ....................................................... 214 
12.2.5 ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ........................................................................... 214 
13 APPENDIX 2: A SUMMARY OF COBIT ............................................................. 215 
13.1 DEFINITIONS..................................................................................................... 215 
13.1.1 CONTROL........................................................................................................... 215 
13.1.2 IT CONTROL OBJECTIVE ................................................................................... 215 
13.1.3 PRINCIPLES........................................................................................................ 215 
 x
13.2 BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS OF INFORMATION................................................ 216 
IT RESOURCES ....................................................................................................................... 216 
13.3 DOMAINS .......................................................................................................... 217 
13.3.1 PLANNING AND ORGANISATION........................................................................ 217 
13.3.2 ACQUISITION AND IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................... 217 
13.3.3 DELIVERY AND SUPPORT .................................................................................. 217 
13.3.4 MONITORING ..................................................................................................... 217 
13.4 CONTROL OBJECTIVES.................................................................................... 218 
13.4.1 PLANNING AND ORGANISATION........................................................................ 218 
13.4.2 ACQUISITION AND IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................... 225 
13.4.3 DELIVERY AND SUPPORT .................................................................................. 227 
13.4.4 MONITORING ..................................................................................................... 233 
14 APPENDIX 3: COBIT CONTROL OBJECTIVES SELECTION GUIDELINES
..................................................................................................................................... 235 
14.1 CONTROL OBJECTIVE SELECTION GUIDELINES ........................................... 235 
14.1.1 IDENTIFY THE ORGANISATION’S IT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT MATURITY .... 235 
14.1.2 IDENTIFY THE LEVEL OF AUTHORITY BY ORGANISATION OWNERS OR MANAGERS
........................................................................................................................... 236 
14.1.3 LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION IN THE ORGANISATION .............. 237 
14.1.4 TECHNOLOGY/INFORMATION RISK PROFILE..................................................... 238 
15 APPENDIX 4: ISO 17799 THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES LISTS......... 242 
15.1 ISO 17799 THREATS LIST ............................................................................... 242 
15.2 ISO 17799 VULNERABILITIES LIST ................................................................ 245 
16 APPENDIX 5: SCENARIO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PECULIUM 
MODEL...................................................................................................................... 248 
16.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 248 
16.2 THE PECULIUM MODEL APPLIED TO MUCKLENEUK BOOKS ....................... 251 
16.2.1 PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES ............................................................................... 251 
16.2.2 RISK IDENTIFICATION........................................................................................ 255 
16.2.3 RISK ASSESSMENT............................................................................................. 257 
16.2.4 RISK MITIGATION.............................................................................................. 263 
16.2.5 RISK MONITORING ............................................................................................ 271 
17 APPENDIX 6: A PAPER PUBLISHED FOR THE ISSA 2005 CONFERENCE 275 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................... 290 
 
 xi
 
LT List of Tables 
 
TABLE 1.1: ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES [NATI 2003].. 2 
TABLE 1.2: SMME AND LARGE ENTERPRISE CONTRIBUTION TO THE NATIONAL GDP...... 3 
TABLE 2.1: ECONOMIC DATA OF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES SAMPLE [WORL 2004]... 13 
TABLE 2.2: ECONOMIC DATA OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SAMPLE [WORL 2004] . 14 
TABLE 2.3: SMES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM [COMM 2003] ............................................. 16 
TABLE 2.4: SMALL BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [SBA 2005] .............. 17 
TABLE 2.5: SMES IN AUSTRALIA [KIRI 1999]..................................................................... 17 
TABLE 2.6: SMMES IN SOUTH AFRICA [GOV 2004]........................................................... 18 
TABLE 2.7: SMMES IN BOTSWANA [LECH 2004] ............................................................... 19 
TABLE 2.8: SMES IN ARGENTINA [FUND 2004] [AYYA 2003] .......................................... 19 
TABLE 2.9: COMPARISON OF ECONOMIC DATA ................................................................... 20 
TABLE 3.1: SECTIONS OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS............................. 44 
TABLE 3.2: THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF KING II AND ASX........................... 45 
TABLE 3.3: CROSS-SECTIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE............................................. 47 
TABLE 3.4: KING II RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS COMPARED TO THE COBIT PROCESS. 53 
TABLE 3.5: THE SCORE DETERMINING THE APPLICATION OF CONTROL OBJECTIVES...... 55 
TABLE 3.6: RECOMMENDED USE OF COBIT BY THE EXAMPLE SMME.............................. 57 
TABLE 4.1: THE WEIGHTS OF THE FRAMEWORK ................................................................. 65 
TABLE 4.2: DURATION OF OCTAVE-S ................................................................................ 72 
TABLE 4.3: OCTAVE-S FRAMEWORK EVALUATION .......................................................... 73 
TABLE 4.4: CRAMM V EXPRESS FRAMEWORK EVALUATION ........................................... 76 
TABLE 4.5: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF OCTAVE-S AND CRAMM V 
EXPRESS ............................................................................................................. 78 
TABLE 5.1: THE REQUIREMENTS MATRIX ............................................................................ 94 
TABLE 5.2: THE REQUIREMENTS MATRIX WITH INCLUSIONS............................................. 98 
TABLE 5.3: REQUIREMENTS, MEASURES AND WEIGHTS.................................................... 102 
TABLE 6.1: PREPARATORY CHECKLIST 1 ........................................................................... 110 
TABLE 6.2: PREPARATORY CHECKLIST 2 ........................................................................... 112 
TABLE 6.3: PREPARATORY CHECKLIST 3 ........................................................................... 115 
TABLE 6.4: PREPARATORY CHECKLIST 4 ........................................................................... 116 
TABLE 6.5: PREPARATORY CHECKLIST 5 ........................................................................... 118 
TABLE 6.6: PREPARATORY CHECKLIST 6 ........................................................................... 121 
TABLE 6.7: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF TRAINING METHODS....................... 122 
TABLE 6.8: PREPARATORY CHECKLIST 7 ........................................................................... 123 
TABLE 7.1: IDENTIFICATION CHECKLIST 1 ........................................................................ 129 
TABLE 7.2: IDENTIFICATION CHECKLIST 2 ........................................................................ 130 
TABLE 7.3: IDENTIFICATION CHECKLIST 3 ........................................................................ 133 
TABLE 7.4: ASSET REGISTER 1 ............................................................................................ 133 
TABLE 7.5: IDENTIFICATION CHECKLIST 4 ........................................................................ 135 
TABLE 7.6: ASSET REGISTER 2 ............................................................................................ 135 
TABLE 7.7: ASSET VALUE CALCULATION ........................................................................... 136 
TABLE 8.1: ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST 1 .............................................................................. 143 
TABLE 8.2: ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST 2 .............................................................................. 145 
TABLE 8.3: ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST 3 .............................................................................. 147 
 xii
TABLE 8.4: IMPACT MEASUREMENT METHOD TEST 1 ....................................................... 150 
TABLE 8.5: IMPACT MEASUREMENT METHOD TEST 2 ....................................................... 151 
TABLE 8.6: IMPACT MEASUREMENT METHOD TEST 3 ....................................................... 152 
TABLE 8.7: ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST 4 .............................................................................. 153 
TABLE 8.8: THE STANDARD PI MATRIX [STEP 2002]........................................................ 154 
TABLE 8.9: THE ADJUSTED PI MATRIX............................................................................... 155 
TABLE 8.10: CALCULATION OF THE SCENARIO 1 RISK VALUE.......................................... 156 
TABLE 8.11: ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST 5 ............................................................................ 156 
TABLE 8.12: ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST 6 ............................................................................ 159 
TABLE 9.1: THE MITIGATION STRATEGY MATRIX ............................................................. 164 
TABLE 9.2: MITIGATION CHECKLIST 1............................................................................... 165 
TABLE 9.3: RISK REGISTER 1 .............................................................................................. 165 
TABLE 9.4: SCENARIO 1 IMPACT AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTROLS ............. 168 
TABLE 9.5: SCENARIO 2 IMPACT AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTROLS ............. 169 
TABLE 9.6: SCENARIO 3 IMPACT AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTROLS ............. 170 
TABLE 9.7: COST OF IMPLEMENTATION CALCULATIONS.................................................. 171 
TABLE 9.8: COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF SCENARIO 1 ....................................................... 171 
TABLE 9.9: COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF SCENARIO 2 ....................................................... 172 
TABLE 9.10: COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF SCENARIO 3 ..................................................... 172 
TABLE 9.11: SCENARIO TEST OF CES................................................................................. 176 
TABLE 9.12: MITIGATION CHECKLIST 2............................................................................. 177 
TABLE 9.13: RISK REGISTER 2 ............................................................................................ 178 
TABLE 9.14: MITIGATION CHECKLIST 3............................................................................. 181 
TABLE 9.15: RISK ACTION PLAN ......................................................................................... 181 
TABLE 10.1: MONITORING CHECKLIST 1 ........................................................................... 187 
TABLE 10.2: MONITORING CHECKLIST 2 ........................................................................... 189 
TABLE 10.3: RISK MANAGEMENT SCORECARD .................................................................. 190 
TABLE 10.4: MONITORING CHECKLIST 3 ........................................................................... 193 
TABLE 10.5: MONITORING CHECKLIST 4 ........................................................................... 194 
TABLE 10.6: MONITORING CHECKLIST 5 ........................................................................... 195 
TABLE 14.1: THE CONTROL OBJECTIVES APPLICABILITY RANGES .................................. 238 
TABLE 14.2: RECOMMENDED USE OF COBIT BY AN SMME ............................................. 241 
TABLE 16.1: A SUMMARY OF MUCKLENEUK BOOKS......................................................... 248 
TABLE 16.2: PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES ............................................................................ 251 
TABLE 16.3: PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES COMPLETED CHECKLIST .................................. 254 
TABLE 16.4: RISK IDENTIFICATION ACTIVITIES ................................................................ 255 
TABLE 16.5: RISK IDENTIFICATION COMPLETED CHECKLISTS ........................................ 256 
TABLE 16.6: RISK ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES....................................................................... 257 
TABLE 16.7: RISK ASSESSMENT COMPLETED CHECKLISTS............................................... 262 
TABLE 16.8: RISK MITIGATION RESULTS ........................................................................... 263 
TABLE 16.9: IMPACT AFTER IMPLEMENTATION FOR RISK 1............................................. 264 
TABLE 16.10: COST OF IMPLEMENTATION FOR RISK 1 ..................................................... 265 
TABLE 16.11: IMPACT AFTER IMPLEMENTATION FOR RISK 3........................................... 265 
TABLE 16.12: COST OF IMPLEMENTATION FOR RISK 3 ..................................................... 266 
TABLE 16.13: IMPACT AFTER IMPLEMENTATION FOR RISK 5........................................... 266 
TABLE 16.14: COST OF IMPLEMENTATION FOR RISK 5 ..................................................... 267 
TABLE 16.15: PARETO ANALYSIS ........................................................................................ 268 
TABLE 16.16: UPDATED RISK REGISTER............................................................................. 269 
TABLE 16.17: THE RISK ACTION PLANS .............................................................................. 270 
TABLE 16.18: RISK MITIGATION COMPLETED CHECKLISTS ............................................. 271 
TABLE 16.19: RISK MONITORING ACTIVITIES.................................................................... 271 
TABLE 16.20: RISK MONITORING COMPLETED CHECKLISTS............................................ 273 
 
 xiii
 
LF List of Figures 
 
FIGURE 1.1: DISTRIBUTION OF ENTERPRISES ........................................................................ 3 
FIGURE 1.2: COMPARATIVE RISK OF SOUTH AFRICA [WORL 2004]................................... 4 
FIGURE 1.3: LOGICAL FLOW OF THE STRUCTURE ................................................................. 6 
FIGURE 2.1: INFLATION AND GDP GROWTH OF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES SAMPLE 
[WORL 2004]..................................................................................................... 13 
FIGURE 2.2: INFLATION AND GDP GROWTH OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SAMPLE 
[WORL 2004]..................................................................................................... 15 
FIGURE 2.3: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AS NOTED IN KING II....................... 22 
FIGURE 2.4: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE AND IT GOVERNANCE .............. 23 
FIGURE 2.5: FIT OF RISK MANAGEMENT INTO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ITS 
COMPONENTS ..................................................................................................... 24 
FIGURE 2.6: RISK IDENTIFICATION....................................................................................... 27 
FIGURE 2.7: RISK ANALYSIS AS A SUBSET OF RISK ASSESSMENT ........................................ 29 
FIGURE 2.8: RISK MANAGEMENT.......................................................................................... 32 
FIGURE 3.1: SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS PRODUCED IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST . 39 
FIGURE 3.2: SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS PRODUCED THROUGHOUT AFRICA ..................... 39 
FIGURE 3.3: SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS PRODUCED IN THE AMERICAS............................. 40 
FIGURE 3.4: SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS PRODUCED IN AUSTRALASIA............................... 41 
FIGURE 3.5: SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS PRODUCED IN EUROPE......................................... 42 
FIGURE 4.1: THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK........................................................ 61 
FIGURE 4.2: THE FRAMEWORK, ITS ELEMENTS AND FACTORS........................................... 64 
FIGURE 4.3: THE CRAMM V EXPRESS PROCESS................................................................ 74 
FIGURE 5.1: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT [KING 
2002] [CLIF 2004].............................................................................................. 87 
FIGURE 5.2: IT GOVERNANCE REQUIREMENTS OF RISK MANAGEMENT [COBI01 2000].. 89 
FIGURE 5.3: INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARD REQUIREMENTS [BSI 2002] ................ 91 
FIGURE 5.4: GAP ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS REQUIREMENTS ............................................. 96 
FIGURE 5.5: THE REQUIREMENTS FRAMEWORK ............................................................... 101 
FIGURE 6.1: THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS WITH PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES 
EMPHASISED ..................................................................................................... 108 
FIGURE 6.2: COMPLETION OF PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES................................................ 109 
FIGURE 6.3: AN EXAMPLE OF THE BALANCED SCORECARD.............................................. 114 
FIGURE 7.1: ORDER OF COMPLETION OF DELIVERABLES ................................................. 127 
FIGURE 8.1: ORDER OF COMPLETION OF DELIVERABLES ................................................. 140 
FIGURE 8.2: RISK PROFILE 1 ............................................................................................... 143 
FIGURE 8.3: RISK PROFILE 2 ............................................................................................... 145 
FIGURE 8.4: RISK PROFILE 3 ............................................................................................... 147 
FIGURE 8.5: RISK PROFILE 4 ............................................................................................... 153 
FIGURE 8.6: THE COMPLETE RISK PROFILE....................................................................... 158 
FIGURE 9.1: ORDER OF COMPLETION OF DELIVERABLES ................................................. 162 
FIGURE 9.2: PROCESS FOR SELECTION OF CONTROLS ...................................................... 166 
FIGURE 9.3: USE OF MONETARY MEASURES IN THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS ........ 174 
FIGURE 10.1: RISK MONITORING IN THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS.......................... 185 
 xiv
FIGURE 10.2: ORDER OF COMPLETION OF DELIVERABLES ............................................... 186 
FIGURE 10.3: DEPENDENCIES IN THE RISK MANAGEMENT SCORECARD .......................... 192 
FIGURE 11.1: THE PECULIUM MODEL................................................................................ 207 
FIGURE 16.1: SIMPLE ORGANISATIONAL CHART ............................................................... 249 
FIGURE 16.2: THE MUCKLENEUK BOOKS BALANCED SCORECARD ................................. 252 
 
  1
 
C1 1 Introduction 
1.1 The South African SMME 
South Africa has recently celebrated ten years of democracy since the first 
democratic elections in 1994. The country has undergone many changes, 
including social, cultural and economic. South Africa has been incorporated 
into various international associations, unions and societies, including the 
United Nations, the Commonwealth and the African Union, of which President 
Thabo Mbeki holds the chairmanship [UN 2005] [CW 2005] [AU 2005]. These 
relationships with the global village have established South Africa as a 
preferred tourist destination and investment opportunity [TOUR 2005]. 
The South African economy has grown considerably, with black 
empowerment being supported by the state and investors to develop 
previously disadvantaged communities, and as a result the economy. 
Government has also targeted small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) 
for development [NATI 2003].  
These enterprises form a sizable portion of the gross domestic product (GDP). 
The SMME market portion contributes 42% to the GDP, but comprises an 
estimated 99% of the total enterprises in the economy, as presented in Table 
1.1 [SOUT 2002] [NATI 2003].1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Survivalist and very small enterprises are included in the SMME grouping although not formally 
defined as such. 
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Table 1.1: Estimated distribution of private sector enterprises [NATI 2003] 
Sector Survivalist Micro
Very 
Small Small Medium Large Total 
Agriculture 14 700 39 800 17 900 20 900 3 240 1 520 98 100
Percentage of total 15% 41% 18% 21% 3% 2% 100%
Mining 1 100 2 500 500 131 112 137 4 480
Percentage of total 25% 56% 11% 3% 3% 3% 100%
Manufacturing 19 600 45 700 30 600 4 800 3 840 1 479 106 019
Percentage of total 18% 43% 29% 5% 4% 1% 100%
Construction 19 900 51 700 13 300 2 300 996 320 88 516
Percentage of total 22% 58% 15% 3% 1% 0% 100%
Wholesale trade 900 6 500 8 900 3 270 660 577 20 807
Percentage of total 4% 31% 43% 16% 3% 3% 100%
Retail trade 91 700 173 500 43 300 13 100 970 744 323 314
Percentage of total 28% 54% 13% 4% 0% 0% 100%
Catering and accommodation 2 300 9 000 660 3 450 385 124 15 919
Percentage of total 14% 57% 4% 22% 2% 1% 100%
Transport 7 600 43 000 6 200 1 400 293 303 58 796
Percentage of total 13% 73% 11% 2% 0% 1% 100%
Finance and business services 7 700 10 300 24 300 4 600 301 425 47 626
Percentage of total 16% 22% 51% 10% 1% 1% 100%
Community, social and personal 
services 18 900 53 900 28 400 4 900 525 388 107 013
Percentage of total 18% 50% 27% 5% 0% 0% 100%
Total 184 400 435 900 174 060 58 851 11 322 6 017 870 590
Percentage of total 21% 50% 20% 7% 1% 1% 100%
 
Of the 870 590 registered enterprises in South Africa, 864 573 are SMMEs. 
These are the great majority of enterprises, but contribute less than half of the 
GDP. This is a clear indication that there are very many SMMEs, but that their 
economic contribution is much less than when compared to a large enterprise. 
Figure 1.1 provides a graphical representation of the enterprise distribution. 
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of enterprises  
The following calculations reflect the approximated average contribution of  
1 000 SMMEs to the GDP, when compared to large enterprises. 
Table 1.2: SMME and large enterprise contribution to the national GDP 
 Enterprises Contribution to GDP Contribution by 1 000
SMME 864 573 42% 0.05 
Large 6 017 58% 9.64 
 
Every 1 000 SMMEs of various sizes contribute an approximated 0.05% to the 
GDP, whereas 1 000 large enterprises contribute almost 10% to the GDP. 
Five large enterprises contribute approximately the same value (0.048) to the 
GDP as a thousand SMMEs. 
SMMEs also suffer a high failure rate in the economy, especially the micro 
and very small enterprises. This failure is attributable to AIDS, crime and a 
lack of management know-how [DISP 2003]. The study discovered that 80% 
of SMMEs fail, with a large number of SMME owners lacking managerial 
qualifications. This indicates that entrepreneurs, although innovative, neglect 
good business practice. These entrepreneurs are also lax in implementing 
crime-prevention or reduction controls [DISP 2003].  
The lack of good business practice and security indicates a lack of corporate 
governance. Corporate governance, as noted by the King II Report of 2002, 
should be applied to all public organisations and is not compulsory for 
SMMEs. Corporate governance, whilst establishing good business practice, 
also entices the business decision-maker to balance economic, environmental 
and social aspects of the enterprise [KING 2002]. This includes taking into 
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consideration financial regulations, social conditions of employed staff and the 
environment in which the organisation operates.  
 
Figure 1.2: Comparative risk of South Africa [WORL 2004] 
This environment in South Africa includes a high crime rate, so much so that it 
affects the overall risk rate for South Africa (refer to Figure 1.2) [WORL 2004].  
The security risk rating for South Africa is set at 3.25, which is higher than the 
average for Sub-Saharan Africa, at 2.6. Global overall risk is lower still, at 2.2. 
Crime prevention and reaction is a serious consideration when securing an 
organisation. 
A well-managed SMME, for conformance to good business practice, should 
consider governance to include securing of all company assets, which 
includes information assets. IT governance is a subset of corporate 
governance and, when applied with due diligence, will protect the information 
assets of the organisation [COBI01 2000]. Due diligence requires that the 
organisation follow a process of identifying the assets and any risks it may 
face from internal or external threats [COBI02 2000]. 
1.2 The Problem Statement 
The problem, as identified above, is the lack of corporate governance, and as 
inclusive, IT governance in SMMEs in South Africa. SMMEs lack these as 
enablers to good business practice.  
A further problem is the divide between the developed and developing 
countries. The developed countries have well-established standards and 
regulatory measures in place to analyse their governance efficiency, but these 
differ greatly from South African measures. It has to be determined whether 
developed countries’ measures are usable in South Africa, and whether these 
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measures can be applied to the South African environment, considering its 
regulations already in place.  
1.3 The Research Project Objectives 
The objective of this study is to determine whether corporate governance 
standards can be applied to SMMEs, and whether they are usable in South 
Africa. The hypothesis is that the developed countries’ methodologies for 
corporate governance are not suitable due to the unique nature of South 
African SMMEs. As a result, this study determines whether subsets, 
specifically the subset of IT governance standards in developed countries, 
conform to regulations and are applicable to the SMMEs.  
IT governance is further drilled down to risk management. Risk management 
as applied in IT governance includes information security risk management 
(ISRM). 
ISRM methodologies used by developed countries are also evaluated as 
enablers of IT governance, for conformance to regulations and applicability to 
the developing countries’ SMMEs. 
A requirement for a new methodology may arise if the hypotheses are proven. 
In the eventuality of such a requirement, the methodology must be created 
and then tested for the conditions raised. These conditions of conformance 
and applicability are expanded into tangible scientific measures. 
1.4 Structure of this Study 
The structure of the study for the formulation of this dissertation is as follows: 
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1.4.1 Research Methodology 
The design of this study is structured according to the following methods 
[OLIV 1999]: 
• Primary method: Model 
The final outcome of the study is the creation of a qualitative model, in 
response to the hypotheses stated throughout the body of the study. 
This model is tested in a scientific theoretical environment and the 
results analysed and reported. 
• Secondary method: Literature study, argument 
As noted, the formulation of the hypotheses and model requires a 
literature study, and as a result, arguments proving or disproving the 
hypotheses. 
The primary means of obtaining literature used was through published 
books, online academic libraries and journals. The arguments are 
based on the comparison of the literature, and in some cases 
assumptions made from the literature when analysed. 
Chapter 2: 
Defining the 
hypothesis 
environment
Chapter 3: Evaluating industry corporate 
governance  and IT governance for 
usability and conformance
Chapter 4: Analyse OCTAVE-S 
and CRAMM V Express in relation 
to the South African SMME
Chapter 5: 
Requirements of 
information 
security risk 
management for 
an SMME
Part 2: The 
Peculium Model
Chapter 11: 
Conclusion
Chapter 1: 
Introduction
Part 1
 
Figure 1.3: Logical flow of the structure 
The structure of this study follows a logical flow of the definition of the 
environment and a literature review of governance and security standards 
(refer to Figure 1.3). The principles discovered in these standards and the 
environment are used to analyse existing ISRM approaches. The results of 
the analysis are used to compile the Peculium Model, an ISRM model for 
SMMEs, which is then tested in a theoretical, real-world based environment 
for usability.  
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1.4.2 Brief Description of the Chapters 
Each chapter is succinctly summarised below. The descriptions provide 
further explanation of the structure presented in Figure 1.4. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the purpose of the research and eventual creation of 
a methodology. The hypotheses are set and the objectives aligned that 
demonstrate the logical flow of the continuing document. 
The chapter also provides a description of the research methodology and 
structure of the dissertation. 
Chapter 2 – Defining the hypothesis environment 
Chapter 2 defines the various aspects of the hypotheses that require further 
insight. It clarifies the hypothesis environment as well as the terminology used 
throughout the dissertation. This information sets the foundation for the 
following chapters. 
Chapter 3 – Evaluating industry corporate governance and IT 
governance for usability and conformance 
This chapter explores those standards and regulations that form the 
foundation of effective ISRM. Implementing ISRM without due diligence to 
these standards can nullify the efforts of ISRM. This chapter also determines 
how corporate governance and IT governance empower the ISRM process. 
Chapter 4 – Information security risk management for small businesses 
This is an extensive chapter analysing existing commercial ISRM 
methodologies for their advantages and disadvantages in the SMME market. 
The analysis also forms part of the hypothesis defined in Chapter 1. The 
methodologies are analysed for: 
• Fit to the objectives of ISRM 
• Suitability to the SMME market, considering cost, resource 
requirements, nature of implementation and usable components. 
Chapter 5 – Requirements for information security risk management for 
an SMME 
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The framework created in Chapter 5 presents the minimum requirements of a 
methodology that conforms to the requirements as determined by corporate 
governance, IT governance, information security standards and the 
advantages of the methodologies analysed in Chapter 4. The chapter 
provides a framework as preparation for the methodology to be created. 
Chapters 6 to 10 – The Peculium Model2 
These chapters form the created methodology in response to the proven 
hypotheses. The components as well as the holistic approach of the 
methodology are presented and discussed in a systematic step-by-step 
procedural manner. A scenario test of the Model is presented in Appendix 5. 
Chapter 11 – Conclusion 
This chapter serves as a summary of the preceding chapters, reiterating the 
hypotheses and the proof thereof. It also concisely describes the Peculium 
Model.  
1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has been used to articulate the problem statement, objectives for 
the dissertation and research model that is used. 
The dissertation is based on the proof of hypotheses and, if done, the creation 
of a model in support of the hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis that is attempted is as follows: 
South African SMMEs cannot be compared to other countries’ 
descriptions of small organisations. 
This hypothesis is proven in the following chapter. Chapter 2 offers an 
explanation of the environment in which this study is conducted, focusing on 
the difference between SMMEs in developing and developed countries. The 
chapter also includes definitions of the terminology used for the research 
environment as applied throughout the dissertation. ISRM is defined from a 
top-down association with corporate governance and IT governance.
                                                 
2 ‘Peculium’ taken from the Latin word for ‘a bit of money’. 
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Part 1: The Hypotheses 
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C2 2 Defining the Hypothesis Environment 
2.1 Introduction 
As with many fields of study and analysis, an awareness of the environment in 
which the analyst acts is of paramount importance. For example, a pathologist 
examining a blood sample for toxicity has to understand what represents 
toxicity in the blood. The same applies to a chemist analysing the reaction of 
chemicals. Ignorance of the properties of the chemicals may have hazardous 
consequences. The principle is also applicable in this case. Stating a 
hypothesis for an SMME environment without understanding what the 
environment is defeats the value of the findings and statements that result. 
One also cannot, in good sense, analyse a field such as information security 
risk management without fully understanding what it is.  
The objective of this chapter is thus the definition of the environment in which 
the research was conducted, based on the hypothesis defined in Chapter 1. 
Consequently, it is to define what the research is analysing. This objective 
consists of the following two goals: 
The first goal of this chapter is the definition of the environment and all 
associated principles that should create a clear understanding of the 
environment of the hypothesis. 
The second goal of the chapter is the definition of the broad discipline of risk 
management and ISRM as they apply to this study. 
Before starting any journey, it is advantageous to have information of both the 
destination and the first steps. This chapter begins with a comparison of the 
small enterprises in developed and developing countries. 
Upon establishment of the hypothesis environment, the definition of ISRM and 
all the associated terminology in the field is presented. 
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The resulting outcome sets the environment for the literature study that 
follows hereafter. 
2.2 Comparison of the Small Enterprise in Developing and 
Developed Countries 
A distinction is made in many levels of society between the “have’s” and 
“have-nots”. The same applies to countries. There are civilisations that have 
developed faster and more effectively than others, with efficient infrastructure, 
low unemployment figures and matured educational systems. 
There are countries at the other end of the scale that have not enjoyed such 
development. These countries have diminished governmental structures, poor 
economies and lack of infrastructure. Many symptoms can be blamed for this; 
in most cases it is due to civil warfare, lack of natural resources and fast-
developing populations. 
There are, however, also countries that cannot distinctly be defined as either. 
South Africa is such a case. Colonial influence in the 18th and 19th centuries 
provided South Africa with strong infrastructures, a well-developed 
educational system and a firm commercial structure [AFRI 2005]. Another 
facet of history, apartheid specifically, removed the majority of the population 
from such development. This led to widespread poverty, illiteracy and 
unemployment [EDUC 2005]. 
Many parties have debated the question of whether South Africa is a 
developed or developing country. 
The international authority on the definition of developed and developing 
countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has declared South Africa 
as a developing country due to the high unemployment and inflation rates and 
the high level of international debt [IMF 2004]. 
The American Central Intelligence Agency recognises South Africa as a 
developed country, based on the high degree of industrialisation [CIA 2004]. 
South Africa is the only African country listed as developed by the Agency, 
whereas no African countries are listed as developed by the IMF. 
South Africa therefore must be recognised as one of the leading developing 
countries. The criteria for a developed country do seem apparent in certain 
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areas of South Africa, but the lack of infrastructure, employment and 
economic sustainability in the large populous areas of the South African 
townships has created the focus for development. Development in these 
areas is highly focused on the construction of housing, roads and schools 
[JOBU 2005] [ALEX 2005]. This is a clear indication that South Africa, 
although noted as a developing country, is definitely assigning resources to 
development, and is firmly en route to having a developed nature. 
2.2.1 Economic Data on Developed and Developing Countries 
Some of the criteria listed in the previous section for declaring a country as 
developed include industrialisation, stable inflation, low unemployment figures 
and firm commercial structures. South Africa has been declared as a leading 
developing country by the IMF. Such a country must be compared to 
developed nations to find those areas that are still lacking in stability or 
maturity.  
The governmental and legal systems in South Africa, influenced by British 
colonial rule, are well established, but, in hindsight, are systems built from the 
foundations of a world leader onto the unstable soil of a developing country. 
Many of the still developing countries were once ruled by the great maritime 
rulers of old, such as England, Spain and Portugal [AFRI 2005].  
To accurately evaluate the applicability of ruling systems created by 
developing countries to developed countries, some data is required to define 
the distinction between the two divides. 
Below follows the comparison of economic data of developed countries and 
developing countries. Samples have been selected to represent the groups 
from the IMF List of Advanced Economies and its exclusions. 
2.2.1.1 Developed Countries 
The following countries have been selected to represent developed countries 
in a sample for this study: 
• United States of America 
• United Kingdom 
• Australia 
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These countries have well-developed economies and low poverty rates, and 
are considered by most to be representative of effective coherence to criteria 
for a developed country. The economic data follows hereafter [WORL 2004]. 
Table 2.1: Economic data of the developed countries sample [WORL 2004] 
  Developed Countries 
Data as at 2003 United Kingdom United States Australia 
GDP growth % 2.00 2.90 2.97
Inflation % 3.00 2.27 2.77
Population (m) 59.30 288.00 19.90
Unemployment (m) 5.00 6.08 6.30
Economic risk 1.50 1.50 1.25
 
The developed countries have an inflation rate of or below 3%, with varying 
populations. The countries also have negligible economic risk, due to their 
well-established economic practices and lack of warfare within their borders. 
The following graphical representation demonstrates the inflation and GDP 
growth over the last six years: 
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Figure 2.1: Inflation and GDP growth of the developed countries sample 
[WORL 2004] 
The United Kingdom has shown the most stability over the period, with both 
inflation and GDP below 3% for the last three years. The USA, on the other 
hand, suffered a significant drop in GDP in 2001. This can be attributed to the 
lack of consumer confidence after the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and 
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World Trade Center Towers [WORL 2004]. Inflation did, however, maintain its 
downward trend. The GDP has maintained a steady increase. 
Australia has experienced a decreasing inflation from an already low 3% since 
2002. The GDP has been fluctuating between a healthy 3 and 4% over three 
years. 
From this information it can be concluded that the well-established systems in 
place in these countries are managing economic growth effectively, especially 
in the case of the United States. A disaster shocked the nation into great fear 
and a war on terror. The economy did recover at a significant pace to 
establish the high level experienced previously. This is also an indication of 
effective governmental and commercial rule. 
2.2.1.2 Developing Countries 
The sample selected to represent developing countries is based on countries 
that have experienced colonial rule, been subject to economic crises or suffer 
diminished governmental, educational or infrastructural systems. The 
representative sample provides a collection of differing cultures, continents 
and current economic growth.  
It has been decided that the sample for developing countries should not 
portray similar economic data, but should reflect the differing motivation for 
the ‘developing’ label assigned to these countries. The sample of developing 
countries is: 
• South Africa 
• Botswana 
• Argentina 
Table 2.2: Economic data of the developing countries sample [WORL 2004] 
  Developing Countries 
Data as at 2003 South Africa Botswana Argentina 
GDP growth % 1.85 5.00 8.41
Inflation % 5.86 8.36 13.44
Population (m) 45.30 1.72 38.40
Unemployment (m) 28.00 .. 21.10
Economic risk 2.25 1.75 3.50
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The developing countries have unstable inflation rates above those of the 
developed countries, with varying populations. South Africa and Argentina 
have moderate to high economic risk due to crime rates and economic 
instability, respectively. Botswana’s economic risk is negligible. The following 
graphical representation presents the inflation and GDP growth over six years: 
 
Figure 2.2: Inflation and GDP growth of the developing countries sample 
[WORL 2004] 
South Africa has maintained a stable range of GDP figures over the last three 
years. Inflation has improved tremendously, dropping from 8% in 2002 to 
under 3% in 2004. Botswana’s inflation has been fluctuating within a high 
range of 6 to 8%. The GDP has enjoyed consistent growth for the last two 
years.  
Argentina is a high-risk economy, as represented in this graph. The inflation 
rate has reached levels of 25%, dropping back down to approximately 8% in 
2004. This is an indication of volatility, confirmed by the GDP figures growing 
from a negative figure in 2002 to 8% in 2004.  
It is clear from this data that the sample of developing countries reflects 
instability in various economic measures. None of the three countries have 
enjoyed stable inflation and GDP growth over the last two to three years, as 
apparent in developed countries. 
This also confirms that they cannot as yet be labelled as developed countries, 
and are correctly grouped in the developing countries category. 
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The value of this data to this study becomes apparent in the following section, 
where the definitions of small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs)3 in the 
two samples are compared. The differing definitions of SMMEs between 
developed and developing countries also reflect the economic contribution by 
SMMEs as being different in the two categories. 
2.2.2 The Small Enterprises in the Sample of Developed Countries  
The data contained in this section is split first into the categories of developed 
and developing countries, and thereafter into each country in the samples. 
The information provides the two measures currently used in the definition of 
SMMEs, that being employee size and annual turnover. Some countries do, 
however, rely on either of the two measures. 
This data determines whether the definitions of SMMEs in developing 
countries also differ as the economic data has been proven to differ. 
2.2.2.1 United Kingdom  
Small enterprises in the United Kingdom fall under legislation of the European 
Union (EU), and are thus defined according to the EU definition of their SMEs, 
or small, medium and micro enterprises [COMM 2003]. The shortened 
acronym includes medium and micro enterprises. The EU defines an SME as 
follows4: 
Table 2.3: SMEs in the United Kingdom [COMM 2003] 
Enterprise 
Size 
Number of 
Employees 
Annual Turnover Rand/Euro Exchange 
at R8,145 
Medium 
enterprise 
Fewer than 250 Less than EUR 
50m R407m
Small 
enterprise 
Fewer than 50 Less than EUR 
10m 
R81.4m
Micro 
enterprise 
Fewer than 10 Less than EUR 2m R16.2m
 
                                                 
3 SMMEs will be used as the collective descriptive word for the remainder of this chapter. Some 
countries do, however, define these collections differently, which will be stipulated. 
4 As defined by the EU Commission held on the 6th of May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises [COMM 2003]. 
5 Exchange rates as at October 2005. 
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2.2.2.2 United States of America 
The Small Business Administration6, an organisation in the US specialising in 
offering small businesses financial and strategic assistance, is the national 
authority on the definition of a small business [SBA 2005]. 
The American small business definition is very extensive in considering all 
industries, which are narrowly defined. The definition is structured to represent 
some 300 industries, not listed here, that either list the annual turnover in 
million, or number of employees. The American small business is defined as 
presented in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Small business in the United States of America [SBA 2005] 
Enterprise Size
Number of 
Employees 
Annual Turnover 
Rand/Dollar 
Exchange at R6,55 
Small enterprise 500 to 1 500 $750 000 to $25m R4.9m to R164m 
 
2.2.2.3 Australia 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics defines the Australian SMEs as presented 
in Table 2.5. Australia does not measure its SMEs in turnover figures, but 
relies solely on the organisation sizes [KIRI 1999]. As such Table 2.5 only 
presents the number of employees in the enterprise definitions. 
Table 2.5: SMEs in Australia [KIRI 1999] 
Enterprise Size Number of Employees 
Medium enterprise Fewer than 200 
Small enterprise Fewer than 20 
Micro enterprise Fewer than 5 
 
An assumption is made that the annual turnover of Australian SMEs, as a 
member of the developed country sample, also experiences turnover into 
multiple millions. 
                                                 
6 Established as a non-profit organisation in the service of the state. It makes use of a “Table of Small 
Business Size Standards” based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
industries [SBA 2005]. 
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It can thus be concluded that SMMEs in the developed world are successful in 
their revenue generation. Parallel information is required of developing 
countries to compare whether there is a notable difference in the data. 
2.2.3 The Small Enterprises in the Sample of Developing Countries  
The sample identified previously is used again to represent the developing 
countries. The definitions of SMMEs are again based on number of 
employees and annual turnover. 
2.2.3.1 South Africa 
The South African SMMEs have become key players in the economy of this 
developing country. The promulgation of the Small Business Development Act 
in 1996 recognised the need for official recognition of these enterprises by the 
state, and the accompanying formalising of their significant role in the 
developing nation [GOV 2004]. 
The initial use of the European Union’s structure allowed the state to use a 
definition that would be easily applicable in the industry. This definition has 
since been adapted to more realistic measures in the National Small Business 
Amendment Act of 2003 [GOV 2004]. A summary of the definition in the 
Amendment Act is as follows: 
Table 2.6: SMMEs in South Africa [GOV 2004] 
Enterprise Size Number of Employees Annual Turnover 
Medium More than 50 and fewer than 
200, excluding agriculture 
which allows only up to 100 
Ranging from R13m to R64m 
across various industries 
Small Fewer than 50 employees Ranging from R3m to R32m 
across various industries 
Very small More than 5 and fewer than 20 
employees 
Ranging from R500 000 to 
R5m across various industries 
Micro Up to 5 employees R200 000 across all industries 
 
The South African definition includes a measure for very small enterprises, 
although they are not included in the acronym. This is due to the large number 
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of enterprises with the number of employees ranging between 5 and 50 (refer 
to Chapter 1, Table 1.1). This grouping is included in the small enterprise 
grouping for the purposes of this study. 
2.2.3.2 Botswana 
Botswana, the current economic star of Africa, is experiencing a 30% to 40% 
contribution to its GDP by SMMEs, employing 190 000 people, just over 9% of 
the population [DAIL 2004]. The Botswana SMME is defined below [LECH 
2004]. 
Table 2.7: SMMEs in Botswana [LECH 2004] 
Enterprise Size 
Number of 
Employees
Annual Turnover 
Rand/Pula 
Exchange at R0,73 
Micro enterprise Up to 2 Up to P60 000 R44 000 
Small enterprise Up to 25 P60 000 to P1.5m R44 000 to R11m  
Medium 
enterprise 
Up to 100 P1.5m to P5m R11m to R37m 
 
2.2.3.3 Argentina 
The Argentinean system of defining SMEs, in contrast to their other South 
American counterparts, is based upon annual sales [FUND 2004]. A study 
has, however, been conducted in which world SME definitions are compared. 
This study suggests that Argentinean SMEs have up to 250 employees [AYYA 
2003]. The SME is defined in Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8: SMEs in Argentina [FUND 2004] [AYYA 2003] 
Enterprise Size Number of Employees Annual Turnover 
Rand/Peso 
Exchange at R0,39 
Micro 
enterprise .. Up to 500 000 pesos R195 000 
Small 
enterprise .. Up to 3m pesos R1.2m 
Medium 
enterprise Up to 250 Up to 24m pesos R9.4m 
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It is clear from Argentina’s data that the SMMEs are not economically as 
successful as those in Botswana, and also offer less individual income by a 
greater number of employees. This again reflects the economic turmoil noted 
in the economic data presented earlier. 
2.2.4 Small Enterprises in Developed versus Developing Countries 
The information provided throughout this chapter has drafted a map of 
SMMEs spanning five continents across the globe. The countries evaluated 
differ in geographical size, cultures, economic risk and many other factors. 
There is, however, one factor which remains the same. All of these countries 
recognise SMMEs as contributors to their respective economies. 
None of the countries define an SMME as an exact copy of that of another 
country. The various countries use different measures and different currencies 
when defining these enterprises. Table 2.9 below summarises the information 
in this section.  
Table 2.9: Comparison of economic data 
  Developing Countries Developed Countries 
Data as at 2003 SA BOT ARG UK USA AUS 
GDP growth % 1.85 5.00 4.10 2.00 2.90 2.97
Inflation % 5.86 8.36 6.59 3.00 2.27 2.77
Population (m) 45.30 1.72 38.40 59.30 288.00 19.90
SMME employees < 50 < 25 < 250 < 50 > 500 < 20
 
The definition of a small enterprise across the two samples and six countries 
differs tremendously. For example, Australia and the USA are evenly matched 
in GDP growth, but have a significant difference in population and small 
enterprise size. 
South Africa and the UK also share similar definitions for number of 
employees, but differ greatly in economic strength. 
It thus follows that the South African SMME is unique when compared to that 
of any of the other sample countries selected here. The hypothesis thus 
stands, that corporate governance of an SMME in one of these countries 
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cannot be directly applied to the South African SMME without some 
customisation. 
A subset of corporate governance, IT governance, can be construed not to 
directly apply to South African SMMEs either. This is, however, a bold and as 
yet unproven statement. A further hypothesis is thus stated, that IT 
governance as created for other countries’ SMMEs is not absolutely suited to 
South African SMMEs either. 
Thus having defined the environment in which this study is focused and the 
accompanying hypothesis, additional preparation is required before proving 
this second hypothesis. 
Proving a hypothesis on the unsuitability of corporate governance, or IT 
governance, requires once again an understanding of the environment. The 
following definitions apply to this study as a guide to understanding corporate 
and IT governance. 
2.3 Defining Corporate and IT Governance 
Corporate governance is fast becoming a much more important consideration 
in both developed and developing countries [WORD 2004]. Countries with a 
well-established and applied corporate governance standard have a more 
secure presence in the global economy. 
2.3.1 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance refers to the manner in which a corporation is directed, 
and laws and customs affecting that direction. It includes the laws governing 
the formation of firms, the bylaws established by the firm itself and the 
structure of the firm. The corporate governance structure specifies the 
relations and the distribution of rights and responsibilities, among primarily 
three groups of participants – the board of directors, managers and 
shareholders. This system spells out the rules and procedures for making 
decisions on corporate affairs; it also provides the structure through which the 
company objectives are set, as well as the means of attaining and monitoring 
the performance of those objectives. The fundamental concern of corporate 
governance is to ensure the conditions under which a firm’s directors and 
managers act in the interests of the firm and its shareholders, and to ensure 
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the means by which managers are held accountable to capital providers for 
the use of assets [CLIF 2004].  
This lengthy definition can be interpreted as stating that corporate governance 
creates a framework by which an organisation is managed. It provides 
guidelines on responsibilities held by directors, shareholders and managers. 
The decisions made by these parties should be made with due consideration 
of the organisation in its entirety, including its assets, business interests and 
staff. 
This interpretation is supported by the World Bank Report on Corporate 
Governance in 1999, in which Sir Adrian Cadbury stated that: 
“Corporate Governance is concerned with holding the balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and commercial goals…the 
aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations 
and society.” [KING 2002] 
The King II Report also recognises the alignment of corporate governance 
with factors outside financial governance such as the “fundamental practices 
of good financial, social, ethical and environmental practice” as reflected in the 
diagram in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3: Corporate governance practices as noted in King II 
Corporate governance is the structure for an organisation to monitor its 
decision-making and to act upon its objectives and strategies. An organisation 
comes to understand through good corporate governance that its strategies 
and objectives will hold an inherent risk. The management of such inherent 
risk, i.e. risk management, becomes a major practice in corporate 
governance. The protection of information assets and continuous usability of 
the information systems that enable achieving organisational goals become 
important considerations. 
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IT governance provides the structure that links IT processes, resources and 
information to organisational strategies and objectives.  
2.3.2 IT Governance 
IT governance is defined as a structure of relationships and processes to 
direct and control the enterprise in order to achieve the enterprise’s goals by 
adding value while balancing risk versus return over IT and its processes 
[COBI01 2000]. 
IT governance applies risk management, or specifically information security 
risk management (refer to Figure 2.4).  
 
Figure 2.4: The relationship between corporate and IT governance 
ISRM is a complex structure of processes and procedures that secures an 
organisation’s IT and information assets against those risks faced when an 
organisation applies strategies to reach its objectives. These risks are not 
restricted to strategic objectives, but are in effect present in daily operations.  
Corporate governance, a regulated and applied discipline, is defined 
according the standardised measures. The same applies to IT governance. 
ISRM is yet to be defined. Lack of such a definition reverses the importance of 
IT governance, and as a result corporate governance to this study. 
The next section defines information security risk management and the 
various facets involved in the discipline. 
2.4 Defining Information Security Risk Management 
ISRM is a particular extension of risk management. Risk management is 
applicable to various facets of an organisation, such as operational risk 
management, market risk management and financial risk management. Four 
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major components of risk management have been identified in the literature 
[BAND 1999]: 
1. Risk identification 
2. Risk analysis 
3. Risk-reducing (mitigating) measures 
4. Risk monitoring 
These four components are complex centres within their own disciplines. 
Definition of each of these components is required as each component, 
although stemming from its previous partner, has its own functionality, 
success criteria and objectives. The one factor that binds all these 
components is the generic, yet focus enabling concept of risk. Risk 
management is thus defined, firstly by evaluating risk, and then broaching 
each component in the order noted in the bottom-up view of Figure 2.5 below 
[COBI01 2000]. 
Corporate 
governance
IT governance
Risk management
Is enabled by
Is implemented through
ISRM
Risk identification Risk analysis Risk mitigation Risk monitoring
As extension of
 
Figure 2.5: Fit of risk management into corporate governance and its 
components 
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2.4.1 Risk 
This chapter has been structured to create an understanding of the 
environment in which this study is focused. It is fitting that care be taken when 
defining risk. Risk, as noted above, is present in every facet of daily life. As 
such, various definitions for risk exist and are used for many different 
purposes. These definitions are not, however, similar as would be expected. 
a. Risk is the quantifiable likelihood of loss or less-than-expected returns 
[INVE 2004]. 
This definition suggests that risk is an uncertainty, but a measurable one. This 
implies that some analysis would be involved either in measuring the 
uncertainty or, as stated next, the uncertain loss. This loss could be 
represented as monetary, asset-related or otherwise. The definition also 
refers to returns. This represents risk in an investment of some variety. This 
definition appears to be directed at monetary risk.  
The definition holds a contrast in perceived impact, as it states a “likelihood of 
loss” which provides a negative connotation, and then states “less-than-
expected returns” which presents a comparatively positive connotation.  
b. Risk is the possibility of suffering harm or loss [OCTA01 2003]. 
This definition differs greatly from the first, but also shows similarity. It is more 
negatively representative of the facets of risk. It humanises risk and creates 
an emotional link to the result of a risk that is realised, in stating the possibility 
of “suffering harm or loss”. There is no indication of measurement of the risk. 
It does not link the result of the harm or loss to an asset. This definition is 
applicable to any risk, in business or private capacity. 
c. Risk is a factor, thing, element or cause involving uncertain danger 
[AMER 2004]. 
This definition is perceived to create a broad scope of applicability, as risk 
may have any source. It also presents an uncertainty of the level of danger 
‘involved’. The definition carries a definitive negative connotation, but does not 
declare any certainties.  
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It is clear that although definitions of risk abound, they are either too non-
specific or too focused on an area not applicable to this study. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, the following definition of risk is used: 
Risk is the measured probability of decreased value of an asset or investment 
as a result of an exposed vulnerability. 
2.4.2 Risk Identification 
Risk identification, as noted in Figure 2.5, is the first component of the generic 
risk management model. Risk identification is a necessary component. As 
stated earlier, some organisations choose to apply selected components, but 
risk identification is unavoidable. Risks cannot be managed if they are not first 
identified. There is, however, some confusion as to what risk identification 
entails. The following definitions illustrate this uncertainty. 
a. The method of identifying and classifying risk [MCNA 1999]. 
This definition suggests a logical and simple process of identification and 
classification of risks. It states that risk identification is the method of 
identifying risks, which is nonsensical. It does not provide any information on 
what the method entails. It also provides no indication of what classification is 
used. 
b. Recognizing that a risk exists and trying to define its characteristics. Risk 
identification is a deliberate procedure to review, … anticipate possible 
risks [SOCI 2004]. 
This definition clearly states that risk identification is a procedure used to 
gather information on risks, including their characteristics, used to anticipate 
realisation of the risks. It does not provide guidance on which characteristics 
are reviewed.  
Neither definitions provide a clear map to identify these risks, nor what 
preparatory processes may be required. The definitions do touch on 
classification and a procedure, respectively. The risk identification definition 
that is more suited to this study is thus created as a modified collective 
representation of the definitions evaluated above. Risk identification is defined 
as follows: 
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Risk identification is the process of identifying assets, the vulnerabilities of 
those assets and any threats facing those assets.  
Figure 2.6 illustrates this collective representation. 
 
Figure 2.6: Risk identification 
The terms ‘assets’, ‘vulnerabilities’ and ‘threats’ are additions to the collective 
definition. These are defined as follows: 
2.4.2.1 Assets 
In security, a resource or information that is to be protected [ATIS 2004]. 
Any item of economic value owned by an individual or corporation, especially 
that which could be converted to cash [BURE 2004].  
2.4.2.2 Vulnerabilities 
A weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal 
controls or implementation that could be exploited [ATIS 2004]. 
The degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, 
injury, damage or harm [EURO 2004]. 
2.4.2.3 Threats 
Capabilities, intentions and attack methods of adversaries to exploit; or any 
circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm [ATIS 2004]. 
Something that is a source of danger [WORD 2004]. 
These definitions suffice for the purposes of this dissertation as the 
connotations are clear and offer no confusion. 
2.4.3 Risk Assessment or Analysis 
 The next component of risk management is risk analysis. This is a 
component that causes much confusion, and at times a stalemate in a poorly 
informed risk management exercise. The risks that the organisation faces 
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have been identified. The organisation may be faced with insecurity regarding 
the process going forward. The next component requires a clear route for the 
risk management executor to take. The terms ‘analysis’ and ‘assessment’ are 
easily interchangeable. 
2.4.3.1 Risk Assessment 
a. Risk assessment is measuring two quantities of the risk, the magnitude 
of potential loss, and the probability that the loss will occur [INVE 2004]. 
The definition asserts itself as a tool of measurement by considering 
probability and loss. The information obtained of such an assessment should 
empower a better decision with regard to control versus asset value. 
b. Formal and systematic analysis to identify and quantify probabilities and 
consequences [BURE 2004]. 
This definition uses the word ‘analysis’ as an explanation of assessment. It 
also measures probability and loss.  
c. Risk assessment is the process of analysing threats to and 
vulnerabilities of [assets] and the potential impact of the loss [of the 
asset]. The resulting analysis is used as a basis for identifying 
appropriate and cost effective countermeasures [ATIS 2004].  
This definition suggests that analysis is a subset of assessment. This analysis 
implies the gathering of information on risks. This information is then analysed 
for impact and probability. This creates a more structured view of the 
measurement step in risk management. 
2.4.3.2 Risk Analysis 
a. A systematic method of identifying the assets, the threats to those 
assets, and the vulnerabilities to those threats [ATIS 2004]. 
This definition, although explanatory, excludes factors mentioned above. It 
does not measure the impact of the threats realised (exposure) or the 
probability of exposure. The process explained analyses the assets more than 
the risk (quantifiable probability of decreased value of an asset or investment) 
to the asset. 
 29
The definitions create confusion. The terms ‘analysis’ and ‘assessment’ are 
thus defined as follows: 
• Risk analysis is the scientific measurement of the threat to an asset, 
the associated probability of the vulnerability being exploited and the 
associated impact of the exposure. 
• Risk assessment is the judgement made when considering the analysis 
result. This judgement is used when prioritising mitigating controls. 
For this study, risk analysis is used as a subset of risk assessment (refer to 
Figure 2.7), as the ultimate goal of the step of measurement in the risk 
management process is to be prepared to control the risk.  
Risk assessment
Risk analysis
Facilitated through information gathered by
 
Figure 2.7: Risk analysis as a subset of risk assessment 
The term ‘exposure’ has been used in defining risk analysis. Exposure as an 
individual factor is defined as follows: 
2.4.3.3 Exposure 
The condition of being subjected to a source of risk [WORD 2004]. 
The potential compromise associated with an attack exploiting a 
corresponding vulnerability [ATIS 2004]. 
These definitions suffice for the purposes of this dissertation as the meaning 
is clear and easily understood. 
2.4.4 Risk Mitigation 
Risk mitigation, the third component of risk management, provides the device 
for reaction to the identified risk. This reaction may be focused on reducing, 
transferring, terminating or accepting the risk. This component poses great 
difficulty in application if the step of risk assessment has not been performed. 
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An organisation may face great difficulty in justifying the expenditure on 
mitigating measures if no motivational documentation is available, 
documentation that the risk assessment would have provided. This could 
potentially offer another stalemate if an organisation has exploited resources 
for risk identification, but cannot justify assigning more resources to mitigation. 
Risk mitigation is, however, the crux of the exercise, as awareness of risks 
alone does not reduce the impact they may have. Risk mitigation is defined as 
follows: 
a. Risk mitigation seeks to reduce the probability and/or impact of a risk to 
below an acceptable threshold [PMBO 2004]. 
This definition demonstrates the purpose of risk mitigation being the reduction 
of the probability of a risk occurring, or impact of the risk if it does occur, to an 
acceptable level. It does not provide any indication of a procedural process, or 
how this mitigation is facilitated. 
b. Risk mitigation is the steps you take to reduce your security risk to an 
acceptable level [ATIS 2004]. 
This definition reflects that risk mitigation is not a single action, but a series of 
steps taken to reduce risk. It does not give an indication of what these steps 
are.  
These definitions do not provide a clear understanding of the scope of risk 
mitigation, when considering the amount of input required in the previous two 
components of risk management. They provide no mention of how mitigation 
is executed, or which courses of action are recommended to the risk 
manager. The definition given below applies more effectively to this study, by 
providing all information required to attempt successful risk mitigation. 
Risk mitigation is the implementation of a strategy that either: 
• Implements controls that reduce the probability and impact of those risks 
identified by assessment as the most probable and with the highest 
impact, or 
• Transfers the risk to a third party, or 
• Terminates the risk by removing the asset from the environment, or 
accepting the risks and associated impacts. 
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A combination of strategies may be implemented for a risk in a very complex 
situation. 
2.4.5 Risk Monitoring 
Risk monitoring, the final component of the ongoing process of risk 
management, is not a result of risk mitigation, but in fact a continuous 
revolving component that monitors the previous componential results for 
change. Risk monitoring is formally defined as follows: 
a. Process of following up the decisions and actions within risk 
management in order to ascertain that risk containment or reduction with 
respect to a particular risk is assured [WORD 2004]. 
This definition clearly states that decisions and actions during the risk 
management process to date are monitored and evaluated to ensure that the 
risks identified are controlled. It does not provide any indication of what 
actions are taken if the containment of risk is not assured. This definition 
provides no contingency. 
b. Risk monitoring is the ongoing risk management task of monitoring the 
success and status of the other risk management tasks [FIRE 2004]. 
This definition, although vague, does plainly state that monitoring is ongoing 
and that it involves monitoring of all other risk management tasks. These 
tasks are noted as identification, assessment and mitigation. It does not 
provide any information as to how this monitoring should occur. 
A clearer formal definition is required to continue the componential definitions 
created thus far. 
Risk monitoring is the regulated and ongoing process of evaluating those risks 
identified, assessed and mitigated for changing characteristics and changing 
the control of those risks accordingly.  
At this stage, it becomes necessary to redefine risk management by 
combining the definitions of the four components as discussed above. 
Risk management, when considering the elements across the various 
components, can be represented as follows (refer to Figure 2.8): 
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 Figure 2.8: Risk management 
Risk management, for the purposes of this study, is a collective of the 
components defined in this chapter and is thus formally defined as follows: 
Risk management is the ongoing componential process of risk identification, 
assessment of the risk identified, mitigation of those risks and monitoring of 
these components for change. 
This definition represents the high-level description of risk management, and 
should be accompanied by the definitions of the components. The definition 
from the literature given earlier in this chapter does not denote this fluid 
structure, or expansion of the components. This definition is thus a much-
improved panorama of the environment in which this dissertation is focused. 
Risk management is still defined too broadly for this dissertation and, as 
mentioned previously, needs further drilldown into the particular extension of 
ISRM. 
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2.5 Specialising in Information Security Risk Management 
A clear understanding of risk management and its components has been 
reached. This study focuses on information security risk management. This 
new terminology requires formal definition as suited to this study. It is broken 
down into individual terms, and then once again collectively defined. 
The individual terms that make up information security risk management are 
defined below. 
2.5.1 Security 
Security, in general terms, can be defined as follows: 
a. Freedom from risk or danger [DICT 2004]. 
This is a very simple and exact definition. It also includes the word ‘risk’, which 
serves the purpose of this study. 
b. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of 
protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts 
or influences [ATIS 2004].  
This definition is very comprehensive in that it takes into consideration not 
only the state of being secure, but those measures that enforce security, as 
well as, very importantly, the maintenance of those measures.  
c. The condition or quality of being secure [WEBS 2004]. 
This definition is more suited as a definition of the result of applying protective 
measures, which logically, is security.  
These definitions all contain properties suited to this study, but none contain 
all the properties collectively. A new definition is created that does represent 
all properties required. 
Security is the condition of negligible vulnerability due to the implementation of 
protective measures. 
2.5.2 Information Security 
Information security, concerning security as listed above, is a subset. Though 
applicable to any environment, it does not ensure general security. 
Information security is formally defined below. 
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a. The protection of information against unauthorised disclosure, transfer, 
modification or destruction whether incidental or intentional [GLOS 
2004]. 
This definition is a holistic description of information security, and includes the 
reference to intentional or unintentional harm. This is important, as securing 
information should include accidental happenstance that may occur. The 
definition does not include descriptions of the harm centres. 
b. Information security is protecting information and information systems 
from unauthorised access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification or 
destruction in order to provide: 
I. Integrity, which means guarding against improper information 
modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information 
non-repudiation and authenticity 
II. Confidentiality, which means preserving authorised restrictions on 
access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal 
privacy and proprietary information 
III. Availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to 
and use of information [NIST 2002] 
This definition is very thorough in expanding on (a). It expands on the threats 
listed in (a), but also includes reference to information and information 
systems, which is vital. It does not, however, refer to intentional or 
unintentional attacks. A collective definition is once again required that reflects 
all the important elements highlighted above. The following definition applies 
for the purposes of this study: 
Information security is protecting information and information systems from 
unauthorised access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification or destruction, 
whether intentional or unintentional, in order to provide: 
I. Integrity, which means guarding against improper information 
modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information 
non-repudiation and authenticity 
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II. Confidentiality, which means preserving authorised restrictions on 
access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal 
privacy and proprietary information 
III. Availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to 
and use of information 
This dissertation focuses on information security risk management. Taking 
into consideration the formal definitions created for risk management, 
information security and all the components of each creates the requirement 
for the definition of the holistic information security risk management. 
2.5.3 The Definition of ISRM 
This definition faces a great challenge. It represents the discipline in which 
this study evaluates the conformance and usability of developed countries’ 
methodologies for IT governance, as a result of corporate governance in 
South African SMMEs. It carries great weight through the remainder of this 
study, and should be carefully considered as the benchmark for evaluating 
hypotheses going forward. ISRM is thus defined as follows: 
Information security risk management is the ongoing componential process of 
identifying information security risks, assessing the information security risks 
identified, mitigating those information security risks and monitoring these 
components for change. 
ISRM thus defined is close to the definition of risk management (refer to 
Figure 2.8), but with the clear distinction of the primary focus on information 
security risks, and not generalised organisational risk. It should, however, be 
considered that these information security risks possibly pose great threats to 
strategic objectives, and should always be held in high regard. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The environment in which this study is conducted has been investigated and 
defined. This environment has been identified as the unique South African 
SMME. 
The South African SMME is defined as having no more than 200 employees, 
generating a turnover up to R64m. The SMME applies across all industries, 
and is defined in the National Small Business Amendment Act of 2003. 
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The hypothesis proven in this chapter is this uniqueness of the South African 
SMME, and this hypothesis was expanded to include a second hypothesis. 
This second hypothesis states that due to the uniqueness of South African 
SMMEs, corporate governance and IT governance principles as applicable to 
international SMMEs are not applicable to South African SMMEs.  
The environment for this study is defined in the second section of the chapter. 
This study, based on the second hypothesis concerning IT governance, 
investigates ISRM as its chief implementer. This discipline has been defined 
as suitable for this study, and is investigated for applicability and usability to 
South African SMMEs in the coming chapters. 
The objective of defining the environment of South African SMMEs and an 
analysis environment of ISRM has thus been achieved. 
The subsequent two goals of defining what makes South African SMMEs 
unique compared to those of the developed and developing countries have 
also been reached, as well as the definition of the components of and relating 
to ISRM. 
Chapter 3 investigates the second hypothesis of corporate governance, its 
accompanying IT governance and its conformance and usability to South 
African SMMEs. 
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C3 
3 Evaluating Industry Corporate 
Governance and IT Governance 
for Usability and Conformance 
 
3.1 Introduction 
South Africa as a developing country has a corporate governance standard 
known as the King II Report [KING 2002]. Corporate governance though, as 
noted in Chapter 1, is not a compulsory practice for SMMEs. This is one of the 
recognised shortcomings in SMMEs that leads to their high failure rate in 
South Africa (refer to Chapter 1). 
Corporate governance at international level allows increased investment in 
organisations that can prove that good corporate governance is practised 
[INET 2004]. This cannot yet be corroborated for South Africa, but it is 
assumed that such a future exists. 
There is much potential in evidence for investment, should corporate 
governance be applied accurately and effectively across industries and size-
markets. This does, however, beg the question whether the good corporate 
governance standard is applicable or usable across those industries and size-
markets. 
The same query arises regarding IT governance. IT governance, as noted in 
Figure 2.4, enables corporate governance. The lack thereof, or impact if 
applied carelessly, can hamper corporate governance. This in turn means that 
corporate governance cannot reach its ideal of enhancing the organisation, 
but in fact becomes a cumbersome exercise with little return on investment. 
With such flags of concern already raised if corporate governance or IT 
governance is applied without due diligence, the same concern is 
compounded if the standards in existence have not been created for 
applicability across size-markets, specifically when considering South African 
SMMEs. 
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The objective of this chapter is thus to determine whether the standards of 
corporate and IT governance in place in South Africa are on a par with 
international standards, and if so, whether they can be applied to South 
African SMMEs, as defined in Chapter 2. 
The first goal of this chapter is to compare the King II Report with an 
international corporate governance standard to determine whether King II is at 
an internationally acceptable level.  
The second goal of this chapter is to present the results of the evaluation of 
the King II Report for suitability to South African SMMEs. 
The third goal of this chapter is to establish the fit of the accepted IT 
governance standard in South Africa to King II.  
The final goal is to present the results of the evaluation of the IT governance 
standards for applicability to South African SMMEs. 
This chapter begins with a comparison of the corporate governance standard 
in South Africa with an international standard. 
3.2 Corporate Governance in South Africa compared to the 
International Standards 
South Africa as a developing country is advanced in the sense of having a 
practised corporate governance standard. This is apparent when evaluating 
the so-called deliverable of corporate governance, namely sustainability 
reporting. 
3.2.1 Corporate Governance in Africa 
Sustainability reporting, stemming from the term ‘sustainable development’, 
reflects the organisation’s commitment to continuous growth and 
development. The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) is 
an international body that evaluates the contribution of these reports by 
organisations worldwide [ACCA 2004]. 
These evaluations have found that South Africa produces over two-thirds of all 
sustainability reports in the Africa and Middle East region (refer to Figure 3.1) 
[ACCA 2004]. This commitment by South African organisations has surged 
since the inception of the King II Report in 2002. The creation of these reports 
is thus directly attributable to King II [ACCA 2004]. 
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South Africa 71%
Rest of Africa 25%
Middle East 4%
 
Figure 3.1: Sustainability reports produced in Africa and the Middle East 
The rest of Africa reflects a poor representation of reporting, only contributing 
25% of the total. In the sample of developing countries used in Chapter 2, 
Botswana, an African country, showed the most economic growth over the 
last three years. The same cannot, however, be said of corporate governance.  
The highest producer of sustainability reports in Africa after South Africa is 
Nigeria at 7% (refer to Figure 3.2). The number of reports contributed by 
Botswana does not feature as representative of Africa’s tally. It can thus be 
deducted that corporate governance in this example of a well-developing 
country is negligible. 
The King II Report has had an obvious influence on sustainability reporting in 
South Africa. It demonstrates the importance of the reports through a section 
devoted solely to integrated sustainability reporting [KING 2002]. 
 
Figure 3.2: Sustainability reports produced throughout Africa 
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More evidence of the influence of King II in Africa is the acceptance of King II 
as the corporate governance standard by NEPAD (New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development) [ACCA 2004]. This decision reflects that NEPAD 
recognises the King II Report as the foremost corporate governance standard 
in Africa. 
The comparison of developing and developed countries continues by also 
evaluating the sustainability reports produced by the sample of developed 
countries. 
3.2.2 Corporate Governance in the Americas, Australasia and 
Europe 
3.2.2.1 The Americas 
The other partner in the developing countries sample, Argentina, paints a 
similar picture to Botswana when considering corporate governance. South 
America, as a whole, represents only 6% of all sustainability reports produced 
in the Americas, with Argentina producing a mere 0.4% of South American 
reports. The only country showing a sizable contribution is Brazil, having 
produced 23 reports (refer to Figure 3.3).  
 
Figure 3.3: Sustainability reports produced in the Americas 
Brazil recognises the need for reporting and has created an Institute of 
Business and Social Responsibility devoted to this cause [ACCA 2004]. No 
other South American country has taken such steps. 
The USA, a developed country sample representative, as reflected in Figure 
3.3, produces 63% of the total for the Americas. This amounts to 446 reports. 
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It is clear that the Americans are committed to creating these reports, and as 
such a well-established corporate governance presence. 
Canada, although not in the sample, also clearly has a strong corporate 
governance commitment. 
3.2.2.2 Australasia 
The largest contributor of sustainability reports in Australasia is Japan at 49%, 
followed by Australia at 38% (refer to Figure 3.4).  
Australia, as representative of the developed countries sample, proves to 
have a substantial reporting drive, producing 339 reports. This number is high 
when compared to the USA, which produces 446. The two populations of 
these countries, as noted in Chapter 2, differ greatly. Australia appears to be 
extremely committed to corporate governance. 
 
Figure 3.4: Sustainability reports produced in Australasia 
3.2.2.3 Europe 
Europe is at the forefront of compliance. It is the largest producer of 
sustainability reports, producing 1 964 reports. 
The UK is the largest producing country with 28% (549 reports), with the 
Scandinavian region following closely behind with 20% (392 reports), despite 
being a sparsely populated region (refer to Figure 3.5). 
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7 8 
Figure 3.5: Sustainability reports produced in Europe 
The conclusion can be made from the figures in Figure 3.5 that corporate 
governance is practised widely in Europe, the only continent that can boast 
such an achievement. 
A further conclusion can be made that developed countries have embraced 
the concept of corporate governance and apply it significantly. This is further 
supported by the heightened investment in organisations that can prove good 
corporate governance.  
The number of reports produced by South Africa, although rising every year, 
is still very low when compared to the developed countries. King II thus needs 
to be examined against the corporate governance of a developed country to 
ensure that it is a standard at a level conducive to international scrutiny. 
3.2.3 King II vs. Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council9 
From the above, the King II Report seems to be the only admirable corporate 
governance standard in the sample of developing countries. King II is thus 
compared to one country’s corporate governance standard selected from the 
sample of developed countries to ensure that it is a standard on a par with 
that of an economically viable country before attempting to apply it to South 
                                                 
7 The East Bloc in Figure 3.5 represents the following countries: Croatia, Slovakia, The Russian 
Federation, Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary. 
8 ‘Other’ in Figure 3.5 represents the following countries: Luxembourg, Ireland, Greece and Portugal. 
9 The Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council is a body created for the formulation of 
Australian corporate governance and its control.  
 43
African SMMEs. As all three countries have proven commendable standards, 
cross-evaluation of each would prove redundant.  
The standard selected for comparison is thus the Australian Stock Exchange 
Corporate Governance Council standard (hereafter referred to as ASX) [ASX 
2003]. No previous comparison of King II and ASX has been found in 
literature. The research findings listed here are unique to this study. 
Each of these standards must be compared by content, compliance and 
usability to examine both the quality of the standard and its applicability. The 
standards should be usable, but not lightweight in content. 
3.2.3.1 Major Sections covered by King II 
The major sections into which the King II Report is divided are listed as 
follows [KING 2002] [CLIF 2004]: 
• Roles and responsibilities of the boards and directors 
• Responsibility and method of risk management 
• Role and scope of internal audit 
• Integrated sustainability reporting 
• Accounting and auditing 
• Compliance and enforcement 
3.2.3.2 Major Sections covered by ASX 
The ASX agrees that the fundamental foundation of corporate governance lies 
in establishing the roles of management and the board [ASX 2003]. The 
essential sections of corporate governance are listed as: 
• Recognise and publish the respective roles and responsibilities of the 
board and management 
• Have a board of effective size and commitment 
• Actively promote ethical and responsible decision-making 
• Safeguard the integrity of the company’s financial reporting 
• Promote timely and balanced disclosure 
• Respect the rights of shareholders 
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• Recognise and manage risk 
• Encourage enhanced performance 
• Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
• Recognise legal and other obligations of all legitimate stakeholders 
The sections of the two standards can be compared using the guide in Table 
3.1. 
Table 3.1: Sections of the corporate governance standards 
King II ASX 
Roles and responsibilities of the boards 
and directors 
Recognise and publish the respective 
roles and responsibilities of the board 
and management 
Have a board of effective size and 
commitment 
Actively promote ethical and responsible 
decision-making 
Respect the rights of shareholders 
Encourage enhanced performance 
Recognise legal and other obligations of 
all legitimate stakeholders 
Responsibility and method of risk 
management 
Recognise and manage risk 
Role and scope of internal audit Safeguard the integrity of the company’s 
financial reporting 
Integrated sustainability reporting Promote timely and balanced disclosure 
Accounting and auditing Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
Compliance and enforcement None 
 
Seven accentuated factors have been extracted from the content of both King 
II and ASX to evaluate the similarities and differences of the two standards. 
The evaluation is represented in Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2: The similarities and differences of King II and ASX 
Factor King II ASX Comment 
Importance  of the board Denoted early in the standard. Denoted early in the standard. The implementers of the standard should be 
identified before providing additional information. 
Information related to the 
board 
All information related to the 
board is in one large section. 
The information is separated 
into various categories. 
All information related to the board should be 
communicated as a collective. 
Risk management Risk management is noted as 
an internal control function. 
Risk management is noted as 
a duty at board level, but no 
further guidance is noted. 
Risk management should be controlled by the board 
and as such afforded the sense of importance it 
warrants. 
Clear description of 
internal audit function 
A section is devoted to the 
roles of an audit committee. 
The creation of an audit 
committee is promoted. 
The requirement of an audit committee is made 
apparent; the role of said committee should also be 
thus. 
Annual reporting A section is devoted to 
describing reporting. 
The strength of the reports 
section is reduced by 
ambiguous guidelines. 
Annual reporting should be a guided, fixed 
requirement. It creates a standard of performance 
measurement and community awareness. 
Clearly defined code of 
conduct 
A code of conduct is a preface 
to the sections of the report. 
A section is devoted to the 
code. 
The two standards evaluated offer fair 
representation of a corporate code of conduct. 
Compliance Clearly defined non-
compliance and enforcement. 
Reporting is voluntary and not 
enforced. 
Quality of reporting is not guaranteed if not 
enforced. 
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The question of compliance with corporate governance regulations could lead 
to a heated debate. The fact that the Australian standard is not enforced but 
yields such large numbers raises the paradox of enforce and receive some 
reports, or not enforce and perhaps receive no reports. 
The Australian achievement is deflated though by the Horwath Corporate 
Governance Report, which examined the quality of the many reports 
submitted [PSAR 2002]. Of the 250 reports analysed, only nine were created 
at the appropriate level of quality. 13 reports were at the lowest level of 
quality, and the majority in the lower tiers of quality. The Horwath Report 
suggested the instigation of non-compliance measures [PSAR 2002]. 
The next evaluation compares the sections of the two standards by 
considering the weight they carry in the standard, the clarity with which they 
are presented and their technical requirements. This evaluation is represented 
in Table 3.3. 
From the criteria listed in Table 3.3, King II compares well against a 
developed country’s corporate governance standard. It is thus concluded that 
King II is a quality standard, and is successfully compared to an international 
level of standard. 
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Table 3.3: Cross-sections of corporate governance 
Cross-section ASX King II 
Solid foundation for 
management 
ASX promotes the publishing of roles and responsibility 
of the board. This is presented in a board charter. 
King II also requires the creation of a charter, adding 
that it should be included in the annual report. 
Structure the board to add 
value 
ASX recommends that the board have a proper 
understanding of current business, and an effective 
review system to manage the competency and 
performance of the board. The board is required to 
host independent board members and an independent 
chair. 
King II contains the same almost to the letter, except 
for including disciplinary measures against board 
members that do not add the required value (as a result 
of annual evaluations), as well as requiring social 
transformation. 
Promote ethical and 
responsible decision-making 
ASX requires the establishment of a code of conduct 
for board members, as well as confidentiality policies 
relating to securities. 
King II has devoted an entire section to the code of 
conduct of a board, which includes a summary of board 
composition, key focus areas and prohibition of 
securities trade. 
Safeguard integrity in financial 
reporting 
ASX requires a formal statement by either the 
chairperson or chief financial officer (CFO) that the 
financial reporting is accurate, and represents a fair 
view of the organisation’s financial standing. An audit 
committee should be established with a majority of 
independent directors and a formal charter. 
King II requires that each board have at a minimum an 
audit and remuneration committee. These committees 
should be chaired by a non-executive, independent 
director. Committee composition, meetings held and a 
brief description of its responsibility have to be included 
in the annual report. 
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Make timely and balanced 
disclosure 
ASX requires establishment of written policies to 
ensure accountability at senior management level for 
compliance. There are no legal ramifications of non-
compliance. 
King II has devoted an entire section to compliancy 
regulations, although adds that the recommendations 
are not too burdensome. “The legal principles imposed 
are subject to criminal remedies.” Disclosure is 
enforced by King II threatening legal action. 
Respect the rights of 
shareholders 
ASX requires the design of a strategy for effective 
communication with shareholders. Attendance of the 
annual general meeting by the external auditor to 
present testimony of the audit is encouraged. 
The board is requested to encourage shareowner 
attendance at general meetings. Repricing of share 
options is subject to prior shareowner approval. Non-
executive directors are encouraged to receive shares 
rather than share options. 
Recognise and manage risk ASX requires a policy on risk management to be 
established by the board or a committee of the board. 
The chief executive officer (CEO) or CFO is 
accountable for the adherence of financial reporting to 
the risk management policy. 
King II has expanded on the mention of risk 
management and controls to include technology risk to 
the financial risks. It requires documented proof that 
risks were identified and managed, to be included in 
the annual report. 
Remunerate fairly and 
responsibly 
ASX requires that the board motivate the link between 
remuneration paid to directors and corporate 
performance. This is done in a disclosure document in 
the annual report. The establishment of a remuneration 
committee is required. 
Membership of the remuneration committee should be 
published in the annual report. Full disclosure of 
director remuneration on an individual basis is required. 
The annual report should contain a “Statement of 
Remuneration Philosophy”. 
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3.3 The Usability of King II in South African SMMEs 
The King II Report was created for public companies to ensure that corporate 
South African business is well governed. The fact that no allowances or 
additions regarding SMMEs were made is concerning, considering the 
contribution of SMMEs to the GDP, and their subsequent importance relating 
to employment, empowerment and development as discussed in Chapter 2. 
The ACCA10 report [ACCA 2004] recognises this shortfall on a global scale by 
stating that: 
“…for small and medium sized enterprises the resource costs of collating data and publishing 
a report remains an inhibiting factor, the development of common standards and efficient 
guidance will help make it more realistic for smaller organisations to produce reports.” 
The cost of applying corporate governance controls and the subsequent 
reporting on the triple bottom-line is a costly exercise [KING 2002], and can be 
even more so for an SMME. 
There are definite factors in the King II Report that, if applied to the SMME, 
could have a dramatic impact on the diligence of management and the 
subsequent sustainability of the SMME. 
The following assumption is taken into consideration: 
It is not feasible to order an SMME with a staff complement of ten 
individuals to remunerate a board of directors, with the majority being 
independent non-executive directors. 
Below follows an analysis of the sections of the report from the perspective of 
an SMME, and how the guidelines may be applied. 
Boards and Directors 
The functions of the board described in King II include the appointment of an 
audit committee, a nomination committee and a remuneration committee. 
These duties can be combined in the SMME by forming a board of decision-
makers. This board should include those members of staff who own shares, 
hold a senior management position, have the required skills and have a 
vested interest in the success of the business, and an independent 
chairperson, or if this is not possible, a non-shareholding executive. 
                                                 
10 The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants is the largest international accounting body. The 
ACCA participates in reporting awards in over 20 countries, and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 
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Senior management officials may be nominated to the board by either opting 
for a board decision, or a staff selection, depending on the size of the SMME 
and the role required by the nominee. 
The chairperson of the board should by rights be independent to ensure 
impartial decisions and proper use of meeting times. If the organisation cannot 
financially support such an individual, an executive member of staff should be 
elected. 
Duties of the board: 
• Financial control of the organisation 
• Sustainability investigations 
• Risk management 
• Transparency and communication 
Accounting and Auditing 
The member of the board managing auditing and accounting is held 
responsible for the internal control of the organisation, including systems, and 
is to report to the board on the financial state of the organisation. 
Sustainability Reporting 
Accepting the benefit of sustainability investigations as an SMME, even at a 
simplified level, prepares the organisation for possible future growth where 
such an exercise becomes compulsory. 
The purpose of sustainability reporting is to create awareness of the 
community surrounding an enterprise, including opportunities, threats, the 
environment and the ethics of the community that empowers the organisation 
to improved decision-making regarding future strategies. 
Risk Management 
SMMEs are by nature entrepreneurial enterprises that face risks on a daily 
basis. 
An exercise in determining the risk tolerance or profile of an SMME should be 
considered in the sense of sustainability. The SMME should evaluate those 
risks that threaten its survival, and mitigate or terminate the risk. 
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A major consideration for risk management is evaluating those risks that face 
the everyday survival of systems on which the organisation depends.  
King II proposes the use of recognised models for risk management. Whether 
these models exist for SMMEs is yet to be identified. The areas listed for risk 
management are: 
? Physical and operational risk  
? Human resource risk 
? Technology risk  
? Business continuity and disaster recovery  
? Credit and market risk  
? Compliance risk 
Technology and business continuity risk controls are not volunteered by King 
II. IT governance fulfils these requirements, and as such becomes an enabler 
of corporate governance. 
Transparency and Communication 
The concept of transparency is that of transferring knowledge to parties that 
have a vested interest in that knowledge, may benefit from the knowledge and 
may add value to the organisation once owning that knowledge. Staff 
members of an organisation are stakeholders in the enterprise. This is vital to 
an SMME, as a strike by staff may cripple the enterprise, or in some cases 
ruin it. It is, though, not entirely likely, due to the fear of unemployment. 
Staff buy-in is recognising improved productivity and efficiency. 
The responsibility of reporting the success of transparency should reside with 
the chairperson. The same applies for the implementation of transparency. 
IT governance, as noted, enables corporate governance. The usability of an 
accepted IT governance standard as a component of corporate governance is 
determined next. 
3.4 IT Governance in South Africa 
IT governance in South Africa is corporately practised through the only 
internationally accepted standard CobiT (Control Objectives for IT). The third 
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version of CobiT was released in 2000 and is endorsed by the International IT 
Governance Institute, the ITGI [ITGI 2005]. 
The CobiT standard consists of five manuals: 
• The CobiT Framework. The Framework presents an overview of the 
CobiT methodology, including definitions of the terminology used 
throughout the manuals [COBI01 2000]. 
• The CobiT Control Objectives. The CobiT Framework consists of 34 
control objectives. Each control objective is thoroughly discussed in this 
manual [COBI02 2000]. 
• The CobiT Implementation Tool Set. This manual provides guidelines 
on the implementation of the control objectives, considering the 
resources required and outcomes expected [COBI03 2000]. 
• CobiT Management Guidelines. The management guidelines form a 
dashboard with which management can monitor progress made in the 
Framework, as well as the impact on the enterprise. This includes a 
maturity model used to examine the advancement of the enterprise 
[COBI04 2000]. 
• CobiT Audit Guidelines. These guidelines are offered to audit the 
effectiveness of the control objectives applied. They are also used to 
assess compliance with CobiT [COBI05 2000]. 
CobiT can be related to the King II definition of risk management [KING 2002], 
defined as the:  
“identification and evaluation of actual and potential risk areas…followed by a process of 
either termination, transfer, acceptance or mitigation of each risk.” 
The risk management process is defined as [KING 2002]: 
“planning, arranging and controlling of activities and resources to minimise the impacts of all 
risks to levels that can be tolerated...” 
CobiT is structured around four domains that follow a cycle for IT governance. 
These domains form steps in the IT governance process. Below is a 
comparison of the steps in the CobiT process and the process of risk 
management defined in King II. 
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Table 3.4: King II risk management process compared to the CobiT process 
King II CobiT 
Planning Planning and organisation 
 
The control objectives listed in the planning and organisation step in the CobiT 
process allow the organisation to define its IT strategies, assess risks, 
manage compliance and communicate back to the organisation.  
Acquisition and implementation Arranging 
Delivery and support 
Acquisition and implementation allow the organisation to act upon the 
planning done in the previous step of the process, arranging solutions, so to 
speak. 
Delivery of the solutions and support for them create the opportunity for the 
organisation to ensure continuous management of the resources involved in 
IT governance and mitigation of risks. 
Controlling Monitoring 
Monitoring of controls implemented allows the organisation to be aware of its 
IT governance in practice and the progress made in managing any problems 
identified. This offers control of the risks and their mitigation. 
 
The CobiT steps fit with the requirements of King II, even more 
comprehensively so. There is considerable detail in the CobiT manuals and as 
such, the ITGI does not expect all 34 control objectives of the steps to be 
implemented, but does require that each of the steps be implemented. Using 
the steps of CobiT allows an organisation to create an IT strategy for a cycle 
of determined duration. CobiT also allows the implementation of risk 
management in the same cycle. 
Refer to Appendix 2 for a summary of CobiT, spanning the steps (domains) 
and the control objectives. 
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3.5 Usability of CobiT in South African SMMEs 
There is no question whether CobiT should be applied in any organisation. 
There are benefits for each conceivable IT-empowered organisation to apply 
some, if not all, of the control objectives. It is, however, recognised that 
application of the control objectives as they stand is an expensive, time-
intensive exercise requiring commitment from various parties [COBI01 2000]. 
An SMME, as has been established, is not an organisation with much time or 
resources to spare. Application of some of the control objectives may, 
however, open up time pockets to allow other activities to occur. Once again, 
application of IT governance with commitment prepares the SMME for 
entrance into the corporate arena. 
Selection of the applicable or most effective control objectives is no simple 
task. An erroneous selection may cause the allocation of resources to a low-
return effort. The benefit of any control objective is not questioned, but rather 
the selection of the highest level of benefit versus resource allocation. 
Appendix 3 details the selection criteria that have been identified as guidelines 
to the selection process. The guidelines are used in the following example to 
demonstrate the selection process. 
An Example of CobiT Control Objective Selection for an SMME 
A stereotypical SMME is used in the example to demonstrate the application 
of the selection guidelines. The selection process makes use of four maturity 
model based criteria, each attributing a maximum score of 5 points. The 
selection process is as follows: 
1. Identify the organisation’s IT resource management maturity 
By identifying the organisation’s maturity, an understanding can be 
reached of the scope of control objectives required. The IT resource 
management maturity is rated as Repeatable due to the organisation’s 
interest in applying control measures. A score of 2 is attributed. 
2. Identify the level of authority by organisation owners or managers 
The level of authority of business owners or managers would determine 
the amount of staff buy-in that may be obtained. The maturity is rated as 
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Initial as the organisation has not established formal management 
structures. A score of 1 is attributed. 
3. Level of technological sophistication in the organisation 
The level of technology used in the organisation affects the control 
required of the systems in place. The maturity is rated as Defined due to 
the conformance of machines and systems available to the existing IT 
need. A score of 3 is attributed. 
4. Technology/information risk profile 
The awareness of a risk profile may increase the consideration of 
decisions made and steps taken concerning the risk area. The maturity 
is rated as Defined due to the recognition of risks and the understanding 
that mitigation is required. A score of 3 is attributed. 
The model used above is now used to calculate the control objective 
application range used to identify those control objectives most suited to the 
organisation. The range is reached by adding the model values selected in the 
four criteria above. The determining score is presented in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: The score determining the application of control objectives 
Criteria Score 
IT resource management maturity 2 
Level of management authority 1 
Technological sophistication 3 
Risk profile 3 
Final score 9 
 
The example organisation has been rated into the third level of maturity out of 
4 (score of 9 – 12). The growth of the organisation from one maturity level to 
another should follow the “define process, implement sophistication, monitor 
process” route as explained in Appendix 3. 
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The organisation is assumed to have made progress in its IT governance and 
needs a formalisation of the outcomes of its efforts. The table defining all four 
ranges is available in Appendix 3. 
The control objectives suggested for application are listed in tabular form. The 
extent to which the SMME chooses to apply the control objectives should be 
at the discretion of the board. 
The control objectives identified as applicable were selected considering the 
following assumption: 
• Any control objective attempted should be done in a workshop 
environment allowing staff participation. As control objectives do 
require resources, buy-in becomes paramount. 
• The maturity levels of “define process, implement sophistication, 
monitor process” can be expanded as follows: 
o Define process selects the initial control objectives required for 
formalising the organisation’s intended use of IT, assessing the 
risks the organisation faces, managing those resources 
required, developing service levels, formalising change and 
incident response structures and monitoring these initial steps 
during the process. 
o Implement sophistication creates room for the organisation to 
improve the policies and procedures already in place. This 
includes the acquisition of improved systems, higher levels of 
service delivery, more control over IT resources and improved 
monitoring of IT. This step involves the largest requirement of 
resources, as it lifts the organisation from acceptable control to 
sophisticated control. 
o Monitor process is the maintenance of the sophistication 
reached in the previous level. An organisation rated at this level 
already may require some backtracking if some of the 
sophistication markers are not in place. This level is the least 
resource intensive, but may require increased resources if the 
required input for maintenance is not upheld. 
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Table 3.6: Recommended use of CobiT by the example SMME 
Control Objective Range 
Planning and organisation 9 – 12 
Define a strategic IT plan ● 
Define the information architecture ● 
Determine technological direction ● 
Define the IT organisation and relationships ● 
Manage the IT investment ● 
Communicate management aims and direction ● 
Manage human resources ● 
Ensure compliance with external requirements ● 
Assess risks ● 
Manage projects ● 
Manage quality ● 
Acquisition and implementation  
Identify automated solutions ● 
Acquire and maintain application software ● 
Acquire and maintain technology infrastructure ● 
Develop and maintain procedures  
Install and accredit systems ● 
Manage changes ● 
Delivery and support  
Define and manage service levels ● 
Manage third-party services ● 
Manage performance capacity ● 
Ensure continuous service ● 
Ensure system security ● 
Identify and allocate costs ● 
Educate and train users ● 
Assist and advise customers ● 
Manage the configuration  
Manage problems and incidents ● 
Manage data ● 
Manage facilities ● 
Manage operations ● 
Monitoring  
Monitor the processes ● 
Assess internal control adequacy ● 
Obtain independent assurance ● 
Provide for independent audit ● 
The application of the control objectives marked above is debatable by the 
organisation. This list is a guide only, with due consideration of assumed 
maturity. 
 58
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has delved deeply in the structured governance practices in 
business and IT. It has been found in this chapter that the King II Report is 
satisfactorily inclusive of the major governance practices supported by 
developed countries. The goal of the chapter has thus been achieved. 
The chapter also uncovered grounds for the encouragement of compliance 
enforcement in sustainability reporting as a deliverable of corporate 
governance. 
The second goal has been achieved as the King II Report has been evaluated 
for usability by an SMME, and tangible uses have been discovered, achieving 
the goal, even though simplicity is motivated. 
The internationally accepted standard for IT governance, CobiT, has been 
evaluated in its entirety for usability by a South African SMME, fit into the King 
II standard and recommended prioritised use of the 34 control objectives. Fit 
has been achieved, as well as a model proposing use of CobiT by an SMME. 
This is the achievement of the third and final goal. 
It has been found in this chapter in total that South African corporate 
governance and IT governance standards can be applied to SMMEs, even if 
in a simplified format. It has also been found that although King II prescribes 
technology and business continuity risk management, it does not volunteer 
how the organisation should approach such a monolith. CobiT does represent 
the means to control the technology and business continuity risk, specifically 
relating to ownership of responsibility, and the inclusion of risk management in 
the organisation’s IT strategy (refer to Appendix 2).  
The operational evaluation of risk and its subsequent management is not yet 
clear. CobiT, although creating control opportunities, does not provide risk 
analysis/evaluation and management methodologies, nor does it endorse the 
use of any recognised methodologies. This is a significant gap in the 
information security management of the organisation, as the resolution of 
possibly crippling risks is not guided, nor emphasised enough. 
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The use of risk management, or specifically information security risk 
management methodologies for this IT governance, and subsequently 
corporate governance, is evaluated in Chapter 4. 
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C4 4 Information Security Risk Management for Small Businesses
 
4.1 Introduction 
ISRM has been mentioned several times thus far in this dissertation. It was 
defined in Chapter 2, and referred to in the context of IT governance in 
Chapter 3. The actual methodologies in practice, however, have not yet been 
vetted. 
This chapter’s primary objective is the examination of ISRM methodologies, 
specifically those for use by small businesses.11 
The examination of the said methodologies is split into two goals. The first 
goal is to present the results of the evaluation of the methodology against a 
predetermined set of criteria based on discoveries in the previous chapters. 
The second goal is the categorisation of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the methodology based on the performance against the criteria. 
The secondary objective of the chapter is to determine whether the 
advantages of the evaluated methodologies motivate their use by South 
African SMMEs to manage information security risk. 
The methodologies that are evaluated for this dissertation have been selected 
due to their free availability to the public, and thus an SMME, and their 
endorsement by internationally recognised institutions or associations. The 
search for freely available methodologies did not provide further, 
internationally endorsed candidate methodologies. The methodologies are: 
• OCTAVE-S, developed by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) 
residing in the US. 
• CRAMM V Express, developed by Insight Consulting, the foremost 
implementer of CRAMM, a British developed methodology. 
                                                 
11 The term ‘small business’ represents SMMEs in this chapter as used by the methodologies examined. 
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The evaluation is based upon a set of criteria defined hereafter. 
4.2 Framework for the Evaluation of ISRM Methodologies 
The research findings presented thus far have ranged from defining a South 
African SMME as a unique small business compared to developed and other 
developing countries’ small businesses, to the use of corporate and IT 
governance by SMMEs. 
Elements of these findings have created a panorama of characteristics of an 
SMME. It has been discovered that SMMEs in South Africa fail due to the lack 
of business knowledge and governance. It has also been found that SMMEs 
lack due diligence owing to the constraints of time, human resources and cost, 
as related to the attainment of tools for diligence. 
The use of corporate and IT governance as suggested in this dissertation also 
creates a benchmark of procedural order to be followed. 
These characteristics and benchmark create a framework of requirements for 
the evaluation of an undertaking by an SMME. Such an undertaking may be 
any project approached by the SMME for development, improvement and 
auditing. In this case, this framework is used to evaluate the fit of recognised 
ISRM methodologies to a South African SMME. The framework is explained 
below. 
4.2.1 The Framework Explained 
The framework that has been created for the evaluation of SMME 
undertakings has four main elements. These elements are subdivided into 
factors. 
The framework is three-dimensional, and includes a weighted system for 
quantifiable measurement of the undertaking. 
W
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Figure 4.1: The three-dimensional framework 
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4.2.2 Elements of the Framework 
The elements as derived from the research findings above are: 
1. Visibility 
2. Cost 
3. Regulatory fit 
4. Fit to South African SMMEs 
Each element is discussed in detail below. 
4.2.2.1 Visibility 
Visibility pertains to the ease with which the ISRM approach may be obtained, 
specifically by an SMME. This includes whether the full methodology is 
obtainable with ease, or whether promotional material only is available. The 
objective of visibility is to measure whether the interested party within the 
SMME can reasonably gain an understanding of the methodology and thus 
make an informed decision of whether to proceed with the ISRM 
methodology. 
4.2.2.2 Cost 
The cost of implementing the undertaking is an estimated measure, as the 
true cost of any exercise can only be determined after the fact. Cost is, 
however, a relative term, as there are many facets to an undertaking that may 
be added as a cost, even though no direct spending was involved. Cost is 
therefore split into these factors: 
• Purchase cost is the requirements of cash spent on the undertaking, 
whether it is an upfront cost, or expenditure throughout the undertaking 
for obtaining the methodology. 
• Organisational involvement is attributable to the human resources 
involved in the undertaking, through various channels. These channels, 
known as subfactors, are: 
o Knowledge requirement. All training required by the 
organisation, or elected individuals. 
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o Senior management buy-in. The involvement of senior 
management in an undertaking is an expensive factor, as senior 
management time is at a higher value than that of an operational 
employee. 
o Self-directed or consulted. The nature of the undertaking also 
affects the cost of the implementation. A self-directed approach 
may be higher in organisational involvement cost, but lower in 
purchase cost. The inverse applies to a consulted approach. 
The purchase cost may be higher, but organisational 
involvement is less. The duration of the undertaking, as 
prescribed by the nature of the undertaking, must also be 
considered. 
o The duration of a consulted approach may be shorter, as the 
schedule is managed by a third party. The duration of a self-
directed approach is self-led, and thus may be prone to 
operational delays. 
4.2.2.3 Regulatory Fit 
The regulatory models that have been evaluated thus far have been the King 
II corporate governance standard and CobiT. Table 3.4 refers to the fit 
between these two standards, and the requirements of risk management in 
King II. The evaluated methodology is required to conform to the steps of 
Table 3.4. 
The steps require the undertaking to have a planning, execution and 
management course, ensuring that a cyclical reviewing process is followed. 
4.2.2.4 Fit to South African SMMEs 
South African SMMEs have been determined as unique when compared to 
five other nations’ definitions, and this should be considered before 
implementing an undertaking created for the SMME of a different nation. 
The fit to South African SMMEs is evaluated contrariwise against the following 
factors: 
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• Horizontal or vertical industry. The undertaking should not promote or 
be aligned with a horizontal or vertical industry. There should be no 
restriction on the industry of the SMME. 
• The size of organisation. The South African SMME has been defined 
as ranging from 1 staff member to 200. The undertaking should not be 
focused on a number excluding parameters of this range.  
• The type of organisation. Any structure of small businesses should be 
allowed, especially when considering the existing lack of business 
skills. There should be no restriction on structure. 
To summarise, the only restriction that is endorsed is the maximum allowance 
of 200 employees. 
The framework is summarised in Figure 4.2. The undertaking is evaluated 
against the four elements. 
Visibility
Cost
Organisational 
involvement
SMME fit
Regulatory fit
Free vs Promotional
Purchase cost
Horizontal/Vertical
Size
Organisational type
Knowledge 
requirement
Senior mgt buy-in
Self-directed/
consulted
Fit to the process
 
Figure 4.2: The framework, its elements and factors 
The framework has thus far been explained in two dimensions. The third 
dimension, the weighting, is assigned as follows: 
4.2.2.5 The Weighted Dimension 
Weights have been assigned to each element, factor and subfactor. The 
weights have been assigned based on estimated importance of the element. 
The most important element, cost, has been assigned the highest weight due 
to the cost focus of SMMEs. A high purchase cost alone could dissuade the 
SMME owner or decision-maker from implementing an undertaking, and thus 
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it carries the most weight. However, cost is not the only consideration. Lack of 
SMME or regulatory fit may result in a very low return on investment, even 
though the cost is low. This is thus the motivation for a weighted framework. 
Visibility also carries a fairly high weight, even though it does not directly 
impact the implementation of the undertaking. It does, however, impact the 
undertaking itself. The remaining weights become of no consequence if the 
decision-maker cannot obtain an initial understanding of the undertaking. 
Avoidance of visibility would create a blind implementation of the undertaking, 
as the decision-maker is attempting to improve the organisation, but has no 
assurances that the implementation is the right one. 
The remaining weights are also go/no-go weights. If the undertaking scores 
low on SMME and regulatory fit, the organisation can be assured that, for its 
enterprise, it is not the optimum solution. A score of 0 in both requires 
immediate dismissal. 
The total of the weights provides a score out of 100. This is then easily 
compared to other evaluations for decision-making. Should two options score 
equally, the elements themselves should be compared, using the go/no-go 
decision blocks. The organisation should review the weights for adequacy in 
the environment before implementation. 
Table 4.1 below outlines the elements, factors and subfactors with their 
assigned weights. A description of the assigning of weights for each factor is 
provided, creating guidance for quantification. All decision points are also 
highlighted, providing the evaluator with the option to dismiss an undertaking. 
The final decision is based on a score higher than a reasonably conservative 
30. 
Table 4.1: The weights of the framework 
Elements, Factors and Subfactors  Assigned 
Weight 
Visibility  20 
The undertaking’s methodology is freely available and user-friendly 20  
Promotional information is freely available with details for further 
information 
10  
No information is freely available 0  
GO/NO-GO DECISION – HIGH RISK OF FUTILE IMPLEMENTATION 
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Cost  40 
Purchase cost  20 
The undertaking’s methodology is free 15  
The undertaking’s methodology is free but has a tool that reduces 
organisational involvement  available at a cost 
5  
The undertaking’s methodology has a cost attributed 0  
The undertaking’s methodology has a cost attributed that includes a 
tool that reduces organisational involvement 
5  
Organisational involvement  20 
Knowledge requirement  5 
The organisation is expected to already have all knowledge required 
for the undertaking 
0  
There is training available for the organisation at a cost 5  
No previous knowledge is required 5  
Senior management buy-in  5 
The undertaking’s methodology promotes senior management buy-
in or sponsorship 
5  
The undertaking’s methodology requires senior management 
execution 
0  
The undertaking’s methodology does not promote or require senior 
management buy-in 
0  
Self-directed or consulted  10 
The undertaking is self-directed 5  
The undertaking is self-directed with consulting available 10  
The undertaking is consulting based with no operational involvement 
from the organisation 
5  
GO/NO-GO DECISION: IS THE COST TOO HIGH? 
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Regulatory Fit  20 
The undertaking’s methodology conforms to the steps in Table 
3.4 
10  
The undertaking’s methodology does not conform to the steps in 
the process in Table 3.4, but does include at least planning and 
arranging 
5  
The undertaking’s methodology does not conform to the steps in 
the process in Table 3.4 at all 
0  
The undertaking’s methodology is cyclical and promotes 
reviewing 
10  
The undertaking’s methodology is not cyclical and does not 
promote reviewing  
0  
GO/NO-GO DECISION: HIGH RISK OF ANTI-REGULATORY SOLUTION 
Elements, Factors and Subfactors  Assigned 
Weight 
SMME Fit  20 
Horizontal/vertical  5 
The undertaking’s methodology is restricted to a horizontal or 
vertical industry 
0  
The undertaking’s methodology is not restricted to any industry 5  
Size  10 
The undertaking’s methodology restricts the size of the 
organisation to a range within the parameters of South African 
SMMEs 
0  
The undertaking’s methodology is restricted to the parameters of 
South African SMMEs 
10  
Organisational type  5 
The undertaking’s methodology is restricted to a specific type of 
organisation, e.g. hierarchical structure 
0  
The undertaking’s methodology is not restricted to a specific type 
of organisation 
5  
GO/NO-GO DECISION: HIGH RISK OF INAPPROPRIATE SOLUTION 
TOTAL  100 
GO/NO-GO DECISION: IS THE SCORE HIGHER THAN 30? 
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The framework has been established in all three dimensions. The following 
section uses the framework to evaluate the OCTAVE-S information security 
risk management methodology as an undertaking methodology. The section 
begins with a discussion of OCTAVE-S, followed by the evaluation outcomes. 
4.3 OCTAVE-S Evaluated 
OCTAVE-S is based on the OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and 
Vulnerability Evaluation) approach designed specifically for the unique 
constraints experienced by small organisations [OCTA01 2003]. OCTAVE-S 
was developed by the Technology Insertion, Demonstration and Evaluation 
program of the Software Engineering Institute (SEI). 
The OCTAVE approach was launched in 1999 by Christopher Alberts and 
Audrey Dorofee and was created for use by large organisations [ALBE 2003]. 
The SEI developed the OCTAVE-S approach in 2003. 
The framework of OCTAVE was retained, with simplified implementation of 
the detail. Below is a brief summary of the OCTAVE-S approach. OCTAVE-S 
v0.9 is summarised and subsequently evaluated. 
4.3.1 OCTAVE-S Summarised 
OCTAVE-S is a self-directed information security risk evaluation. It requires a 
three- to five-member interdisciplinary team to lead the undertaking, and also 
requires that these staff members have broad insight into the organisation’s 
business and security processes [OCTA02 2003]. The ultimate outcome of the 
undertaking is an organisation-wide protection strategy and risk mitigation 
plans. 
The OCTAVE-S approach is divided into three phases [OCTA01 2003]. These 
phases are: 
1. Build asset-based threat profiles 
2. Identify infrastructure vulnerabilities 
3. Develop security strategy and plans 
4.3.1.1 Build Asset-based Threat Profiles 
The team uses this phase to create a set of criteria against which risks are 
later evaluated. All organisational assets are identified and the existing 
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security practice is defined. No external consulting is offered in this phase and 
all operational tasks are completed by the team itself [OCTA03 2003]. 
A selection process is used to select three to five critical assets, on which the 
remainder of the evaluation is conducted. 
Finally, security requirements are defined and threat profiles created for each 
critical asset. The threat profile is based on three levels: the asset, followed by 
all connected aspects that may expose a threat and the outcomes if the threat 
is realised. The outcomes are closely related to the characteristics of 
information security, as defined in Chapter 2. These are disclosure, 
modification, destruction and interruption of the function of the asset. 
The phase is divided into the following processes and activities: 
S1. Identify organisational information 
S1.1 Establish impact evaluation criteria 
S1.2 Identify organisational assets 
S1.3 Evaluate organisational security practices 
S2. Create threat profiles 
S2.1 Select critical assets 
S2.2 Identify security requirements for critical assets 
S2.3 Identify threats to critical assets 
S2.4 Analyse technology related processes 
4.3.1.2 Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities 
The team analyses the computing infrastructure in this phase, focusing on the 
access means to the critical assets, albeit systems and data. The team also 
analyses which parties are responsible for the maintenance of these assets; in 
many cases with small businesses, this is an outsourced party [OCTA03 
2003]. 
The phase is divided into the following processes and activities: 
S3. Examine computing infrastructure in relation to critical assets 
S3.1 Examine access paths 
S3.2 Analyse technology related processes 
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4.3.1.3 Develop Security Strategy and Plans 
This phase requires the team to identify risks to the critical assets and what 
may be done to mitigate these risks. Risks are measured on a qualitative 
scale of high, medium or low. All this information is collated into a protection 
strategy for the organisation’s critical assets and mitigation plans to reduce 
the risks. The worksheets provided are a structured benchmark for creating 
these plans [OCTA03 2003]. No expectation of when these plans are 
executed is provided. 
The phase is divided into the following processes and activities: 
S4. Identify and analyse risks 
S4.1 Evaluate impact of threats 
S4.2 Establish probability evaluation criteria 
S4.3 Evaluate probabilities of threats 
S5. Develop protection strategy and mitigation plans 
S5.1 Describe current protection strategy 
S5.2 Select mitigation approaches 
S5.3 Identify changes to protection strategy 
S5.4 Identify next steps 
4.3.2 Scope of Application 
OCTAVE-S is aimed at organisations ranging from 20 to 80 staff members. 
The organisational structure is flat, with people from different departments 
being accustomed to interdepartmental projects [OCTA01 2003]. 
An organisation such as this is expected to be able to assign three to five 
people that have broad knowledge of the organisation and its security 
practices. 
OCTAVE-S is not recommended for an organisation that cannot create a team 
of knowledgeable staff members, for example an organisation that consists of 
independent business units, or dispersed groups of staff that do not interact 
much. 
The team members are expected to have problem-solving abilities, analytical 
skills, a teamwork ethic and time, described as a few days. It is not indicated 
whether the few days are full days, or the total of various short sessions. 
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4.3.3 Preparation Guidelines 
OCTAVE-S provides a module containing all preparation activities that are 
suggested before kicking off the undertaking [OCTA02 2003]. 
• The first notable preparation is senior management sponsorship. 
OCTAVE-S makes it very clear that senior management sponsorship is 
vital, but cannot clearly define how to obtain it, which is reasonable. 
Senior management sponsorship is required to encourage staff 
participation, allocation of resources and support of implementation of 
the outcomes. 
• The next preparation activity is selection and training of the team. As 
has been mentioned, the team should be made up of individuals with 
the skills listed above, containing at least one leader in the group, and 
a staff member with close links to IT, either through working closely 
with IT, or the third-party provider. 
The use of managers on the team is encouraged, but they should not 
make up the majority of the team as this may restrict open 
communication. 
• Training of the team is addressed by promoting the training of at least 
one team member on OCTAVE-S. The number of team members to be 
trained is guided by financial resources available. Training may be 
received either by formal education, or self-study of the implementation 
guide. This creates a circular reference, as the creation of the team 
would already have required some study of the implementation guide. 
• Setting the scope of the evaluation allows the team to identify which 
areas of the organisation are evaluated. A subset of the organisation’s 
business units may be selected, as opposed to the whole. In some 
cases a single business unit may be selected to provide stimuli for 
authorisation for a full analysis by senior management. OCTAVE-S 
recommends at least four business units, one of which must be the IT 
department or IT management department. This restriction is 
questionable, as many small businesses may consist of only one or two 
business units. 
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• The schedule for the undertaking is created next. Worksheets are 
provided to offer guidelines of workshop duration, depending on the 
experience of the team. The duration of the undertaking is 
demonstrated in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Duration of OCTAVE-S 
Phase From To 
Preparation 4 days 8 days, 4 hours 
Build asset-based threat profiles 1 day 2 days, 6 hours 
Identify infrastructure vulnerabilities 3 hours 1 day 
Develop security strategy and plan 1 day 5 days, 1 hour 
Total 6 days, 3 hours 17 days, 3 hours 
 
The worksheets provide a checklist at each process to ensure that all steps 
have been completed. Guidance is also provided on managing logistics for all 
workshops. 
4.3.4 Implementation Guidelines 
OCTAVE-S provides a set of guidelines for each process in each phase with 
step-by-step instructions of what information is to be gathered and which 
worksheet is to be completed, as well as definitions of any terminology used 
[OCTA03 2003]. 
The guidelines are structured in the order of the phases and their processes. 
The remaining modules of the implementation guide provide the worksheets 
for the phases. The evaluation of OCTAVE-S is discussed next. 
4.3.5 OCTAVE-S Evaluation Outcomes 
The evaluation of OCTAVE-S based on the implementation guide is presented 
in tabular format in Table 4.3, allowing presentation of scores attributed to the 
elements and factors provided in the framework, as well as the motivation for 
the scores. 
OCTAVE-S has achieved an average score in total, but ranks very low in the 
regulatory and SMME fit elements. It is a high-risk methodology for an 
undertaking for ISRM. 
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Table 4.3: OCTAVE-S framework evaluation 
Elements, Factors and Subfactors  Score 
Achieved
Visibility  20 
OCTAVE-S is freely available online and is easy to understand  20 
SCORE  20 
Cost  40 
Purchase cost   
OCTAVE-S is available at no cost  15 
Vulnerability tools may be obtained at a cost but are not required  5 
Organisational involvement   
Knowledge requirement   
There is training available for the organisation at a cost  5 
Senior management buy-in   
OCTAVE-S requires senior management buy-in or sponsorship  5 
Self-directed or consulted   
OCTAVE-S is self-directed  5 
SCORE   35 
Regulatory Fit  20 
OCTAVE-S does not conform to the steps in Table 3.4, but does 
include at least planning and arranging 
 5 
OCTAVE-S is not cyclical and does not promote reviewing    
SCORE  5 
GO/NO-GO DECISION: HIGH RISK OF ANTI-REGULATORY SOLUTION 
SMME Fit  20 
Horizontal/vertical   
OCTAVE-S is not restricted to any industry  5 
Size   
OCTAVE-S restricts the size of the organisation to 20 to 80 staff 
members 
  
Organisational type   
The organisation is expected to have more than 4 business units   
SCORE   5 
GO/NO-GO DECISION: HIGH RISK OF INAPPROPRIATE SOLUTION 
TOTAL  65 
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The following section presents a similar summary of the CRAMM V Express 
system, with subsequent evaluation outcomes. 
4.4 CRAMM V EXPRESS Evaluated 
CRAMM V Express, similar to OCTAVE-S, is based on the large organisation 
version CRAMM V Expert. The software was developed by Insight Consulting 
based on the CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) 
methodology, created by the United Kingdom Central Computer and 
Telecommunication Agency (CCTA) in 1987 [SPIN 1999] [CRAM 2005]. 
CRAMM V Express is a tool for rapid yet effective risk assessments that 
require limited time and human resources [INSI 2005]. 
4.4.1 The CRAMM V Express Tool 
The tool available from Insight Consulting follows a very simple process for 
identifying the assets, assessing the risks facing an organisation’s assets and 
proposing mitigating controls, or as CRAMM describes them, 
countermeasures to reduce the risk. 
The tool presents user-friendly screens that allow input from a single user, 
with reporting available for review. The process followed by the tool is 
presented in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3: The CRAMM V Express Process 
4.4.2 Scope of Application 
The tool may be used for any system; there is no distinction of which systems 
should be assessed. There is also no promotion of an organisation-wide 
assessment or assessment of departments or business units only. 
No guidance is offered on who is responsible for managing the assessment, 
for example who is required to enter the information, and who is responsible 
for ensuring that the mitigating controls are applied. 
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The tool does not offer any training on identifying threats or vulnerabilities, or 
assessing the level of vulnerability once the risk has been identified. The tool 
assumes that the user is knowledgeable of this specialist information, but still 
requires a tool to present the countermeasures. 
4.4.3 Preparation 
The tool itself does not require any preparation, but does assume the user is 
aware of all systems that should be entered into the tool. The onus lies on the 
user to nominate which systems are to be assessed and gain the assessment 
skill beforehand as well. 
4.4.4 Implementation 
Implementation of CRAMM V Express does not take place per se, as the use 
of the tool takes very little time, but no guidance is offered on when or how the 
proposed mitigating controls are to be implemented. The onus again lies on 
the user to make those decisions. The use of the tool is also dependent on the 
single user, as it does not push the user to use it; instead it remains on a 
shelf. 
4.4.5 Cost 
The CRAMM V Express tool is available at a cost of £1 500,00 excluding tax, 
with an additional annual licensing fee of £250,00. In rands, this translates to 
a purchase cost of R17 205,0012 excluding tax, and R2 867,50 per year for 
licensing.  
This is not an extremely large sum of money, but may be contested if the tool 
is not used to its full potential. The risk of investing the purchase cost with no 
return on the investment is high [KARA 2005].  It is, however, fast to use and 
does not have a high cost in organisational involvement. 
CRAMM V Express has scored below average and has failed in the cost 
element. This is surprising as very little organisational involvement is required, 
although a purchase cost is attributed. The downfall is the lack of the 
requirement of senior management involvement. This has been stipulated by 
King II  as well as CobiT as vital, which also supports the low regulatory score. 
                                                 
12 Calculated at the rate of R11,47 per pound as at October 2005. 
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The high score in SMME fit is inconclusive, as CRAMM V Express is not 
specifically tailor-made for small businesses, but neither does it exclude them. 
4.4.6 CRAMM V Express Evaluation Outcomes 
Table 4.4: CRAMM V Express framework evaluation 
Elements, Factors and Subfactors  Score 
Achieved
Visibility  20 
Promotional information is freely available with details for further 
information 
 10 
SCORE  10 
Cost  40 
Purchase cost   
CRAMM V Express has a cost attributed to a tool  5 
Organisational involvement   
Knowledge requirement   
The organisation is expected to already have all knowledge 
required for the undertaking 
  
Senior management buy-in   
The undertaking’s methodology does not require senior 
management buy-in 
  
Self-directed or consulted   
The undertaking is self-directed  5 
SCORE  10 
GO/NO-GO DECISION: IS THE COST TOO HIGH? 
Regulatory Fit  20 
CRAMM V Express does not conform to the steps in Table 3.4 at all   
CRAMM V Express promotes reviewing by offering a record of 
countermeasures used and still to be implemented 
 10 
SCORE  10 
SMME Fit  20 
Horizontal/vertical   
The CRAMM V Express is not restricted to any industry  5 
Size   
CRAMM V Express has no restrictions on organisational size at all  10 
Organisational type   
CRAMM V Express is not restrictive  5 
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SCORE  20 
TOTAL  50 
4.5 Advantages and Disadvantages of OCTAVE-S and CRAMM V 
Express 
This section is used to highlight those features of both OCTAVE-S and 
CRAMM V Express that are advantageous for use by South African SMMEs, 
and those that are not. 
The advantages and disadvantages are categorised according to those 
discoveries while evaluating the approaches for the framework outcomes. 
Advantages or disadvantages not covered by the framework, but that still 
have value, are also highlighted. 
Table 4.5 presents the various advantages of both approaches, categorised 
by the framework elements and factors. 
The advantages of the two approaches provide a structure that may form the 
ideal approach for an SMME, had the approach existed. 
The conclusion may be made that although the above approaches may offer 
some benefits to South African SMMEs, there are risks that they become 
difficult to apply and are abandoned before completion. There is no support 
available for either of these approaches should the organisation grow weary of 
self-direction. 
The portal has now been opened to create an approach that holds all the 
advantages listed in Table 4.5, but none of the disadvantages; such an 
approach that scores higher on the framework, if not the ultimate score of 100. 
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Table 4.5: Advantages and disadvantages of OCTAVE-S and CRAMM V Express 
Framework  OCTAVE-S CRAMM V Express 
Visibility   
Advantages The full implementation guide is available online, 
containing introductory information, preparation 
guidelines, worksheets and other documents. 
A flash presentation presenting the uses of the 
CRAMM V Express tool is available to anyone that 
requests it. 
Disadvantages  The presentation provides information on the 
function of the tool only, with no background of 
CRAMM. 
The user has no means to test the tool before 
making a purchase decision. 
Cost   
Purchase cost   
Advantages OCTAVE-S is completely free. The cost of the tool has been greatly reduced from 
the full CRAMM V Expert version. 
Disadvantages  The tool must be purchased for use and has no 
demo version available for testing beforehand. 
Organisational involvement   
Advantages OCTAVE-S is self-directed, and may be applied 
using the organisation’s own discretion for 
schedules. 
OVTAVE-S insists on senior management 
involvement. 
No human resources except the tool user are 
required to obtain results. 
The tool provides a dashboard against which the 
countermeasures may be listed that requires 
implementation. 
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Disadvantages No external assistance is available for conducting 
OCTAVE-S successfully. 
Training is said to be available, although no 
institutions are recommended. Self-training is also 
recommended, assuming the organisation has the 
human resources at its disposal for this. 
The approach requires the creation of a mitigation 
plan, but does not include assigning resources to 
execution of this plan, only to the steps of the plan. 
No senior management involvement is required or 
endorsed by CRAMM V Express.  
The tool may never be used effectively, and has no 
measure to control this. 
Knowledge of risk analysis is assumed by the tool 
and offers no training provision for those non-skilled 
users. 
The countermeasures dashboard is static unless 
the organisation applies the countermeasures and 
self-manages their management. This, again, 
requires training. 
Regulatory Fit   
Advantages OCTAVE-S has a well-structured preparatory 
process that encourages detailed planning before 
launching the undertaking. 
The ‘arranging’ phase of OCTAVE-S is split into 
three phases, which concludes in deliverables of 
next steps and plans, which have assigned 
resources. 
CRAMM V Express offers the dashboard of 
implemented countermeasures that can be 
maintained with updates of implementations at any 
time. 
Disadvantages OCTAVE-S does not offer detail on monitoring the 
execution of the plans created, and does not create 
scope for reviews of the planned executions. There 
is thus no ‘controlling’ phase of the plans. 
CRAMM V Express does not follow any procedural 
structure, nor does it allow the assigning of tasks to 
individuals or groups. 
The reviewing of implementation of 
countermeasures is self-driven, and appears easy 
to lapse. 
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SMME fit   
Horizontal/vertical   
Advantages OCTAVE-S offers no restrictions. CRAMM V Express offers no restrictions. It was 
created for reduced cost and time requirements. 
Disadvantages  CRAMM V Express offers no restrictions, and is 
thus not tailor-made for SMMEs. 
Size   
Advantages OCTAVE-S was specifically created for the small 
business and is much simplified from the original 
OCTAVE approach. 
CRAMM V Express offers no restrictions. It was 
created for reduced cost and time requirements. 
Disadvantages OCTAVE-S restricts implementation to a specific 
size range which excludes 91% of South African 
SMMEs. 
CRAMM V Express offers no restrictions, and is 
thus not tailor-made for SMMEs. 
Organisational type   
Advantages OCTAVE-S was created for an enterprise with 
multitasking, interdisciplinary staff, which is 
characteristic of many SMMEs. 
CRAMM V Express offers no restrictions. It was 
created for reduced cost and time requirements. 
Disadvantages OCTAVE-S was designed with a flat hierarchical, 
interdisciplinary structure in mind. 
It excludes those enterprises with independent 
business units, or non-interdisciplinary staff 
members. 
CRAMM V Express offers no restrictions, and is 
thus not tailor-made for SMMEs. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a framework that may be used to evaluate any 
undertaking by an SMME concerned with developing, protecting or auditing 
the business. The framework is three-dimensional, providing a quantitative 
scoring system for evaluating an undertaking. The three dimensions are 
element, factor and weight. The factor dimension is in some cases split into 
subfactors. 
The first objective was achieved by applying this framework to the arena of 
ISRM, specifically evaluating OCTAVE-S and CRAMM V Express. 
The framework evaluated each approach in terms of availability, cost, 
regulatory fit and SMME fit. The framework has found that neither of these 
approaches is ideal for South African SMMEs, with mediocre scores of 65% 
and 50%, respectively.  
It was also found that the advantages and disadvantages of each are not in 
favour of South African SMMEs, which led to the conclusion, and achievement 
of the second objective, that application of the approaches is not 
recommended. 
An outcome of these evaluations was the realisation that a new, South African 
SMME aimed approach needs to be developed that encompasses the 
advantages of both, but not the disadvantages of either, and that scores high 
on the evaluation framework. 
The requirements of such an approach, considering the framework 
requirements as well as international security standards, are presented in 
Chapter 5. 
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C5 
5 Requirements of Information 
Security Risk Management for an 
SMME 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter revealed that ISRM methodology created for small 
businesses is not necessarily congruent with the requirements of South 
African SMMEs. 
A South African SMME, with its unique structure and economic placement in 
South Africa, requires a methodology created to suit its unique structures and 
requirements for low resource and cost, as well as the requirements of 
corporate governance and subsequently IT governance. A fourth requirement 
is that of the international information security standard. Compliance with 
corporate and IT governance cannot ignore compliance with security 
standards. 
This chapter’s primary objective is the identification of the requirements of all 
of the abovementioned. The goals for this objective are: 
1. The requirements of an SMME 
2. The requirements of corporate governance 
3. The requirements of IT governance  
4. The requirements of the information security standard 
The second objective is to amalgamate the above and include the advantages 
of the ISRM methodologies evaluated in Chapter 4. The goals of this objective 
are: 
1. A list of requirements 
2. The advantages identified in Chapter 4 added to the list of requirements  
3. A structure including both the requirements and advantages 
The structure including requirements and advantages is used for the creation 
of an ISRM methodology that may be used by an SMME in South Africa. 
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The third objective is the identification of measures and weights for the 
requirements. 
The requirements of the SMME as identified in Chapter 4 are summarised 
first, following by listings of further requirements. 
5.2 SMME Requirements 
The requirements of an SMME centre on the structure of the SMME. The 
requirements are as follows: 
S1 Horizontal or vertical industry. The SMME may be from any industry. 
S2 The size of organisation. The SMME’s size may range from 1 staff 
member to 200.  
S3 The type of organisation. Any structure or hierarchy is acceptable. 
The next goal is the identification of the requirements of corporate 
governance. 
5.3 Corporate Governance Requirements 
The corporate governance standard applicable to South Africa is the King II 
standard. This standard has been evaluated for use by SMMEs, and a 
proposed simplified structure was presented in Chapter 3. 
King II is now presented in further detail, specifically relating to the risk 
management of corporate governance included in the standard. The corporate 
governance of risk management in the standard was created for all principles 
of risk faced by the organisation, including those of business continuity and 
technology. 
The corporate governance requirements of risk management are thus 
presented in the context of business continuity and technology, as information 
security is included in this grouping. 
The requirements of corporate governance are divided into the following: 
• Global requirements. These requirements do not apply to any specific 
step in the risk management process, but are applicable to the 
management of the process and the selection of the methodology. 
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• Process requirements. These requirements apply to specific elements 
of the steps of the risk management process. 
The requirements are expressed in relation to SMMEs based on the contents 
of the King II Report. 
5.3.1 Global Requirements 
Global requirements are divided into requirements of stakeholders that hold 
responsibility or accountability for the requirements, as well as the required 
environment for risk management. The distinction of accountability and 
responsibility is explained in Appendix 1. 
The responsibility and accountability of stakeholders in the risk management 
process are divided between the board and senior management. The board is 
ultimately responsible for the entire process, but may hold senior 
management accountable. 
5.3.1.1 Requirements of the Board 
The required responsibilities of the board of an SMME are [KING 2002] [CLIF 
2004]: 
K1.1 Deciding on the organisation’s appetite for risk. The level of acceptable 
or unacceptable risk is identified. 
K1.2 Implementation of risk identification, risk impact measurement and 
proactive management of risk. 
K1.3 Inclusion of day-to-day activities of risk management in the 
organisation. 
K1.4 Use of recognised models for risk management. This responsibility 
may be interpreted as a model compliant with the requirements of this 
standard for this study, as it has been found that existing models are 
not necessarily applicable to SMMEs. 
K1.5 Maintaining an up-to-date register of key risks, including their 
estimated financial impacts if realised. 
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5.3.1.2 Requirements of Senior Management 
The required accountability of senior management of an SMME is [KING 
2002] [CLIF 2004]: 
K2.1 Design, implementation and monitoring of risk management. Although 
senior management is accountable for implementing risk management, 
the board is ultimately responsible for it. 
K2.2 Ensuring the implementation of risk management is a team-based 
approach. No single person may be tasked with risk management. A 
group of members of senior management must implement risk 
management. 
K2.3 A board-appointed committee of directors and senior managers 
evaluates risk. The operational execution of the evaluation is led by 
directors and managers, but must not exclude other staff. 
K2.4 Effective and continuous monitoring of risks. Senior management are 
expected to generate reviewed reports of risk monitoring on an annual 
basis. 
5.3.1.3 Requirements of the Environment 
King II requires that the following be considered for the environment 
(organisation) in which risk management is conducted [KING 2002] [CLIF 
2004]: 
K3.1 Identify the control environment. The environment in which risks are 
managed must be identified before the process is started. This is the 
organisational culture, objectives, values and competency of staff.  
K3.2 Assess risk related to organisational objectives. The risk assessment 
process should also consider risks that are significant to the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives. The risk assessment 
must be undertaken annually, but management of risks must be 
undertaken continually. 
K3.3 Design control activities to respond to risks throughout the organisation 
and outside of it. They should enhance the environment. 
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K3.4 Information and communication. Information gathered by risk 
identification and assessment should be communicated to the 
organisation in a method suitable to the culture. It should also be 
communicated in a time frame that enables staff to continue with their 
responsibilities. Management’s intent for managing risks must be 
understood by all staff. 
K3.5 Evaluate the monitoring of risks against a set of key performance 
indicators extracted from the organisation’s objectives. 
K3.6 An effective system of continuity of critical business systems must 
disclose responses to significant risks should they occur. 
5.3.2 Process Requirements 
The process requirements of King II are listed next. 
Risk Assessment Requirements of King II 
King II prescribes risk assessment as a step in the process of risk 
management, and is required to include [KING 2002] [CLIF 2004]: 
K4.1 A demonstrable system of risk identification. 
K4.2 Estimated likelihood of the occurrence of a risk. 
K4.3 Quantification of the impact of the risk. This includes estimated costs of 
significant losses, which may be material losses, loss in earnings or 
cash flows. 
K4.4 Comparison to available benchmarks. No guidance is provided on 
which benchmarks may be used, or what is compared. This 
requirement therefore assumes that the final value of the risk is 
calculated using established methods. 
K4.5 Recommendations should be made of how each risk should be 
managed. 
Figure 5.1 presents these requirements in a process flow.  
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Figure 5.1: Corporate governance requirements for risk management [KING 
2002] [CLIF 2004] 
The requirements of King II may be expanded by the requirements of IT 
governance, as a subset of corporate governance. The requirements of CobiT 
are presented next. 
5.4  IT Governance Requirements 
IT governance is a continuous, cyclical process as was presented in Chapter 
3, when the process of risk management required by King II was mapped to 
the domains of CobiT. 
A control objective of CobiT, assess risks, is included in the planning and 
organisation domain, or step of IT governance. This control objective provides 
the following requirements of IT governance for risk assessment, as a step of 
risk management: 
Risk Assessment Requirements of CobiT for an SMME 
C1 Business risk assessment. Management is required to establish an 
assessment framework that is applied to all aspects and systems of the 
business or organisation, that is applied at regular intervals, and that is 
regularly updated with information from audits. 
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C2 Risk assessment approach. The approach adopted by management 
should allow scope of boundaries and assigning of responsibilities and 
required skills. Management should lead the decision of the mitigation 
solution identified after assessment and be involved in identification of 
risks. 
C3 Risk identification. The essential elements of risk include: 
a. Tangible and intangible assets 
b. Asset value 
c. Threats 
d. Vulnerabilities 
e. Safeguards or controls 
f. Likelihood and consequences of threats 
g. Qualitative and quantitative rating of risk 
h. Business, regulatory, legal, technology, trading and human 
resources 
C4 Risk measurement. The analysis of risk identification information 
should include quantitative and qualitative measures. Risk analysis 
forms part of risk assessment. The measurement of the risks thus falls 
into the risk assessment step in the risk management process. 
C5 Risk action plan. A cost-effective risk action plan should be defined that 
ensures cost-effective controls and measures to mitigate exposure to 
risk on a continuing basis. The action plan should identify risk 
mitigation solutions as avoidance, termination, mitigation and transfer. 
The final option is acceptance, in which case the board is aware of the 
risk but cannot mitigate it. This applies especially to residual risk. 
C6 Risk acceptance. Formal acceptance of residual risk should be 
documented and offset by adequate insurance. 
C7 Safeguard selection. Controls that offer the highest return on 
investment and quick wins should be prioritised. Management is 
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required to communicate the purpose of the control and monitor the 
continued effectiveness. 
C8 Risk assessment commitment. Management should encourage risk 
assessment as an important tool in the implementation of internal 
control, and include it in the strategic IT plan and monitoring 
mechanisms. 
Figure 5.2 offers a summary of the requirements of CobiT. 
 
Figure 5.2: IT governance requirements of risk management [COBI01 2000] 
The information security standard requirements are identified next to complete 
the requirements listing. 
5.5 Information Security Standard Requirements 
The internationally endorsed standard for information security management is 
the ISO 17799 standard [SABS 2000]. This standard was originally created by 
the British Standards Institute and was known as the BS 7799 [SABS 2000]. 
The International Organisation for Standards adopted it and distributed it as 
ISO 17799. The South African Bureau of Standards subsequently adopted it 
and dubbed it SABS ISO 17799 [SABS 2000]. Although the standard was 
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created for no specific size of organisation, it does hold value for the South 
African SMME. As the standard is also locally endorsed, it should be 
considered for its generic security content [SABS 2000]. The standard has a 
specific requirement for risk assessment as is presented in the next section. 
Risk Assessment Requirements of ISO 17799 
The following requirements are stated by ISO 17799 as the tasks required of 
risk assessment and management [BSI 2002]: 
I1 Asset identification and valuation. All assets associated with the 
business environment are identified and evaluated against a value 
scale. This value scale is concerned with confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (CIA) and any other values deemed necessary. 
I2 Security requirements identification. Identification of all threats and 
vulnerabilities of the assets listed. 
I3 Security requirements assessment. Identification of a value scale for 
each of the security requirements identified. Assigning of the values. 
I4 Calculation of risks based on the assets and security requirements. 
I5 Identification and evaluation of options for treatment of risks. 
Identification of a suitable risk treatment action for each of the risks, 
that is both realistic and in line with business requirements. Document 
all results for the risk treatment plan. 
I6 Selection of security controls, reducing the risk and risk acceptance. 
Determine the acceptable level of risk and ensure that the level is 
appropriate for the organisation. For those risks for which the option of 
risk reduction was selected, select suitable controls that reduce the risk 
to an acceptable level. A list of controls is provided by the standard. 
Figure 5.3 summarises these requirements. 
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 Figure 5.3: Information security standard requirements [BSI 2002] 
All the requirements have been gathered and presented in separate 
groupings. The next section presents the full list of requirements and 
investigates any overlapping in the list. 
5.6 Full List of Requirements and Requirements Matrix 
The four sections listing requirements are now compounded into a single list 
of requirements, and mapped in a matrix (refer to Table 5.1) to determine 
whether there are any requirements that are duplicated. 
The full list of requirements is as follows: 
S1 Any industry 
S2 1 to 200 staff size of organisation 
S3 Any type of organisation 
K1.1 Deciding on the organisation’s appetite for risk  
K1.2 
Implementation of risk identification, risk impact measurement and proactive 
management of risk 
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K1.3 Inclusion of day-to-day activities of risk management in the organisation 
K1.4 Use of recognised models for risk management 
K1.5 Maintaining an up-to-date register of key risks 
K2.1 Design, implementation and monitoring of risk management 
K2.2 Ensuring the implementation of risk management is a team-based approach 
K2.3 A board-appointed committee of directors and senior managers evaluates risk 
K2.4 The operational execution of the evaluation must not exclude other staff 
K2.5 Effective and continuous monitoring of risks 
K3.1 Identify the control environment 
K3.2 Assess risk related to organisational objectives 
K3.3 Respond to risks throughout the organisation and outside of it 
K3.4 Information and communication 
K3.5 Evaluate monitoring of risks against a set of key performance indicators 
K3.6 Disclose responses to significant risks should they occur 
K4.1 System for risk identification 
K4.2 Estimated likelihood of the occurrence of a risk 
K4.3 Quantification of the impact of the risk 
K4.4 Comparison to available benchmarks 
K4.5 
Make recommendations of how each risk should be managed and 
communicated 
 93
C1 Business risk assessment 
C2 Scope of boundaries, assigning of responsibilities 
C3 Risk identification 
C4 Risk measurement 
C5 Risk action plan 
C6 Risk acceptance 
C7 Safeguard selection 
C8 Risk assessment commitment 
I1 Asset identification and valuation 
I2 Security requirements identification 
I3 Security requirements assessment 
I4 Calculation of risks 
I5 Identification and evaluation of options for treatment of risks 
I6 Selection of security controls, reducing the risk and risk acceptance 
There are requirements that are very similar in nature, specifically between 
CobiT and ISO 17799. The matrix maps the requirements to the risk 
management process.  
The matrix demonstrates that although corporate governance provides 
requirements throughout the entire process of risk management, IT 
governance and the security standard do not. The gap analysis is discussed 
next. 
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Table 5.1: The requirements matrix 
 SMME King CobiT ISO 17799 
Preparation 
Size 
Industry 
Structure 
Appetite for risk 
Risk management team 
Objectives 
KPIs 
  
Identification 
 Environment 
System of risk identification 
Scope of boundaries 
Responsibilities 
Tangible assets 
Intangible assets 
Assign asset value 
Tangible assets 
Intangible assets 
Evaluate asset against value 
scale 
Assessment 
 Likelihood of occurrence 
Impact measurement 
Communication to staff 
Threats 
Vulnerabilities 
Assessment in IT plan 
Likelihood of occurrence 
Impact measurement 
Identify resources 
Threats  
Vulnerabilities 
Calculate risks 
Identify controls 
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Mitigation 
 Proactive management Action plan 
Mitigation solution 
Risk strategies 
Select controls 
Select controls 
Monitoring 
 Day-to-day activities 
Risk register 
Performance measurement 
Assessment reports 
Monitoring measurement 
Business continuity plan 
(BCP) 
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5.7 Gap Analysis 
The listing of requirements created by standards in place in information security 
in South Africa has created a gap when mapped to the ISRM process. 
 
Figure 5.4: Gap analysis of standards requirements 
Both IT governance and the security standard provide guidance on the selection 
of mitigating controls for risk, but offer no guidance on the implementation of the 
controls, or the subsequent continuity of the process, including monitoring of the 
risk profile for change. 
The requirements of continuity and monitoring rely solely on corporate 
governance that is at a high level of generic requirements for any business risk. 
They do, however, offer good guidance and are accepted for the framework of 
requirements. 
The last piece of the requirements puzzle is the inclusion of the advantages of 
OCTAVE-S and CRAMM V Express identified in Chapter 4. The required 
inclusions are listed below. 
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5.8 Required Inclusions in the Framework 
The advantages and disadvantages of the two methodologies evaluated in 
Chapter 4 are amalgamated into a list of required inclusions in the requirements 
framework. 
IF1 Implementation with organisation-approved schedules 
IF2 Senior management involvement 
IF3 Restriction of human resource involvement beyond minimum 
requirement 
IF4 Dashboard for measurement of control implementation success (The 
dashboard may be updated at any time as the risk profile changes.) 
IF5 Availability of training 
IF6 Creation of mitigation plan with proposed use of resources required for 
execution 
IF7 Detailed planning process before commencement of risk identification 
IF8 Milestones achieved at the end of each step of the process that are 
required for the start of the next step 
IF9 Review sessions during mitigation and monitoring phases to ensure 
control of schedules and mitigation 
IF10 No restrictions on organisation structures or sizes within the SMME 
definition 
The matrix is repeated to include these requirements (refer to Table 5.2): 
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Table 5.2: The requirements matrix with inclusions 
 Previous Matrix List Inclusions 
Preparation 
Size 
Industry 
Type 
Appetite for risk 
Risk management team 
Objectives 
KPIs 
Type 
Size 
Senior management 
involvement 
Training 
Planning process 
Identification 
Environment/scope 
Responsibilities 
Tangible assets 
Intangible assets 
Evaluate assets against value scale 
 
Assessment 
Threats 
Vulnerabilities 
Likelihood of occurrence 
Impact measurement 
Calculate risks 
Include in IT plan 
Identify resources 
 
Mitigation 
Action plan 
Mitigation solution 
Risk strategies 
Select controls 
Mitigation plan 
Monitoring 
Day-to-day activities 
Risk register 
Performance measurement 
Assessment reports 
Monitoring measurement 
BCP 
Performance measurement 
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These inclusions and the requirements listed in previous sections are combined 
into a requirements framework. 
5.9 The Requirements Framework for Information Security Risk 
Management of an SMME 
The compounding of all the information presented in this chapter is presented 
first in the final list of requirements, and then in a diagram depicting the 
procedural steps with the requirements listed. Figure 5.5 presents the diagram. 
Measures and weights are assigned to the requirements in the section following 
thereafter. 
1. Preparation 
1.1 Confirm organisation is an SMME (size, industry, type) (S1, S2, S3) 
1.2 Identify appetite for risk ((K1.1) 
1.3 Risk management team (K2.2) 
1.4 Objectives (K3.2) 
1.5 KPIs (K3.5) 
1.6 Senior management involvement (IF2) 
1.7 Training (IF5) 
2. Identification 
2.1 Environment/scope (C2) 
2.2 Responsibilities (C2) 
2.3 Tangible and intangible assets (C3) 
2.4 Evaluate assets against value scale (I1) 
3. Assessment 
3.1 Threats (I2) 
3.2 Vulnerabilities (I2) 
3.3 Likelihood of occurrence (C3) 
3.4 Impact measurement (C3) 
3.5 Calculate risks (I4) 
3.6 Include in IT plan (distributed to staff) (C8) 
3.7 Identify resources (C3) 
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3.8 Communicate findings to staff (C8) 
4. Mitigation 
4.1 Proactive management/action plan (K1.2) 
4.2 Mitigation solution (C5) 
4.3 Risk strategies (C5) 
4.4 Select controls (C7) 
5. Monitoring 
5.1 Day-to-day activities (K1.3) 
5.2 Risk register (K1.5) 
5.3 Performance measurement (K3.4) 
5.4 Assessment reports (K3.4) 
5.5 Monitoring measurement (K3.5) 
5.6 Business continuity plan (K3.6) 
5.10 Measurement of Requirements 
The list comprises 29 requirements. These requirements cannot carry equal 
weight in the creation of an ISRM approach for SMMEs as some steps are more 
important than others, e.g. identifying risks is more important than identifying key 
performance indicators. Each requirement is important though, and is thus 
included. 
The measurement of each requirement and the subsequent weights are 
presented in Table 5.3. Each step in the risk management process is assigned a 
weight for achieving the milestone that is the completion of all requirements 
within the step. The final step, risk monitoring, presents the highest weight as it is 
most often neglected, as shown in the gap analysis. 
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Risk identification
Risk assessment
Risk mitigation
Risk monitoring
3.1 Identify threats
3.2 Identify vulnerabilities
3.3 Estimate likelihood of occurrence
3.4 Perform qualitative and quantitative impact measurement
3.5 Calculate risks
3.6 Include assessment in IT plan
3.7 Identify resources
4.1 Create risk action plan 
4.2 Management leads decision of mitigation solution
4.3 Identify risk strategies
4.4 Select controls with highest ROI and quick wins
5.1 Implement day-to-day risk management activities
5.2 Keep an up-to-date risk register
5.3 Provide benchmark for performance mesurement
5.4 Review assessment reports
5.5 Measure monitoring against KPIs
5.6 Provide report of balanced assessments
5.7 Maintain BCP
1.1 Confirm organisation is an SMME
1.2 Identify appetite for risk
1.3 Identify risk management team
1.4 Identify organisational objectives
1.5 Identify key performance indicators (KPIs)
1.6 Involve senior management
1.7 Obtain trainingPrepatory activities
2.1 Establish scope and environment
2.2 Assign responsibilities
2.3 Identify tangible and intangible assets
2.4 Assign asset value with value scale
 
 
Figure 5.5: The requirements framework 
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Table 5.3: Requirements, measures and weights 
Requirement Measure Weight 
Preparatory Activities Milestone Achieved 20 
SMME The methodology is fit for an organisation between 1 and 200 staff in size13 2 
Identify appetite for risk Formal statement from the board of the risk value that is acceptable 3 
Identify risk management team Team comprising senior management and staff 3 
Identify objectives List of primary organisational objectives 1 
Identify key performance 
indicators List of key performance indicators 2 
Involve senior management 
Responsibility of process assigned to high 
authority (either board member or senior 
member of staff) 
5 
Obtain training Trained team 4 
Risk Identification Milestone Achieved 15 
Identify risk environment 
Statement of organisation/part of 
organisation for which methodology is 
applied 
3 
Assign responsibilities and 
skills Documented list of responsibilities 2 
Identify assets Asset register 5 
Evaluate assets against value 
scale 
Documented value scale 
Register completed with values 
5 
Risk Assessment Milestone Achieved 20 
Identify threats and 
vulnerabilities Threats and vulnerabilities register 2 
                                                 
13 This is the ultimate measure of the requirements list, although with a low weight. Non-compliance with 
this requirement is contrary to information security risk management for an SMME. 
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Estimate likelihood of 
occurrence 
Register completed with qualitative 
likelihoods 4 
Impact measurement Register completed with qualitative measures 4 
Calculate risks Register completed with risk values 5 
Requirement Measure Weight 
Include in IT plan 
Dates captured at each update 
Communication to staff 
2 
Identify resources Resources list, controls list 3 
Risk Mitigation Milestone Achieved 20 
Risk action plan Action plan 5 
Mitigation solution Statement of solution selection 3 
Risk strategies Documented risk strategies 5 
Select and apply controls Controls mapped against register with dates for implementation 7 
Risk Monitoring Milestone Achieved 25 
Day-to-day activities Inclusion in employment policies 5 
Up-to-date risk register Dates captured at each update 5 
Performance measurement Review sessions 5 
Report of assessments Documentation 3 
Measure monitoring Score achieved on KPIs 4 
Maintain BCP Dates captured at each update 3 
5.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has completed the preparation for the creation of an ISRM 
methodology for South African SMMEs by creating a framework of requirements 
for the methodology. 
The following objectives and goals have been achieved: 
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The first objective of identifying the requirements was achieved by identifying the 
requirements of: 
• The SMME 
• Corporate governance 
• IT governance  
• The information security standard 
In the identification of these requirements, a gap was discovered in the 
governance of risk management. The only standard presenting requirements for 
the final step in the risk management process, risk monitoring, is King II, which is 
at a high level. This is a shortcoming of CobiT and ISO 17799. 
The second objective was achieved by combining the requirements with the 
advantages of the methodologies evaluated in Chapter 4. Some overlapping 
requirements were combined into a framework of 29 requirements and presented 
in a process flow diagram allowing a global perspective of the requirements 
framework. 
The third objective was achieved by listing the 29 requirements, and assigning 
measures and weights to them. This enhances the governance of the process in 
the methodology yet to be created, and is congruent with the requirement of 
performance measurement already included in the framework. 
The framework creates a benchmark that is used to create a methodology 
compliant with the standards and the SMME. This methodology is called the 
Peculium Model and is described in Part 2. 
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Part 2: The Peculium 
Model 
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C6 6 Preparation for Information Security Risk Management 
 
6.1 Introduction 
ISRM, as defined in Chapter 2, is a procedural process used to identify, assess, 
mitigate and monitor risks of the information assets of an organisation. 
Many methodologies for ISRM exist across the world with recurring themes used 
in various aspects, such as risk identification methods and methods for analysing 
risks, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
It has been established in this dissertation that ISRM methodologies created for 
the small business market are not necessarily fit for South African SMMEs, which 
make up a major portion of the South African economy. 
A framework of requirements is now in place that guides the creation of the 
Peculium Model. This Model conforms not only to international standards of risk 
management, but also to the requirements of the SMME.  
The objective of this chapter is to introduce the first step of the Peculium Model 
based on the requirements framework, namely preparation for risk management. 
The subsequent chapters each introduce the next step in the Model, as listed 
below: 
• Risk identification 
• Risk assessment 
• Risk mitigation 
• Risk monitoring 
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The goals of the chapter that collectively achieve the methodology of the first 
step are as follows: 
1. The method for confirming that the organisation is an SMME 
2. The method of obtaining senior management involvement 
3. The method for identifying the organisational objectives 
4. The method for identifying the appetite for risk 
5. The method for identifying the key performance indicators of the process 
6. The method for selecting the risk management team 
7. The method for training the risk management team 
8. Checklists that ensure that all deliverables in the step are completed before 
proceeding to the next step, namely identification 
The chapter is structured around the goals, except for the checklists, which are 
presented with each method as listed above. The chapter begins with a brief 
overview of preparation for risk management, after which the methods for each of 
the above are provided. 
6.2 Overview of Preparation for Risk Management 
Preparation for risk management has been moved from the standard risk 
management process of identification, assessment, mitigation and monitoring, as 
the tasks involved require emphasis as well as completion before the process 
may continue (refer to Figure 6.1). Preparation is thus the catalyst for the risk 
management process, but vital for completion before commencement of the 
process. 
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Figure 6.1: The risk management process with preparatory activities emphasised 
The preparatory activities, as discovered in Chapter 5, stem mostly from 
corporate and IT governance. The establishment of the deliverables in 
preparation is used throughout the risk management process to finally complete 
the monitoring step and again prepare for the cycle’s repetition.  
The deliverables, previously noted as requirements for the preparatory activities, 
are as follows: 
• Confirm the organisation is an SMME 
• Obtain senior management involvement  
• Identify organisational objectives 
• Identify the appetite for risk 
• Identify the key performance indicators 
• Assemble the risk management team 
• Conduct training 
The deliverables have dependencies associated but do allow some concurrent 
activities to occur. The first activity, namely confirming the organisation is an 
SMME, has to be completed first. Thereafter, before any continuation of the 
process, the risk management sponsor as a senior member of management has 
to be identified.  
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This individual facilitates the remaining activities in this step. The sponsor leads 
the identification of objectives, the risk appetite and the key performance 
indicators. Finally the sponsor leads the selection of the risk management team 
and their training. The identification of the KPIs and the team are not dependent 
on previous activities and may occur concurrently. The training of the team is, 
however, dependent on their selection as denoted in Figure 6.2. The completion 
of all the deliverables constitutes the completion of the preparation milestone, as 
required by the requirements framework. 
 
Figure 6.2: Completion of preparatory activities 
6.3 Confirm the Organisation is an SMME 
The most important deliverable of preparatory activities is the identification of 
whether the organisation in is fact an SMME. The methods and processes 
employed in this methodology for ISRM are based on a framework of 
requirements, again based on the environment of the SMME.  
As defined in Chapter 2, SMMEs have staff numbers within the boundaries of 1 
to 200. This includes all industries of organisations.  
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The organisation that applies the following steps and deliverables must be within 
the boundaries of staff supplied. An organisation that does not conform should 
reconsider the use of this methodology. 
Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks only if the organisation does in fact have 
staff between the boundaries as specified (refer to Table 6.1). The checkbox 
must be checked before continuing to step two. 
Table 6.1: Preparatory checklist 1 
Preparatory Activities 
            
Step One  Confirm organisation is an SMME    
  1 Is the staff complement between 1 and 200?    
                    
6.4 Obtain Senior Management Involvement 
The involvement of senior management cannot only rely on the awareness and 
budgetary approval of the board or senior management forum. A senior 
management or board member should be elected as a sponsor for the risk 
management process. 
In the case of corporate governance, this role is usually fulfilled through the 
financial manager or director, as the head of internal auditing [KING 2002]. This 
role, if available, should be used as the financial manager has reasonable 
understanding of budgetary constraints, and the skill of presenting financial data 
to the board or management forum. 
6.4.1 Roles and Responsibilities of the Sponsor and the Board  
The role of the sponsor in this process is as follows: 
• Progress reporting to the board or senior management forum. 
Presentation of the KPI scorecard, assessment reports, asset register and 
risk register lies with the sponsor. 
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• Obtaining budget approval for the process. The sponsor is expected to 
present the requirements for budget and consequences of no budget to 
the board. 
• Obtaining resource allocation for the process. The sponsor is also 
responsible for ensuring that the risk management team or any external 
resources required are available as and when stipulated. 
• Management of schedule adherence. The sponsor is accountable to the 
board for completion of the risk management process within the period 
provided. As resources at an SMME are restricted, the scheduling of tasks 
and maintenance of the schedule become of utmost importance. 
• Performance measurement. The sponsor is expected to maintain 
performance measurement during the process and to ensure that the 
presentation of performance to the board is favourable. 
• Monitoring measurement. The sponsor is expected to measure whether 
risk monitoring is taking place and with due diligence. 
• Communication to staff. The risk register, mitigating strategies and other 
available communication mechanisms should be communicated to staff to 
ensure risk awareness within the staff complement, as well as 
demonstration of risk mitigation. 
• Selection of environment or scope for risk management. As dictated within 
the risk identification step, an environment for risk management must be 
identified. The sponsor is expected to motivate the selection to the board 
and staff. 
The role of the board in this process is as follows: 
• Receipt of progress reports from the sponsor as the process runs. The 
board is expected to evaluate the progress reports critically for approval or 
rejection. 
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• Decisions in support of mitigation strategies. Although the sponsor should 
have financial evaluation skills for determining the cost benefit of 
mitigating strategies, the board is finally responsible for the budget 
allocation. 
• Call for completion of the process iteration and beginning of the next 
iteration of the risk management process. Risk management is a repetitive 
cyclical process that sees no end once started. There must, however, be a 
decision of when a new cycle of preparation will begin. 
The sponsor should be made aware of his/her responsibilities in the risk 
management process and should provide a signature as proof of this. 
6.4.2 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the sponsor be identified, the roles 
and responsibilities explained and accepted (refer to Table 6.2). All checkboxes 
must be checked before continuing to step three. 
Table 6.2: Preparatory checklist 2 
Preparatory Activities 
            
Step Two  Obtain senior management involvement      
  1 Sponsor appointed by the board or management forum  
 2 Explain the sponsor roles and responsibilities to the sponsor  
  3 Sign off sponsor roles and responsibilities   
        
6.5 Identify Organisational Objectives 
The objectives of the organisation determine the focus of the risk management 
process, as required by corporate governance. The objectives may, for example, 
focus on revenue generating business units, as opposed to overhead business 
units, such as an administration department. The objectives furthermore align the 
system, information and infrastructure assets with the environment determined 
for risk management. 
The organisation may already have a list of objectives compiled. These 
objectives must, however, be reviewed and communicated to the risk 
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management team to empower their decisions later in the process. The team 
cannot be expected to have decisions supported without consulting the 
objectives. 
If no list of objectives exists, one must be compiled by the board or senior 
management and communicated to the risk management team. This list of 
objectives articulates the driving factors for the business, such as increased 
revenue, improved customer service and development of staff. It is not the 
responsibility of the team or the sponsor to determine these objectives. The 
board should determine these objectives outside of the risk management 
process. Risk management is not the organisation’s fix-all process for business 
processes that are lacking. 
The SMME may use the following method in standardising the organisational 
objectives: 
6.5.1 Standardising the Objectives 
The King Report supports the use of the balanced scorecard for measurement of 
performance against objectives [KING 2002]. The balanced scorecard stems 
from the realignment of organisational objectives which in the past were mostly 
financial, to include perspectives of the customer, internal processes and 
learning and growth of the organisation [BALA 2002]. This scorecard, when used 
in its entirety, provides the organisation with a one-page status report of its 
financial performance, internal process successes, customer relationship 
strength, and knowledge and other development of its staff. The balanced 
scorecard in this dissertation is used in a simplified format as it is only used for 
standardising objectives, and not the full use of performance management. 
The objectives should be structured into the balanced scorecard for ease of use 
in this process. 
An example of standardising objectives for the balanced scorecard is as follows: 
1. The risk management sponsor convenes the board. 
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2. The risk management sponsor explains the benefit of the balanced 
scorecard. 
3. The risk management sponsor asks the board to elect at least one 
objective per perspective of the scorecard. 
The balanced scorecard, when completed, should be similar to the example 
presented in Figure 6.3. 
 
Figure 6.3: An example of the balanced scorecard 
6.5.2 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the balanced scorecard concept be 
explained to the board and the template completed (refer to Table 6.3). All 
checkboxes must be checked before continuing to step four. 
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Table 6.3: Preparatory checklist 3 
Preparatory Activities 
         
Step Three  Identify objectives     
  1 Explain use of balanced scorecard for standardising objectives   
  2 Complete balanced scorecard  
        
6.6 Identify the appetite for risk 
As corporate governance requires, an organisation must identify its appetite for 
risk before entering the risk management process. This applies to all types of risk 
management. 
The appetite for risk is defined in monetary values. Appetite is the amount the 
organisation is willing to risk in a venture. In simpler terms, appetite is the worst 
case scenario loss that the organisation can endure. The appetite for risk is 
based on the organisation as a whole and is a business-driven decision.  
The risk appetite amount is used later on in the process as a benchmark for 
decisions ranging from the risk valuation to mitigation and subsequently 
monitoring. The amount therefore requires careful consideration at the highest 
level of the organisation, preferably the board, or if not in place, senior 
management. 
6.6.1 Determining the Appetite for Risk 
The appetite for risk should be discussed at a senior management or board level 
forum. In the case of a micro enterprise with fewer than five staff members, the 
owner or senior manager may make the decision on his/her own. 
The board or management forum should have the decision on appetite for risk 
included in the agenda to ensure that it receives recognition as an important item 
for the forum.  
The board or management members must be made aware of the use of the 
appetite in later stages of the risk management process, and also assure the 
members that the risk management process is required by corporate and IT 
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governance, and may benefit the organisation with both improved information 
security and possibly a return on investment. 
6.6.2 Selection of the Appetite Amount 
The amount must be based on the worst case scenario loss that the organisation 
can endure. The organisation may base the amount on a percentage of net profit, 
percentage of assets owned or revenue for a period. 
The amount is used later in the risk management process to measure impacts of 
a threat on the business, by comparing the projected monetary and productivity 
loss against this appetite identified. 
The amount must be realistic and not purposefully low as this skews the risk 
assessment. 
6.6.3 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the appetite for risk be identified (refer 
to Table 6.4). All checkboxes must be checked to continue to step five. 
Table 6.4: Preparatory checklist 4 
Preparatory Activities 
            
Step Four  Identify appetite for risk      
  1 
Include risk appetite as an agenda item at the next meeting of the 
board   
  2 Decide on appetite amount   
        
6.7 Identify Key Performance Indicators 
The KPIs for any process or project determine the performance measurement for 
the process or project, and the support or rejection of the continuation of the 
process, or repetition of the project. 
The KPIs are created before the process begins, and are determined by the 
board or senior management forum. They may be based on the milestones and 
deliverables of the process, the monetary resource requirement of the process, 
the completion of the process, or all of the above. 
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6.7.1 Minimum Required KPIs 
The minimum required KPIs for this methodology are the completion of the 
deliverables required, as created through the requirements framework, and the 
subsequent achievement of the milestone at each step of the process as the 
deliverables are completed. 
The minimum required list of KPIs is as follows: 
• Achieve milestone at each step of the risk management process. Non-
performance in this KPI should result in serious action by the board 
against the risk management team, as their assigned duties have not 
been completed. 
• Complete each deliverable within the milestone at each step of the 
process. Each deliverable should carry documented proof of this, e.g. the 
balanced scorecard of objectives. Each deliverable should therefore be 
proven before the milestone may be marked as completed. 
• Present milestone summary to the board or senior management forum at 
the end of each step. The risk management sponsor should present the 
progress of the risk management process to the board to ensure its 
continued support of the process and associated costs.  
• Present the completed asset register at the end of risk identification. The 
asset register should be included in the annual report, if such a report is 
created, and at least presented to the board to ensure that it is aware of 
the assets owned by the organisation.  
• Maintain the completed risk register at the end of each step. The risk 
register grows and develops through the process and has to be 
maintained. Each updated register must be communicated to the board. 
• Communicate the completed risk strategies at the end of risk mitigation. 
The board must be made aware of the strategies employed for coping with 
the risks discovered and the motivations for them. 
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• Maintain the completed action plan. The highest valued risks must have 
an associated action plan that describes how the risk is mitigated. This 
action plan must be updated regularly with up-to-date progress of 
mitigation. 
• Communicate the completed assessment report at the end of the risk 
monitoring step. The final assessment report articulates the cost and 
benefit of the entire risk management process. 
• Maintain the updated business continuity plan at the end of each risk 
management cycle. Business continuity in the face of an exposed risk 
must be planned for and updated regularly. 
This list is the minimum requirement of KPIs. The organisation may, however, 
add to the list if deemed necessary. 
Performance against the KPIs must be updated at the end of each step of the 
process to ensure that information on the progress of the process is readily 
available. A scorecard system is presented in Chapter 10 to demonstrate the 
presentation of progress. 
6.7.2 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that additional KPIs be added to the list if 
so desired, and the final list entered for the process (refer to Table 6.5). Number 
1 is mandatory. Number 2 must be checked to continue to step six. 
Table 6.5: Preparatory checklist 5 
Preparatory Activities 
            
Step Five  Identify KPIs         
 1 Include additional KPIs to minimum required KPI list provided   
  2 Enter final KPI list   
                    
6.8 Assemble the Risk Management Team 
The risk management team may be assembled at the same sitting of the board 
or senior management as when the appetite for risk and KPIs are determined.  
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The team assembly should preferably be conducted with the consent of the 
individuals. If they are selected as a grudge responsibility, this may reduce 
commitment and loyalty to the risk management process and its completion. 
The composition of the team should be representative of the organisation, 
including team members from most, if not all, business units. The first deliverable 
of risk identification, identify the environment, may exclude some business units. 
The team may be slightly adjusted at that stage. 
6.8.1 Risk Management Team Size 
The size of the team will differ in each organisation, as the number of business 
units and their size over a range of 1 to 200 staff members can vary greatly. 
OCTAVE-S proposes using the methodology for organisations of staff of 20 and 
more, and having the team size at three to five members [OCTA02 2003]. This 
translates to an average of 15% of the staff complement. 
OCTAVE-S also proposes up to three team members from any business unit 
involved in the process. This number may, however, become excessive in 
smaller organisations. As such, a minimum of one team member from every 
business unit involved in the process is recommended.  
Using the 15% of staff scale, the team size for any SMME may be created using 
the following guide: 
• Staff size fewer than 10: 2 team members 
• Staff size between 11 and 30: 3 - 5 team members 
• Staff size between 31 and 50: 6 – 8 team members 
• Staff size between 51 and 100: 9 – 15 team members 
• Staff size over 101: 11 – 20 team members 
The size of the team is subject to decisions by the board or senior management 
forum.  
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The individuals selected to represent the business units should not be selected 
for availability, as most staff members will claim that they are not available, but 
rather knowledge of the business unit’s functions, use of information, systems 
and infrastructure. Again, consent for participation should be obtained, if 
possible. Difficulties may arise from refusals to participate. The board must use 
its discretion in selecting team members that have the knowledge and the 
enthusiasm for participation. 
The team members should be encouraged to participate and an incentive offered 
in return for their participation. The incentive should be performance-based to 
ensure that the required responsibilities are fulfilled to a high standard. A 
disciplinary process should be in place if a very low standard of performance is 
achieved. 
6.8.2 Risk Management Team Roles and Responsibilities 
The roles and responsibilities of the team members should be assigned at the 
discretion of the team sponsor. The sponsor should be able to determine which 
of the following roles are more suited to which team members: 
• Asset identification. The team members are expected to identify the 
information assets in use in the environment for risk management. 
• Evaluation of assets. The application of the identified assets to the value 
scale and subsequent prioritisation needs to be conducted. 
• Identification of threats and vulnerabilities. Asset weaknesses and 
possible areas from which a threat may originate must be identified. 
• Likelihood and impact measurement. The effect an exposure of a 
vulnerability or realisation of a threat may have on the asset needs to be 
calculated. 
• Risk calculation. Threat, vulnerability, likelihood and impact information 
must be combined into a risk value that may be prioritised for mitigation. 
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• Proposal of mitigation solution. Best fit of mitigation solution to the risk 
considering the cost of mitigation and change management needs to be 
determined. 
• Formulation of action plan. Steps that have to be taken to mitigate the risk 
must be determined. 
• Implementation of controls. Installation or processing of controls or other 
mitigation solutions assigned must be handled. 
• Maintenance of risk register and BCP. Regular updates to the risk register 
and BCP must be made as and when changes are required through the 
acquisition of new assets or implementation of controls. 
6.8.3 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the team be identified, the roles and 
responsibilities explained and accepted (refer to Table 6.6). All checkboxes must 
be checked before continuing to step seven. 
Table 6.6: Preparatory checklist 6 
Preparatory Activities 
            
Step Six   Assemble risk management team       
  
1 Include team assembly as an agenda item at the next meeting of the 
board   
  2 Explain role of the risk management team and size   
  3 Elect risk management team   
  4 Obtain elected members’ buy-in   
                    
6.9 Conduct Training 
The risk management team, although selected for their knowledge of their 
business units and the associated assets, cannot be expected to have 
knowledge of risks, risk management or any of the associated skill areas. It is 
therefore vital to prepare the team for the risk management process, and all the 
assessments and decision-making involved. 
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The risk management team should, after training, have full comprehension of the 
following: 
• The risk management process, steps and substeps. The team must 
understand how each step leads to the next and what information in each 
step is required to complete the next. The team must understand the 
concepts of information security, identification, assessment, mitigation and 
monitoring.  
• As is required for the board, the team must be aware of the schedule 
imposed on the process, and all the deliverables and milestones 
associated with the process. 
• Analysis methods required for the substeps where applicable. The 
analysis methods used in the methodology are simplified for the SMME. 
The team is, however, still expected to comprehend the analysis required 
and complete the assessments. 
An assessment should be performed on the team before training is provided to 
determine the level of knowledge. As SMMEs face restrictions of time resources, 
time should not be wasted on training team members that do not require the 
training. 
The risk management sponsor may also decide to opt for Just-In-Time (JIT) 
training at the inception of each step. There are advantages and disadvantages 
to both training methods (refer to Table 6.7). 
Table 6.7: Advantages and disadvantages of training methods 
 Advantage Disadvantage 
Full training in 
preparatory 
activities 
The team has full awareness of 
the extent of the process, and 
understands the quality required 
of each step before continuing to 
the next. 
The knowledge gained in training 
may fade after the first few steps, 
causing insecurity in the 
remaining steps of the process. 
JIT training The knowledge required for each 
step is fresh in the mind of the 
team member when the step 
begins, thus ensuring that the 
correct methods are applied. 
The team member is not in a 
forward-thinking process, but in a 
compartmentalised method that 
may reduce the quality of the 
output of the steps. 
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Both training methods provide challenges that may be resolved in a combination 
of the two. The suggested training method is a full course in the preparatory 
activities, with a refresher course before each step commences to ensure that 
the team members have full recollection of the methods employed in the step. 
This ensures that the team members have an understanding of what is required 
in the next step, but with full cognisance of the current step’s requirements. 
It is recognised that SMMEs are resource restricted and may not agree with the 
commitment of resources to this much training. It should, however, be 
emphasised that the training is not wasted, but that the added benefit of risk 
awareness and buy-in of staff into risk management may present greater benefits 
to the organisation outside of the actual process. The training of the team is not a 
nice-to-have, but a necessity. 
An assessment should be performed after the full training course to ensure that 
the team members are prepared to commence the next step in the process. 
These steps are to be completed before risk identification commences. Risk 
identification should start immediately after completion of preparation whilst the 
training is still recent. 
Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the team be trained and assessed to 
ensure that all members are at the same level of knowledge as required for the 
process (refer to Table 6.8). All checkboxes must be checked before continuing 
to risk identification. 
Table 6.8: Preparatory checklist 7 
Preparatory Activities 
            
Step Seven  Conduct training        
 1 Provide the required training to the risk management team   
  2 Assess the team to ensure that it is prepared for the process   
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6.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the deliverables required of the preparatory 
activities for risk management. The chapter has shown that the board enjoys 
great involvement in the preparation for risk management, as is required by 
corporate governance. 
The goals of the chapter required the methods of the steps in the process to be 
provided. These are summarised below. 
The chapter has provided the necessary guidance in determining the 
organisation as an SMME, and selecting the sponsor for leadership in the 
process. The roles of the sponsor and the board were also provided. 
The balanced scorecard has been proposed as a tool for standardising 
organisational objectives in a simple format for use by the risk management 
team. 
The organisation’s risk character has been defined, which may act as a catalyst 
for a higher quality selection of appetite for risk. The use of key performance 
indicators has also been introduced to the risk management process as the 
performance management system. 
The role of the team has been defined, as well as the selection of the team size 
for the organisation. Finally, a training strategy has been presented, using both 
full training and refresher training for best results. 
The goals of presenting the deliverables and achievement of them, as well as the 
checklists to be used as proof of completion have thus been achieved. 
Completion of the preparatory activities should empower the risk management 
team to conduct the risk management process, and allow the risk management 
sponsor to communicate the achievements of the process to the board. 
The next chapter demonstrates the deliverables required for risk identification. 
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C7 7 Risk Identification 
7.1 Introduction 
The identification step in the risk management process is concerned with the 
identification of assets and valuing of these assets in order to prioritise them for 
risk assessment. 
This chapter shows the procedure involved in identifying the information assets, 
and their subsequent valuation. 
In the previous chapter, the requirement of identification of the environment for 
risk management was pointed out. This environment, when identified in this 
chapter, also determines the duration of the risk management process and the 
resources required. 
The objective of the chapter is to gather enough information about the assets to 
perform the assessments in the next step of the Peculium Model. 
The goals of this chapter are thus: 
1. The method for identifying the environment in which risks are identified, 
assessed, mitigated and monitored 
2. The method for distributing responsibilities for the process to the risk 
management team in the identified environment 
3. The method for identifying the information assets in the environment 
4. The method for prioritising assets based on their information security 
weakness value 
The goals are based on the deliverables of the identification step in risk 
management, as defined in the requirements framework of Chapter 5. 
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The final goal for the chapter is to present the checklists for ensuring completion 
of all deliverables before advancing to the assessment step in the process. The 
collective achievement of the goals achieves the objective. 
7.2 Overview of Risk Identification 
The King Report states that each execution of a risk management process must 
have a system for risk identification [KING 2002]. The IT governance standard, 
CobiT, allows for guidance in this instance by requiring the identification of both 
tangible and intangible assets and then assigning each a value [COBI02 2000]. 
The difference between tangible and intangible, in the case of information 
security, is the separation between system and infrastructure as tangible, and 
information, or data, as intangible.  
The reason for this distinction is that the data contained within the system and 
infrastructure, although processed, stored and accessed through the tangible 
assets, has value within itself, which is not as readily replaceable as a system or 
hardware item. 
Therefore, in this system for risk identification, tangible information assets, or 
tangible assets in shorter form, are system and infrastructure, representing 
hardware and networks. Intangible information assets (or intangible assets) 
represent that data stored on the hardware, processed by the system and 
accessed through the infrastructure. 
However, before identifying these assets, the risk management team must 
determine the environment in which the assets require identification, and confirm 
the responsibilities of the members of the team for identifying the assets. 
The chapter now continues with the presentation of the deliverables of risk 
identification. As with preparation, all deliverables for identification must be 
completed before continuing with the assessment of the identified assets (refer to 
Figure 6.1). 
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The deliverables of risk identification are: 
• The identified environment 
• Distributed responsibilities of the risk management team 
• Identified tangible and intangible assets 
• Asset weakness values 
These deliverables are in a distinct order and may not be completed 
concurrently, or out of sequence. Each deliverable must be completed before 
commencing the next, as displayed in Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1: Order of completion of deliverables 
7.3 Identify the Environment 
Identification of the environment is very important to the SMME owner due to the 
constraints of time and resources present in the small business environment. The 
risk management sponsor must be aware of the implications of a full-scale risk 
management process applied to the whole organisation, as well as the benefits 
the organisation may reap from the process. 
In the case of a micro enterprise, it is recommended that the whole organisation 
be risk managed. However, in the case of an upper level small or medium 
enterprise, the business units facing the greater risks or holding the higher value 
assets should be targeted for a first iteration, and other business units scheduled 
for a later iteration. 
The challenge of identifying the environment before knowing the risk or asset 
values does, however, face the sponsor. The sponsor is expected to make a 
justified decision on the environment for board approval without the justifying 
information. 
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In the case of a repetition of the risk management process, this challenge is 
removed, as a previously unassessed environment is selected, or the same 
environment is assessed again to determine a reduction or increase in risk. 
7.3.1 Information to make Decisions 
In a new environment for risk management, it is not that simple. In this case, the 
sponsor must use information already available to make an informed decision on 
the selection of the environment. This information may come in many forms: 
• The environment is requested by the board for the risk management 
process. This is the easier option as the sponsor is handed the 
environment. This request may stem from an adoption of corporate 
governance and the requirement for risk management. 
• The organisation has suffered an exposure and subsequent loss in 
business units, or as a whole. In this case, the organisation has 
experienced the cost of an exposed risk, and this has catalysed the 
requirement of analysing all risk and having improved protection should 
another attack occur. An example of such an attack is a virus attack 
causing a lack of productivity in the sales department.  
• The organisation has been made aware of a similar enterprise suffering a 
loss and is willing to make the investment in risk management in order to 
be better prepared in the same situation. 
• A business unit or the whole of the organisation suspects untoward action 
by staff and wishes to reduce the risks facing their assets from internal 
attacks. 
There may be various other sources of information in determining the 
environment. What is, however, important is that the selection of a poor 
environment does not bring the process of risk management into disfavour with 
the board as a high-cost waste of time. In other words, selecting a business unit 
with no assets of great value and no identifiable threats as a “test run” is not 
recommended. 
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7.3.2 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the environment be identified, 
approved and documented (refer to Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1: Identification checklist 1 
Identification Activities 
            
Step One  Identify the environment/scope of risk management    
  1 Identify business units     
  2 Identify environment       
  3 Approve identified environment     
  4 Document environment     
                    
          
Risk Management Environment 
            
Business units/departments/divisions included in environment:     
                    
7.4 Distribute Risk Management Responsibilities 
Some risk management responsibilities were listed in Chapter 6. Not all team 
members are expected to perform the same tasks. For example, a team member 
very familiar with technology or systems may be more suited to identifying 
assets, whereas a more analytical team member may be more suited to 
assessing the risks identified. 
The same applies in the case of the environment; not all team members originally 
identified may have knowledge of the environment that is planned for 
assessment. The discretion lies with the sponsor whether all team members 
should remain in the team based on their qualities or skills, or whether only staff 
in the affected business units need remain. The appropriateness of identifying 
the environment after the team is questionable. This is, however, required as in 
the requirements framework. For the purposes of this dissertation it remains in 
this step of the process. 
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It is important that the temptation of too few team members not lead the sponsor 
into overloading the team members. The temptation may arise from the 
uncomfortable restriction on resources of the staff members to assist in the 
process. The focus must remain on the importance of conducting the process 
with due diligence. 
The requirement of external resources may also be faced by the sponsor. These 
external resources are not necessarily external to the enterprise, but may be staff 
members not included in the team. The use of hired external resources is, 
however, a cost to the enterprise and should be considered carefully before 
decisions are made. 
Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the originally selected team members 
be verified for the environment and responsibilities determined, distributed and 
documented (refer to Table 7.2). All checkboxes must be checked before 
continuing to step three. 
Table 7.2: Identification checklist 2 
Identification Activities 
             
Step Two  Distribute responsibilities        
 1 Verify team members     
  2 Determine responsibilities     
  3 Assign responsibilities to the team members  
  4 Document assigned responsibilities     
                      
           
Team Responsibilities 
            
Team member Responsibilities     
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7.5 Identify Tangible and Intangible Assets 
In this deliverable of the identification step, the first document that is presented to 
the board at regular intervals is created. The information asset register provides 
the board or senior management forum with a list of the systems, infrastructure 
and information in the possession of the organisation, or if the environment is 
restricted, in the environment targeted. 
The organisation does have the opportunity to identify all assets used across all 
business units; in fact, it should be aware of all assets in place. The risk 
management team is, however, restricted by set schedules and budgets, and 
should not be used as a ‘nice-to-have’ team to gather information it does not 
require to complete its function. 
7.5.1 Creating the List of Assets 
The asset list is created by listing the assets as systems, information or 
infrastructure. 
• Systems are products or applications that process the information for the 
user, such as presenting financial figures in a structured report. Systems 
are either off-the-shelf products or custom developed. Systems may also 
be integration groups of systems that offer a synergistic benefit. Such a 
system group must also be seen as a separate asset. Such integrated 
systems usually require the intervention of a developer to return to full 
functionality. 
• Information is the data that is generated, accessed or stored by the 
system. The data is unique in any enterprise and cannot be replaced by 
an off-the-shelf purchase. 
• Infrastructure includes the hardware, networks, input and output devices 
used to access or process information through a system. Infrastructure is 
usually replaceable at a cost, but requires installation by a skilled IT 
technician. 
 132
7.5.2 Creating the Asset Register 
The asset register is not a simple list of assets, but in fact provides a more 
detailed image of the asset for the board. The asset register does contain the 
asset list, but also stores properties of the asset. 
• An asset may be used across an enterprise and by various business units. 
However, a primary business unit must take ownership of the asset. 
• The access route to the asset must also be determined, for example a 
specific pocket of data is facilitated by a server and a system. The asset 
register must list both the server that stores the information and the 
system through which it is viewed. 
• The users of the asset must be listed. Most attacks on assets are by the 
hand of staff. As such, the users that access the asset must be listed. 
• The security requirements of the asset may be any or all of the following: 
o Confidentiality of the asset is a security requirement if the asset is a 
proprietary system of great value, or sensitive data.  
o Integrity of the asset is a security requirement if the accuracy of the 
asset is of great value, e.g. the accuracy of salaries. 
o Availability of the asset is a security requirement as the lack thereof 
may cause a damaging loss to productivity. 
With the asset register completed for the environment, the board is presented 
with the first valuable information because of the risk management process. The 
board now has access to the list of assets with confidentiality requirements, 
those assets that require integrity and lastly those assets that offer productivity. 
The asset register is used further in the next step where weakness values are 
assigned to the assets based on their security requirements. 
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7.5.3 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the assets be identified and added to 
the asset register with the associated properties (refer to Table 7.3). 
Table 7.3: Identification checklist 3 
Identification Activities 
            
Step 
Three  Identify assets       
  1 Create list of all systems, information, hardware and infrastructure   
  2 Complete asset register with properties   
   
 
7.5.4 Asset Register  
The asset register as shown below provides an at-a-glance list of the assets in 
the environment with their properties identified (refer to Table 6.2). This is the 
first version of the asset register, which develops throughout this step in the 
process. 
Table 7.4: Asset register 1 
Asset Register 
            
  Properties   
Asset       
Business 
Unit 
Access 
Route Users CIA    
            
                   
7.6 Evaluate Assets against Weakness Value Scale 
The assets identified in the previous deliverable may become a lengthy list of 
assets of indeterminate value. For this reason assets are valued for weakness to 
assist the selection of assets for which the risk assessment is performed. 
This is a vital step for SMMEs as the cost of assessing all assets for risk may be 
too expensive an exercise for their resources to conduct. 
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The weakness valuation of the assets is based on the security requirements 
determined for the assets and captured in the asset register. The monetary 
replacement or purchase cost of asset is not considered, as its weakness value 
goes beyond its price tag.  
7.6.1 Asset Valuation System 
The system for valuing the assets is as follows: 
• Each of the security requirements has equal weight in the system. In other 
words, if two security requirements apply, each carries a weight of 50%. If 
all three apply, each carries a weight of 33.3%. 
• Each security requirement poses challenges to the asset to determine its 
strength against the security requirements.  
• Values are awarded based on the lack of strength, or presence of 
weakness. As such, the higher the weakness value of the asset, the more 
crucial its risk assessment and subsequent mitigation of the risk. 
The asset register must be updated with the weakness values assigned to the 
assets, and reordered according to highest weakness value. Those assets rated 
with the highest weakness value are then presented to the board for selection for 
risk assessment. The board makes the decision on the number of assets to 
select. In the case of low weakness valued assets, a smaller amount may be 
selected for assessment. A low weakness valued asset is valued lower than 
30%. 
7.6.2 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the weakness values be calculated 
and stored in the register. The register is then ordered according to highest 
weakness value and the selected assets for risk assessment identified by the 
board (refer to Table 7.5). All checkboxes must be checked before continuing to 
step five. 
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Table 7.5: Identification checklist 4 
Identification Activities 
            
Step Four  Evaluate assets against weakness value scale      
  1 Calculate weakness values         
  2 Capture weakness values to asset register      
  3 Reorder register according to weakness value       
  4 Identify highest weakness value assets        
                    
7.6.3 Asset Register 
The asset register is updated to include the weakness value and is reordered 
according to highest weakness value. The categories identified earlier now 
become properties (refer to Table 7.6). 
Table 7.6: Asset register 2 
Asset Register 
           
        Properties   
Asset Business Unit Interacts with Users CIA 
Weakness 
Value  
        
             
7.6.4 Weakness Value Calculation 
The calculation of the weakness value is dependent on the security requirements 
that apply. Each security requirement offers challenges to the asset, with a score 
of 5 assigned to a “Yes” or “No” answer, depending on the resulting weakness or 
strength of the asset (refer to Table 7.7). 
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Table 7.7: Asset value calculation 
Weakness Value Scale       Yes/No CIA Value   
Weakness
Value 
            
Availability  
Can operations continue when * is unavailable?  No 5    
Can unavailability create a loss of revenue?  Yes 5    
Can * be restored within reasonable period? Yes 0  3.33 
           
Confidentiality              
Is * confidential?    Yes 5  5.00 
           
Integrity                  
Is * encrypted or protected by secure access?  No 5  5.00 
           
          13.33 
                  88.89%
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the methodology for the identification of assets for 
the risk management process. The goals of the chapter have been achieved and 
are summarised below. 
The first requirement of this chapter, the identification of the risk management 
environment, may occur in many forms, whether by board decision, proposition 
or response to an exposure. 
The chapter has also provided the sponsor with the opportunity of electing 
certain members of the risk management team to certain tasks, as befits their 
strengths. 
This chapter has provided the first important register of information to the board 
as proof of deliverable completion, the asset register. The chapter has also 
demonstrated how an enterprise may value its assets based on confidentiality, 
integrity and availability requirements. 
The chapter has presented checklists that enforce the completion of each 
deliverable before continuing to the next. 
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The next chapter on risk assessment makes use of the asset register information 
to determine the threats, vulnerabilities and risk values for the highest valued 
assets. 
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C8 8 Risk Assessment 
8.1 Introduction 
The assessment of risks empowers an organisation to combat its vulnerabilities, 
recognise threats and prepare for solutions. Risk assessment may also expose 
areas in what the organisation thought was a well-protected system to expose its 
weaknesses in protecting sensitive information. 
Assessment is thus a double-edged sword. While it is in the best interest of any 
organisation to be aware of the risks facing its information security, it is also an 
unavoidable increase in the potential expenses that result in the discovery of its 
systems, infrastructure and information protective requirements. 
For the owner of the SMME, any unplanned expense is unwanted. The new risk 
of spending on reducing risks with no guarantee of return faces the SMME. The 
owner cannot be assured that an attacker, albeit an external hacker or 
disgruntled employee, will not attempt to corrupt the organisation’s data, or steal 
sensitive information. Neither can the owner be guaranteed that this attacker will 
attack the organisation. This issue becomes the age-old mantra of “rather safe 
than sorry”. It is the same reason why the organisation is insured against 
physical theft, has a security gate at the front door and a strong box for petty 
cash. 
In this digital age, the SMME owner should be just as concerned with the 
protection of the organisation’s information assets as the physical assets also 
housed within the organisation’s premises. More often than not, the information 
assets will exceed the physical assets in replacement value. 
The objective of this chapter is thus the Peculium methodology for assessment. 
The goals of the chapter are as follows: 
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1. The method for identifying threats 
2. The method for identifying vulnerabilities 
3. The method for determining the likelihood of occurrence of the threat 
4. The method for determining the impact of the threat 
5. The method for calculating the risks facing the highest weakness valued 
assets as identified in Chapter 7 
6. The method for including the risk values in the organisation’s IT plan 
7. The checklists for ensuring the completion of each deliverable 
The goals are based on the requirements for assessment listed in Chapter 5. The 
collective achievement of the goals facilitates the achievement of the objective. 
The chapter is structured around the achievement of goals 1 to 6, with the 
checklists for each goal distributed throughout. 
8.2 Overview of Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment, as defined in Chapter 2, includes risk analysis. Analysis is the 
gathering of the information used to assess the risk, in this case the identification 
of threats and vulnerabilities, measurement of the likelihood of occurrence and 
impact measurement. All of this data is then used to create the risk value and 
prioritise the risks from highest to lowest for finding the highest impact mitigation 
strategies in the next step of risk management. 
The methods employed in risk analysis and assessments vary across different 
industries and methodologies [OCTA01 2003] [CRAM 2005]. There are 
advocates for both qualitative and quantitative risk analysis methods, and various 
techniques for calculating the risks [KARA 2005]. 
In this dissertation the qualitative method for risk assessment is used as it offers 
a simpler, shorter and more affordable option to the SMME owner. Quantitative 
methods are often mathematical or financial in nature and usually require a 
software tool at a purchase cost [KARA 2005]. An example of such a tool is the 
CRAMM V Express tool examined in Chapter 4.  
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The SMME owner and the risk management team in this methodology are under 
the constraints of a limited time frame and budget, and are also only provided 
with the training for conducting this methodology. The qualitative methods for risk 
assessment are a better fit to the SMME due to the simplified calculation 
methods used [KARA 2005]. 
This chapter presents the methods used to analyse risks and then perform the 
required assessment. The composite information should provide the risk 
management team with enough information to enter the next step of risk 
management, being risk mitigation (refer to Figure 6.1). 
The deliverables of risk assessment are: 
• The identified threats 
• The identified vulnerabilities 
• The calculated likelihood of occurrence 
• The measured impact 
• The calculated risks 
• The inclusion of the assessment in the IT plan 
The deliverables are in a semi-sequential order, as a pair of deliverables may be 
completed concurrently (refer to Figure 8.1). The risk management team may 
distribute these assessments to reduce the time of the assessment step. 
 
Figure 8.1: Order of completion of deliverables 
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8.3 Identify Threats 
Threats to information assets may come in many forms and from various 
sources. Not all risks facing information assets may be blamed on the hacker, but 
neither can the hacker be excluded. The hacker is one of many threats facing 
any information-based environment. 
Threats have been categorised in various ways, as it is easier to identify threats 
when the analyst is provided with some guidelines. 
The following threat categories are used for this analysis method. They are 
based on the OCTAVE method but are used in a simplified format for use by an 
SMME [ALBE 2003]: 
• Internal threats are those propagated by staff or systems within the 
organisation. Staff within the organisation may accidentally or intentionally 
harm an asset. Internal systems may accidentally affect another system or 
other asset. Internal threats are thus classified as human or system 
threats. 
• External threats are those propagated by external people or systems 
attacking the organisation. These again may be accidental, or malicious. 
External threats are also classified as human or system threats. 
• Other threats, as the name implies, include those threats that are not 
propagated by people or systems. Such threats include natural disasters. 
8.3.1 Matching Threats to the Assets 
The ISO 17799 information security standard provides a list of threats that may 
face any organisation [SABS 2000] [GMIT 2002]. The list is not conclusive and 
may be added to should other threats be identified. The risk management team 
should review this list and identify those risks that apply to the assets identified 
and valued in Chapter 7. Refer to Appendix 4 for the full ISO 17799 list of threats. 
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8.3.2 Create Risk Register 
The second large proof documentation provided to the board is created in this 
step. The risk register is the collection of risk profiles, each of which is a 
combination of various pockets of data forming a descriptive map of the risk 
facing the information asset. This risk register is used to prioritise the risks once 
assessed, and also holds the mitigation information for the risks [BARR 1995]. 
The risk profile grows and develops throughout the risk management process, 
starting with information from the asset register, gaining information through the 
assessment, and being finally completed in monitoring. 
The risk profile is referred to again in this chapter. In relation to threats, however, 
the following information is captured: 
• Asset name and properties are the starting point of the risk profile. The 
risk profile identity is based upon the asset register. The board should be 
able to gauge a picture of the asset based on the name, access route, 
host system and business unit. The full asset register still remains holding 
all the asset information. 
• Threat names and properties for each threat identified for the asset. The 
threat properties are as follows: 
o The threat description provides a non-professional’s explanation of 
the threat, e.g. “failure of network components” may be a layman’s 
description of a switch reducing routing speed to a non-
performance amount. 
o The CIA affected by the threat is added. Not all threats may 
threaten each of the security requirements, but it is vital to 
understand which are threatened. For example, the switch used 
above will threaten network availability, thus the security 
requirement of availability. 
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8.3.3 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the threats be selected, added to the 
risk profile and the description and effect on CIA also added (refer to Table 8.1). 
All checkboxes except for 2 must be checked to indicate the completed task, and 
completed step one. Number 2 is not mandatory. The checkbox may be left 
blank. 
Table 8.1: Assessment checklist 1 
Assessment Activities 
            
Step One  Identify threats        
  1 Select threats       
 2 Add more threats if applicable      
  3 Add threats to risk profile      
  4 Add descriptions and CIA affected to risk profile    
                   
8.3.4 Risk Profile Example 
The risk profile contains the name of the asset and the threats facing it. The 
information regarding the threat captured to the profile is the threat name, 
description and effect on CIA (refer to Figure 8.2). The risk profile continues to 
expand throughout this chapter. Each addition to the risk profile going forward is 
highlighted using bold font in the figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Risk profile 1 
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8.4 Identify Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities, unlike threats, are only concerned with the organisation itself, and 
not the outside world. Vulnerabilities of a government system, travel 
infrastructure or IT facilitating cabling cannot be altered by the organisation itself, 
and neither should the risk management team be utilised to attempt to solve their 
external environment’s problems. 
Vulnerabilities are, however, linked to both internal and external threats. An 
internal vulnerability, such as poor cabling structures within the building, may be 
threatened by an infiltration by an external hacker, abusing the weak cabling 
security for access to the information assets. 
The same applies to internal threats, such as the inaccurate allocation of user 
access rights, exposing the organisation to the internal threat of unauthorised 
access to software. 
Vulnerability itself causes no harm, but requires a threat to the associated asset 
to create the harm. There is not always a distinct link between threats and 
vulnerabilities, but awareness of both is vital. The ISO 17799 states that a threat 
without a corresponding vulnerability creates a non-risk, or the absence of risk 
[SABS 2000] [SPIN 1999].  
The use of a software tool to identify network vulnerabilities may be used, but as 
stated earlier in the chapter, is not required. Appendix 4 provides the full list of 
vulnerabilities provided by ISO 17799. Again, the risk management team may 
add to the list if so required.  
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8.4.1 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the vulnerabilities be identified, 
mapped to the threats and then added to the risk profile (refer to Table 8.2). All 
checkboxes, except 2, must be checked before continuing to step three. Number 
2 is not mandatory. The checkbox may be left blank. 
Table 8.2: Assessment checklist 2 
Assessment Activities 
            
Step Two  Identify vulnerabilities       
  1 Identify the vulnerabilities applicable to the assets    
 2 Add more vulnerabilities if applicable     
  3 Map the vulnerabilities to the threats     
  4 Capture all information to the risk profile     
                   
8.4.2 Risk Profile Example 
The risk profile now includes the vulnerabilities that have been mapped to the 
identified threats (refer to Figure 8.3). The vulnerabilities have been added as an 
extension of the threats and are indicated in bold font. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Risk profile 2 
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8.5 Calculate Likelihood of Occurrence 
The likelihood of occurrence in risk management is the estimation or probability 
of the vulnerability being exposed to the threat [RISK 2002]. The likelihood is a 
subjective measure that could be based on historical data if available.  If this is 
not available, the likelihood relies on the analysis of the threat and vulnerability 
information and probability estimation. 
The likelihood levels are defined as [SABS 2000]: 
• A high probability or likelihood of occurrence is the occurrence of a threat 
that is highly likely, or highly probable to occur. 
• A medium probability or likelihood of occurrence is the occurrence of a 
threat that is somewhat likely, or possible to occur. 
• A low probability or likelihood of occurrence is the occurrence of a threat 
that is not likely to occur. 
For use later in the chapter, the values of 3, 6 and 9 are assigned to the levels for 
low, medium and high, respectively. This scale provides a wider scope for the 
calculation of impact and risk values later in this chapter, and also assists in the 
prioritisation of these values. The likelihood of occurrence or probability value is 
always denoted by the letter P for use in formulae. 
This new information about the probability or likelihood of occurrence of the 
threat or exposure of the vulnerability must also be mapped to the risk profile. 
The risk management team must update the risk profile as the information is 
obtained. 
8.5.1 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the likelihood levels be assigned and 
captured to the risk profile (refer to Table 8.3). All checkboxes must be checked 
before continuing to step four. 
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Table 8.3: Assessment checklist 3 
Assessment Activities 
            
Step Three  Calculate likelihood of occurrence (P)      
  1 Assign likelihood values        
  2 Add likelihood values to risk profile     
                  
8.5.2 Risk Profile Example 
The risk profile is updated with the likelihood of occurrence values. The letter P 
represents the likelihood of occurrence or probability value assigned to the threat 
and is indicated in bold font. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Risk profile 3 
8.6 Perform Impact Measurement 
Impact measurement, similar to likelihood of occurrence, makes use of the 
information gathered from identifying threats and vulnerabilities to estimate 
impact values. 
The impact measurement of the threat is determined through the business 
impact that the exposure of the vulnerability will create. This business impact is 
measured considering the impact on generic areas of the business. These 
generic areas include reputation, health, productivity, legal penalties, monetary 
factors and facilities [ALBE 2003]. 
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The method for measuring the impact of a realised threat has been represented 
in many different forms in literature [SPIN 1999] [SUH 2003] [ALBE 2003]. 
However, these methods are not very distinct or easily used by SMMEs. 
The various methods require testing for suitability to the SMME environment. 
8.6.1 Determining the Impact Areas 
The impact of a threat can reach various areas of the business, depending on the 
industry. The generic areas already identified may increase the complexity and 
duration of the impact measurement. For this reason, the areas are compounded 
into the following: 
1. Monetary loss. The exposure of a vulnerability to a threat may cause 
financial harm to the organisation in the context of a replacement cost of 
an asset, or revenue lost as a result of the exposure. For a small 
organisation, cash flow may be a great challenge, and monetary loss a 
great impact. The level of impact is compared to the appetite for risk 
identified in the preparatory activities. The ranges are unique to each 
organisation. For the purposes of demonstrating impact measurement, the 
appetite is R80 000 and the ranges R0 – R10 000 representing low 
impact, R11 000 – R40 000 representing a medium impact, and R41 000 - 
R80 000 representing a high impact. 
2. Productivity loss. The loss of productivity in an organisation may be 
represented by the cost of payroll for the duration of the exposure. The 
impact is calculated using the following formula: 
Impact (Productivity) = Days × Payroll  
The amount is compared to the appetite for risk ranges to determine the 
impact level of high, medium or low. 
3. Reputation loss. SMMEs in South Africa account for a great number of 
enterprises. As such, outperforming the rest is vital for an SMME’s 
survival. The loss in reputation may cause loss of accreditation of an 
industry standard, loss of customers and future growth. 
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These three areas represent the major concerns for an SMME and may be 
expanded to include more specific areas [ALBE 2003]. 
The areas are used to determine the impact of the threat. The method for using 
these areas is as yet undefined. 
8.6.2 Determining the Ideal Impact Measurement Method 
Three methods for measuring qualitative impact as mentioned above can be 
defined as worst case scenario, average impact and weighted impact. 
• Worst case scenario impact assigns a value of high, medium or low to all 
the impacts identified, and assigns the highest value to the total impact. 
• Average impact also assigns a value of high, medium or low, but in this 
case a numerical association is made and the average calculated. A value 
of 1 is assigned to low, 2 to medium and 3 to high. Total values of 1-3 are 
low, 4-6 are medium and 7-9 are high. The 9-point scale is used again as 
explained in 8.5. 
• Weighted impact assigns weights to each impact identified, and calculates 
the total in a formula using the weights to favour certain impacts above 
others. The weights may differ in different industries. In the scope of the 
SMME, however, the monetary factor is almost always of highest concern. 
For the purposes of this test, the monetary area is granted the highest 
weight, with equal weight for productivity and reputation. Monetary weight 
is 40%, and productivity and reputation each 30%. 
Impact, when used in a formula, is always denoted using the letter I. The 
abovementioned methods cannot be proven or disproved without testing the 
methods in the same scenarios. The scenario tests selected for this are as 
follows: 
• A threat of malicious software exposes the open communication lines to 
the SMME.  
• A threat of theft exposes poor physical protection of the building. 
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• A threat of wilful damage exposes the inadequate allocation of access 
rights. 
8.6.3 Scenario Tests of the Impact Measurement Methods 
Three scenarios are provided to test the impact measures. 
Scenario 1 
A virus attack causes a server to crash. The threat is malicious software; the 
vulnerability is unprotected public communication lines. The technical support 
staff will take two days to repair the damage. 
The areas identified and methods discussed above are presented in Table 8.4. 
Table 8.4: Impact measurement method test 1 
Malicious Software 
Monetary 
loss 
Revenue loss for 2 days is R20 000. 
Impact is medium. 
Productivity Server downtime of 2 days. Payroll per day is R1 800. Technical staff 
required to recover the server and repair the damage are paid R500 
per day. 
I(Pr) = Days × (Payroll + Technical staff) 
I(Pr) = 2 × (1 800 + 500) 
I(Pr) = R4 600 
Impact is low. 
Reputation  Some customers are lost due to the 2 days of downtime. 
Impact is medium. 
Worst case Average Weighted 
The highest impact is 
medium. 
Impact is medium. 
I  = Medium + Low = 
Medium 
I = 2 + 1 + 2 
I = 5 
Impact is medium. 
I = Medium + Low + 
Medium 
I  =  0.6 + 0.16 + 0.6 
I = 1.36 
Impact is medium. 
 
The impact has been determined to be medium in all three methods. No distinct 
method is as yet selectable.  
Scenario 2 
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The vulnerability of lack of physical protection has been exposed to the threat of 
theft. All servers and desktop computers have been stolen and will take at least 
one working week to replace. The scenario is presented in Table 8.5. 
Table 8.5: Impact measurement method test 2 
Lack of Physical Protection 
Monetary 
loss 
All server and desktop hardware must be replaced at a cost of R70 
000. Revenue loss for 5 days is R50 000. 
Impact is high. 
Productivity The wait for hardware is at least 5 days.  
I(Pr) = Days × Payroll 
I(Pr) = 5 × 1 800  
I(Pr) = R9 000 
Impact is low. 
Reputation  Many customers are lost due to the 5 days of downtime. 
Impact is high. 
Worst case Average Weighted 
The highest impact value is 
high. 
Impact is high. 
I = High + Low + High 
I = 3 + 1 + 3 
I = 7 
Impact is high. 
I = High + Low + High 
I  = 1 + 0.3 + 0.9 
I = 2.2 
Impact is high. 
 
Again, the test does not provide a clearly discernible best method as all results 
are high. A final test is attempted. 
Scenario 3 
The vulnerability of wrong allocation of access rights is exposed to wilful damage. 
Information is corrupted and irretrievably damaged. Recovery of the information 
is of vital importance. The scenario is presented in Table 8.6. 
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Table 8.6: Impact measurement method test 3 
Wrong Allocation of Access Rights 
Monetary 
loss 
The data is an information asset. It cannot be purchased for 
replacement. Revenue intake is reduced to half measures. 
Impact is high. 
Productivity Productivity is reduced due to the unavailability of the data. The 
recreation of the data doubles the lack of productivity. It takes 4 days 
to recreate the data. This circumstance changes the formula: 
I(Pr) = Days * (Payroll + Recreation productivity) 
I(Pr) = 4 * (1 800 + 1 800) 
I(Pr) = R14 400 
Impact is medium. 
Reputation  Many customers are lost due to the effort of recreating the data. 
Customers fear the repercussions to their own business due to the 
wilful damage. 
Impact is high. 
Worst case Average Weighted 
The highest impact is high. 
Impact is high. 
I = High + Medium + High 
I = 3 + 2 + 3 
I = 8 
Impact is high. 
I = High + Medium + High 
I  = 1.2 + 0.6 + 0.9 
I = 2.7 
Impact is high. 
 
Again, all three methods provide the same answer. The conclusion may then be 
made that the calculation for determining the three impact values is sound and 
provides correct evidence for calculating the total impact value. As each method 
yields the same or a similar result, the easiest method should be used for the 
benefit of the risk management team. The simplest method is average and is 
entered as the method for this methodology. 
8.6.4 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the impact values be assigned to the 
threats and captured to the risk profile (refer to Table 8.7). All checkboxes must 
be checked to allow continuation to step five. 
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Table 8.7: Assessment checklist 4 
Assessment Activities 
            
Step Four  Perform impact measurement (I)       
  1 Assign impact values        
  2 Add impact values to risk profile      
                 
8.6.5 Risk Profile Example 
The risk profile is updated with the impact measures assigned to each threat. A 
new leg in the risk profile tree is created to hold the assessment data. The impact 
values are represented by the letter I and are indicated on the profile using bold 
font. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.5: Risk profile 4 
8.7 Calculate Risks 
The culmination of the information that has been gathered to date, the purpose of 
the assessment, is the calculation of the risk values. These risk values provide 
the necessary prioritisation of risks to mitigate first, based on the urgency of the 
high value. 
There are various methods of calculating risks and various arguments for and 
against these methods. 
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The risk management team, as applied in this methodology, is a group of 
individuals that most likely do not have a background in statistical and 
mathematical measurement of risk. For this reason, qualitative measures have 
been used for this calculation [KARA 2005]. 
8.7.1 The Standard Risk Calculation Method 
The information gathered thus far in assessment, to summarise, is: 
• The threats facing the asset 
• The vulnerabilities of the asset 
• The probability (likelihood of occurrence) of the threat (P) 
• The impact of the occurrence of the threat (I) 
Traditional calculation of the risk value has been based on the formula: 
Risk (R) = Probability (P) * Impact (I) 
This calculation is qualitatively performed using a PI matrix that allows the 
plotting of the risk value, based on the product of probability and impact (PI). 
The column representing the impact value is highlighted, and intersects with the 
row representing the probability value. The intersection becomes the risk value 
(refer to Table 8.8). 
Table 8.8: The standard PI matrix [STEP 2002] 
  Impact 
 L M H 
L L M M 
M M M H 
Probability 
H M H H 
 
This system is flawed, however, as a risk with high impact and low probability 
(HILP) has the same value as a risk with high probability and low impact (HPLI), 
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now referred to as the HILP-HPLI problem [STEP 2002]. The same applies to 
any other risks valued as high, medium or low. The prioritisation mitigation of the 
list becomes impossible. 
The answer to the HILP-HPLI problem has been addressed through various 
means. One approach is the assigning of numeric values to high, medium and 
low, still not resolving the prioritisation issue. Another method is increasing of the 
impact values of high, medium and low, causing the higher impact risk to be 
mitigated first (refer to Table 8.9) [STEP 2002]. 
Table 8.9: The adjusted PI matrix 
  Impact 
 L 2 M 4 H 8 
L 2 4 8 16 
M 3 6 12 24 
Probability 
H 4 8 16 32 
 
This raises the question of whether a higher probability risk is really lower in 
value than a higher impact risk. If this is true, the assigning of risk values is 
useless, as the impact values carry a greater weight than the probability. The 
time spent on probability and risk calculation is wasted and the requirements of 
Chapter 5 are not met. 
8.7.2 The Standard Risk Calculation Method Revisited 
The information gathered using the likelihood of occurrence and impact 
measurement methods has yielded values that may be classified as high, 
medium or low. 
The formula for calculating risk is retained and likelihood of occurrence (P) is 
multiplied by impact (I). The resulting value provides a numerical figure for 
prioritising risks and thus determining the top risks to be mitigated. The nature of 
the 9-point scale used for high, medium and low, as well as the method and 
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areas for calculating impact have provided a broad range of possible risk figures, 
not as contained as in the method described above. 
Scenario 1 used earlier is now completed to calculate the risk value. A probability 
of medium is assumed. This value is based on qualitatively collected data, and 
does not change to a quantitative statistical or monetary value. It remains 
qualitative. The risk value calculation is presented in Table 8.10. 
Table 8.10: Calculation of the scenario 1 risk value 
Asset Threat P I R 
Server Malicious software 6 5 30 
 
These risk values calculated for each threat facing the highest weakness valued 
assets may now be prioritised into a benchmark top five highest risks, or should 
the organisation prefer, risk values higher than a numeric amount. The selection 
of five top risks is the minimum, thus eradicating the temptation to reduce the list 
and shorten the process. 
8.7.3 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the risk values be calculated and 
added to the risk profile, and finally prioritised for the top risks selection (refer to 
Table 8.11). All checkboxes must be checked for completion of step five. 
Table 8.11: Assessment checklist 5 
Assessment Activities 
            
Step Five  Calculate risks      
  1 Calculate risk values      
 2 Add risk values to risk profile    
 3 Sort risk register by risk value    
  4 Select top risks    
                    
 157
8.7.4 Complete Risk Profile 
The completed risk profile provides all the information required for risk mitigation. 
The latest addition, the risk values, are presented in bold font (refer to Figure 
8.6). 
8.8 Include Risk Values in IT Plan 
All of the information gathered thus far in the asset register and through risk 
assessment is represented in the risk profile of each asset. 
The risk profiles collected create a risk register that can be inserted into the IT 
plan of the organisation. This is handed to the board as an informative 
explanation of the standing of the organisation’s risks and assets. 
If no IT plan exists for the organisation, the sponsor must hand the risk register to 
the board. The risk management team is not to be used to create an IT plan. 
The risk register is again updated in the remaining steps in the risk management 
process. Each update must be communicated to the board and staff to ensure 
that the parties are aware of the risks and how the organisation is combating 
them. 
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Figure 8.6: The complete risk profile 
 159
Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the risk register be included in the IT 
plan, or handed to the board (refer to Table 8.12). 
Table 8.12: Assessment checklist 6 
Assessment Activities 
            
Step Six  Include risk profiles in IT plan      
  1 Include risk profiles in IT plan or hand to the board    
                   
8.9 Conclusion 
The risk management process, as presented in the chapters of this dissertation, 
has been customised from established risk management methodologies. It 
offers the risk management team a simple but effective method of calculating 
the risks facing the organisation’s information assets to create a prioritised list 
for mitigation and ultimately monitoring. 
This chapter has achieved the goals specified and is summarised below. 
The chapter used traditional methods in the use of the ISO 17799 lists of known 
threats and vulnerabilities to information assets. A connection needs to be 
made between a threat and vulnerability to create a risk. The failure to make a 
connection removes the threat from the risk profile. 
The method for determining likelihood of occurrence has also been traditional, 
whereas the impact measurement method has been determined to be the 
average value of the three areas assessed; being monetary factors, productivity 
and reputation loss. This method was selected after testing three methods; 
worst case, average and weighted yielded no clear best option. Average was 
selected for its simplicity to benefit the risk management team. 
The chapter has also presented the challenge of calculating risk values, as the 
traditional methods do not provide the answer to the HILP-HPLI problem. The 
benefit of the 9-point scale and impact measurement method used is the use of 
numerical associations with the risk values, thus removing the HILP-HPLI 
problem. 
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The chapter has also presented the checklists that ensure that all deliverables 
are completed before continuing to the next step of risk management, namely 
mitigation. 
Chapter 9 presents the methodology for risk mitigation. The risk values 
calculated in this chapter are carried forward for mitigation strategies, and the 
risk register is used to host additional information known as the action plans. 
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C9 9 Risk Mitigation 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The mitigation or reduction of risk is where all the information, knowledge and 
experience of the past steps in the risk management process come together to 
reduce the risk. 
The mitigation step is where information gathering ends and interpretation of 
the information begins as financial decisions are made that may affect the way 
the organisation operates. 
This is true to a large extent for the SMME. Smaller enterprises are more easily 
adaptable to change, as change is usually on a smaller scale. Any change is, 
however, difficult. The mitigation of a risk, for example the threat of 
unauthorised access, may lead to training all staff of the SMME to use more 
effective passwords and lock their workstations when they leave their desks. 
This may seem a small change to implement, but changing the habit of a whole 
organisation is difficult. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide the Peculium methodology for 
mitigation. 
The goals of the chapter are: 
1. The method for identifying the mitigation strategy for each risk 
2. The method for selecting the controls for the risks identified for mitigation 
3. The method for creating an action plan for each risk 
4. The checklists for each deliverable  
The goals are based on the requirements listed in Chapter 5. The collective 
achievement of the goals constitutes the achievement of the objective. 
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9.2 Overview of Risk Mitigation  
Risk mitigation, different in a sense from risk assessment, does not offer such 
variety in methods and tools. Risk mitigation can be found to follow the steps of 
selecting the strategy, finding the control and planning its implementation in 
most methodologies [SPIN 1999] [SUH 2003] [ALBE 2003]. 
The difference in this methodology is the manner in which the information from 
previous steps is presented. The asset register and risk register are in a unique 
format in this methodology. 
The decisions made in this step of the risk management process provide the 
organisation with the habitual changes, tool implementations and policies to 
reduce its risk to information assets.  
These changes and implementations are performed in the next step, namely 
monitoring (refer to Figure 6.1). 
The deliverables of the mitigation step are: 
• The identified mitigation strategy for each risk 
• The selected controls for each risk identified for mitigation 
• The action plan for the mitigation of each risk 
The deliverables are in sequential order and may not be completed out of order. 
 
Figure 9.1: Order of completion of deliverables  
9.3 Identify the Mitigation Strategy 
The mitigation strategies that are required to be assigned to each risk 
determine how the risk is treated going forward. There are four specific options 
available as strategies for the risk, each with their own advantages and 
disadvantages [SCHW 2002]. 
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• Risk avoidance is the most affordable but most dangerous of strategies 
to assign. In the case of avoidance, nothing is done about the risk. The 
organisation takes the decision to take no action against the risk until 
such time as it is deemed dangerous enough to mitigate. The risks that 
are prioritised for mitigation are already at a critical level. This strategy 
should not be considered for high impact or probability risks. In the event 
of an iteration of the process not yielding high impact or probability risks, 
such a strategy may be justified. 
• Risk termination is the removal of the asset at risk from the organisation. 
The selection of this strategy would create many consequences, such as 
reduction in productivity and loss of information. An asset facing a threat 
to its availability should not be considered for termination, as the 
mitigation strategy becomes the threat. 
• Risk mitigation in most cases involves the implementation of controls that 
reduce the threat to the asset. In some cases the control is system 
related (a code change), infrastructure related (improved perimeter 
security) or through the intervention of staff, such as security awareness 
training. Not all controls are at a purchase cost to the organisation, but 
may facilitate a productivity loss. 
• Risk transfer concerns the movement of the risk onto a third party. In 
most cases the third party is an insurer that will reimburse the 
organisation for losses should the threat be realised. The transfer of risk, 
although with the assurance of reimbursement, does not protect the 
confidentiality or integrity of the information lost, and creates a period of 
no availability. Realisation of the threat could also lead to serious loss of 
reputation. 
9.3.1 Assigning a Strategy to Each Top Risk 
The process for assigning a strategy to each of the top risks identified must be 
followed to ensure that the strategy is justifiable to the board. The steps for 
assigning the strategy are as follows: 
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1. Gather the risk profile for each risk with the assessment information of 
the impact and probability of the risk. 
2. Map the assessment information to the recommendations presented in 
the mitigation strategy matrix (refer to Table 9.1). 
Table 9.1: The mitigation strategy matrix 
Risk Avoid Terminate Mitigate Transfer
High impact, high probability  • •  
High impact, medium probability   •  
High impact, low probability   • • 
Medium impact, high probability  • •  
Medium impact, medium probability   •  
Medium impact, low probability    • 
Low impact, high probability  • •  
Low impact, medium probability   •  
Low impact, low probability •    
 
The matrix provides a guideline for the selection of the strategy.  
a. The strategy of mitigation occurs more often than any other 
strategy.  
b. The strategy of avoidance should only be applied to low 
impact, low probability risks. 
c. The strategy of termination may only be considered if 
availability is not a security requirement. However, should 
availability be a security requirement, mitigation may be 
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performed. This reinstates the HILP-HPLI problem but in a 
reduced scope in the security requirements. 
d. The strategy of transfer is used for those risks that have a 
very low probability of occurring, but that may have an 
impact on the organisation. In some instances a secondary 
strategy of mitigation may be employed to reduce the 
impact should the vulnerability be exposed. 
3. The strategy is added to the risk register against each risk (refer to Table 
9.3). 
9.3.2 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the mitigation strategies be assigned 
and captured to the risk register (refer to Table 9.2). All checkboxes must be 
checked before continuing to the next step. 
Table 9.2: Mitigation checklist 1 
Mitigation Activities 
            
Step One  Identify mitigation strategy       
  1 Assign mitigation strategy to each risk      
  2 Capture mitigation strategy to risk register      
                  
9.3.3 Risk Register 
The risk register presented here does not contain the full risk profile as all 
relevant information is displayed in Chapter 8. The mitigation information in the 
risk register is used henceforth. A generic example is used to present 
information. 
Table 9.3: Risk register 1 
Risk Register 
            
Risk   Mitigation Solution        
 Risk 1  Transfer         
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9.4 Selecting the Mitigating Controls 
The risks that were selected for mitigation in the previous deliverable are used 
again in this selection of controls. The remaining risks are revisited in “Create 
action plans”. 
The selection of a control is a difficult process that requires careful 
consideration of the cost benefit of the control, as well as the ultimate fit to the 
risk at hand. 
The process for selection of controls, also known as safeguards, can be 
described as demonstrated in Figure 9.2 [NIST 2002]. 
 
Figure 9.2: Process for selection of controls 
1. A list of controls is reviewed for potential controls that fit the risk [GMIT 
2002]. 
2. A cost benefit analysis is performed on each potential control to 
determine the best fit control for the organisation. The cost benefit 
analysis considers the following for each control: 
a. Impact as determined during risk assessment 
b. Impact after implementation 
c. Cost of the implementation, considering the purchase cost and 
productivity loss during implementation 
3. The control is selected and entered into the risk register. 
9.4.1 Performing the Cost Benefit Analysis 
The cost benefit analysis is used to determine a best fit control when multiples 
are available to mitigate a risk and the return on investment of the control. The 
analysis is performed by considering the impact before the control is 
implemented, reduction in threat impact when the control is implemented and 
the cost of the implementation [NIST 2002]. 
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The scenarios used to demonstrate the measurement of impact in Chapter 8 
are used again here. 
 
9.4.1.1 The Impact as Determined by Risk Assessment 
The impact measurement performed for the three scenarios in Chapter 8 is as 
follows: 
• Scenario 1: Medium 
• Scenario 2: High 
• Scenario 3: High 
9.4.1.2 Determining the Impact after a Control is Implemented 
Payroll used is at R180 per staff member per day in an organisation of ten staff. 
Technical staff are remunerated at R500 per day. 
Scenario 1 
In scenario 1 a virus attack causes a server to crash. The controls that have 
been selected are as follows: 
? Ant-virus software that protects the server. It is a managed solution that 
automatically updates virus definitions on a daily basis.  
? Software firewall protecting data entry to the server. The firewall may be 
configured to block viruses that use network protocols but not file 
attachment viruses. The probability of exposure is slightly reduced. 
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Table 9.4: Scenario 1 impact after implementation of the controls 
Malicious Software 
Control Anti-virus Firewall 
Monetary 
loss 
No revenue is lost. 
Impact is low. 
An email attachment contains a virus that 
causes the server to crash. Server is down for 2 
days. 
Impact is medium. 
Productivity I(Pr) = Days × Payroll 
I(Pr) = 0 
Impact is low. 
Server downtime of 2 days. Payroll per day is 
R1 800. Technical staff are required to recover 
the server and repair the damage. 
I(Pr) = Days × (Payroll + Technical staff) 
I(Pr) = 2 × (1 800 + 500) 
I(Pr) = R4 600 
Impact is low. 
Reputation  No customers are lost. 
Impact is low. 
Some customers are lost due to the 2 days of 
downtime. 
Impact is medium. 
 
The impact after the implementation of the controls, based on the average 
calculation, is: 
? Anti-virus: I = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3: Low 
? Firewall: I = 3 + 1 + 3 = 7: High 
Scenario 2 
In scenario 2 the lack of physical protection has been exposed to the threat of 
theft. The controls that have been selected are as follows: 
? Security gate at the entrances to the offices. Limited individuals have 
copies of the keys. The security gate is a preventative measure. 
? Security alarm notifying a security company of unauthorised entry to the 
offices. The security alarm is a reactive measure. 
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Table 9.5: Scenario 2 impact after implementation of the controls 
Lack of Physical Protection 
Control Security Gates Security Alarm 
Monetary 
loss 
The security gate is damaged 
and needs to be replaced. 
Impact is low. 
Some computers are stolen before the 
response team arrives. The server is 
untouched. The value of the computers is 
R15 000. 
Impact is medium. 
Productivity Productivity is unaffected. 
Impact is low. 
The wait for hardware is at least 2 days 
for 3 of 10 staff members.  
I(Pr) = Days × Payroll 
I(Pr) = 2 × 540  
I(Pr) = R1 080 
Impact is low. 
Reputation  No customers are affected. 
Impact is low. 
No customers are affected. 
Impact is low. 
 
The impact after the implementation of the controls, based on the average 
calculation, is: 
? Security gates: I = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3: Low 
? Security alarm: I = 1 + 3 + 1 = 5: Medium 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 3 represents the vulnerability of wrong allocation of access rights 
which is exposed to wilful damage. Information is corrupted and irretrievably 
damaged. Recovery of the information is of vital importance. The controls that 
have been selected are as follows: 
? A resource is allocated to obtain and enter the access rights required. 
? A backup device is installed to create daily backups of the information. 
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Table 9.6: Scenario 3 impact after implementation of the controls 
Wrong Allocation of Access Rights 
Control Access Rights Created Backup Device 
Monetary 
loss 
Unauthorised access is 
removed. 
Impact is low. 
Restoration of the backup retards 
revenue intake for half a day. 
Impact is low. 
Productivity No productivity is lost. 
Impact is low. 
 
Productivity is reduced due to the time 
required for the backup restore. It takes 
half a day to restore the data.  
I(Pr) = Days * (Payroll + Technical staff) 
I(Pr) = .5 * (1 800 + 500) 
I(Pr) = R1 650 
Impact is low. 
Reputation  No customers are affected. 
Impact is low. 
No customers are affected. 
Impact is low. 
 
The impact after the implementation of the controls, based on the average 
calculation, is: 
? Access rights created: I = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3: Low 
? Backup device: I = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3: Low 
9.4.1.3 Cost of the Implementation 
Cost of the implementation is calculated by considering the purchase cost of the 
control (including the first year of licensing, or monthly payments) and the 
productivity of staff that is lost during the implementation. 
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Table 9.7: Cost of implementation calculations  
Scenario 1 
Control Anti-virus Firewall 
Purchase cost R3 000 for server licence R10 000 
Productivity loss 2 hours technical staff14 
R125 
5 hours technical staff
14
 
R315 
Total R3 125 R10 315 
Scenario 2 
Control Security Gates Security Alarm 
Purchase cost R2 000 for 2 gates R7 000 
Productivity loss None None 
Total R2 000 R7 000 
Scenario 3 
Control Access Rights Backup Device 
Purchase cost None R10 500 
Productivity loss 4 hours single payroll15 
R90 
None 
Total R90 R10 500 
The preparatory information is now available for the cost benefit analysis. 
9.4.1.4 The Cost Benefit Analysis of Selected Controls 
Table 9.8: Cost benefit analysis of scenario 1 
Scenario 1 
Impact before 
implementation Medium 
Control Anti-virus Firewall 
Impact after 
implementation 
Low Medium 
Purchase cost R3 000 for server licence R10 000 
Productivity loss 2 hours technical staff 5 hours technical staff 
                                                 
14 Technical staff payroll is at R500 per day, 2 hours is at R125, 5 hours is at R315. 
15 Payroll at R180 per day, 4 hours is at R90. 
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R125 R315 
Total R3 125 R10 315 
 
The cost benefit analysis shows that the implementation of anti-virus is both 
lower in cost and provides a lower impact at risk realisation. Anti-virus is the 
control selected. 
Table 9.9: Cost benefit analysis of scenario 2 
Scenario 2 
Impact before  High 
Control Security Gates Security Alarm 
Impact after  Low Medium 
Purchase cost R2 000 for 2 gates R7 000 
Productivity loss None None 
Total R2 000 R7 000 
 
The cost benefit analysis shows that the security gates are lower in cost and 
provide a lower impact at risk realisation. Security gates are the control 
selected. 
Table 9.10: Cost benefit analysis of scenario 3 
Scenario 3 
Impact before High 
Control Access Rights Backup Device 
Impact after Low Low 
Purchase cost None R10 500 
Productivity loss 4 hours single payroll 
R90 
None 
Total R90 R10 500 
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The cost benefit analysis shows that access rights creation is lower in cost and 
although the impacts are both low, access rights creation is the control 
selected. 
9.4.2 Pareto Analysis of Controls 
The selection of controls, in whatever form, may inadvertently mitigate other 
risks not on the prioritisation list. For this purpose, a Pareto analysis can be 
done. 
Pareto analysis gained its name from the pioneer of the principle of least effort 
thinking, Vilfredo Pareto, who discovered the imbalance of wealth and income 
in 19th century England. Pareto discovered that approximately 20% of the 
population were enjoying 80% of the wealth [KOCH 1997].  
This 80/20 rule has been applied in financial circles, domestic applications and 
the military to determine the high impact low effort products, services or 
weapons. The result of this analysis is to focus more productivity on the high 
impact products, and less on the less effective products. 
The same rule may be applied in the case of risk mitigation. One control may 
mitigate various risks, even inadvertently. The important point is to be aware of 
the mitigation of risks to keep the risk register up to date and provide the board 
with an accurate view of the state of the information assets. 
9.4.2.1 Finding the Controls that apply the 80/20 Rule 
The controls that mitigate more than one risk, preferably at least one risk in the 
top list, can be discovered by completing the following steps: 
1. Ensure that the control selected is relevant to the list of top risks. 
2. Use an electronic version of the risk register to search for the threats 
matching those related to the asset in the top risk list. 
3. Select the risks that contain the matches. 
4. Create a report of the risks that are mitigated by the implementation of 
the control. 
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The list of connected risks should help to convince the board of the value of the 
control, not only mitigating a critical risk, but also reducing more risks than were 
bargained for. The cost of the risk, when distributed across its implementations, 
is conceptually reduced. 
9.4.2.2 Cost of Exposure Saving 
Monetary measures have been included in the preparatory activities and the 
assessment steps of the risk management process. The mitigation step in the 
risk management process, as the scope for requesting budget for control 
implementation, must also make use of monetary measures to lend credibility to 
its requests (refer to Figure 9.3). 
 
Figure 9.3: Use of monetary measures in the risk management process 
 
The monetary value available to the risk management team thus far has been 
the appetite for risk. The appetite amount provides a threshold for risk 
management when considering monetary measurement and consideration of 
risks and controls. 
Cost of exposure saving (CES) is calculated by subtracting the cost of the 
control from the appetite amount. However, this is not a utopian concept as the 
amount is most likely always higher than the cost of the control. The following is 
thus recommended: 
? For a low impact risk, the upper barrier of the low impact range of the 
appetite as used in Chapter 8 is used. 
? For a medium impact risk, the mean of the medium impact range of the 
appetite is used. 
 175
? For a high impact risk, the lower barrier of the high impact range of the 
appetite is used. 
The ranges provide a conservative upper level for expenditure on a control, but 
prevent the lack of any benchmark by using the upper level of the low impact 
range of the appetite. This controls justifying the cost of a control for a low 
impact risk, as well as a medium or high impact risk. 
The formula for calculating the CES is as follows: 
CES = IA (H/M/L) – Cost of control 
IA represents the impact range of the appetite, with H/M/L representing the 
amount as specified by the rules above. 
The formula is adapted for the 80/20 rule controls by subtracting the cost of the 
control from the cumulative impact appetite of the 80/20 rule risks. 
CES = Σ IA (H/M/L) – (Cost of control + Additional cost) 
The adaptation of the control to apply to multiple risks may increase the cost of 
the control, such as the addition of anti-virus software licences. However, this 
may not always apply. 
The result of the CES equation, when a positive amount, shows the savings the 
control will create should the risk be exposed. A higher result yields a more 
cost-effective control. 
A negative amount, though, reminds the risk management team that the 
selected control is expensive and that the mitigation strategy selected may be in 
error. 
A result of zero is a breakeven. In such a case the cost of the control is justified. 
9.4.2.3 Scenario Test of CES 
The testing of the formula is conducted using the three scenarios used 
previously. 
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Table 9.11: Scenario test of CES 
Scenario 1 
Impact before Medium 
Control Anti-virus Firewall 
Total R3 125 R10 315 
CES CES = IA(H/M/L) – Cost of 
control 
CES = IA(M) – Cost of control 
CES = 25 500 – 3 125 
CES = 22 375 
The control is justified. 
CES = IA(H/M/L) – Cost of 
control 
CES = IA(M) – Cost of control 
CES = 25 500 – 10 315 
CES = 15 185 
The control is justified. 
Scenario 2 
Impact before  High 
Control Security Gates Security Alarm 
Total R2 000 R7 000 
CES CES = IA(H/M/L) – Cost of 
control 
CES = IA(H) – Cost of control 
CES = 41 000 – 2 000 
CES = 39 000 
The control is justified. 
CES = IA(H/M/L) – Cost of 
control 
CES = IA(H) – Cost of control 
CES = 41 000 – 7 000 
CES = 34 000 
The control is justified. 
Scenario 3 
Impact before High 
Control Access Rights Backup Device 
Total R90 R10 500 
CES CES = IA(H/M/L) – Cost of 
control 
CES = IA(H) – Cost of control 
CES = 10 000 – 90 
CES = 9910 
The control is justified. 
CES = IA(H/M/L) – Cost of 
control 
CES = IA(H) – Cost of control 
CES = 10 000 – 10 500 
CES = - 500 
The control is not suitable. 
 
The calculations in Table 9.11 reveal that the formula has shown some controls 
to have a greater saving than others, and one control that has been shown as 
an unjustifiable expense. The next task is to present these amounts to the 
board for approval of the selection of strategies and controls. 
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9.4.3 Board Approval of Mitigation Strategies 
The list of controls and other mitigation strategies that have been entered into 
the risk register should be approved by the board before continuing planning 
the implementation of the strategies. 
It may be the case that the board is not satisfied with, for example, a transfer 
strategy being selected for a risk, and may request a control to be nominated 
instead. The inverse applies as well. 
The sponsor is expected to present the risk register to the board for approval, 
and make amendments as required.  
9.4.4 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that controls be selected, the 80/20 rule 
applied to the register, an 80/20 rule report created and the controls captured to 
the risk register (refer to Table 9.12). Numbers 1, 2, 4 and 5 are mandatory. If 
number 2 yields no result, number 3 may be ignored and left unchecked. 
Table 9.12: Mitigation checklist 2 
Mitigation Activities 
            
Step Two  Identify mitigation solution       
  1 Select control for each mitigation risk     
  2 Apply 80/20 rule to risk register     
  3 Create 80/20 rule control report      
 4 Capture controls to risk register      
  5 Risk register acceptance by the board      
                  
9.4.5 Risk Register 
The risk register has to be completed with all the controls that have been 
selected. Those risks that are being mitigated need not be assigned a control. 
The top risks are listed first, with 80/20 rule risks listed thereafter. The register 
contains generic information to present its functionality. 
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Table 9.13: Risk register 2 
Risk Register 
           
Risk Top Risk Y/N Mitigation Solution Control CES   
 Risk 1 Yes Transfer       
 Risk 11 No Mitigation  Anti-virus R10 000   
          
9.5 Create Action Plans 
The creation of the action plan for each risk is the final submission of proof 
documentation to the board for approval of the preparation for reducing the 
information security risks of the environment. The action plan represents the 
culmination of the assessments and selections performed by the team, and 
should therefore not be a poor representation of the risk management process. 
The action plan contains the following information, as required in Chapter 5: 
• The risk mitigation strategy and control already identified 
• The implementation cost of the control and CES 
• The mitigation date 
• The resources associated with the control/strategy 
• The exposure response procedure 
• The escalation procedure 
Each section of the action plan must be completed before presentation to the 
board, with the exception of risks with no control assigned. Those risks still 
require the remaining sections to be completed. 
9.5.1 The Mitigation Date 
The mitigation date is used to indicate the date when the mitigation should be 
applied. The dates should be in order of most critical risk first, where controls 
apply, and urgent dates where transfer and termination of risks apply. In the 
case of termination, a strategy for change control should also be available to 
ease the organisation out of use of the asset. 
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The mitigation date is subject to approval from the board and should not be 
before the board or senior management forum date. 
9.5.2 Resources Associated with the Control/Strategy 
The staff members, or external resources associated with the strategies and 
controls of risks must be listed, e.g. in the case of transfer, the insurance firm. 
An example of a control resource would be a training resource for security 
awareness training. 
9.5.3 The Exposure Response Procedure 
The response to an exposed risk, or realisation of a threat, must also be 
described in the action plan. This applies especially in the case of risk 
avoidance. A contingency plan should be in place to recover lost assets, 
determine the extent of the damage and contact the appropriate resources for 
recovery.  
This procedure applies especially in the case of opting for a strategy that does 
not effectively reduce the risk, or a control that does not prevent the exposure, 
but detects it. These procedures should be in place for the worst case exposure 
of the risk. 
The following steps must be completed for including the exposure response 
procedure in the risk register: 
1. Review the strategy of the risk: 
a. If the strategy is mitigation, is the control a preventative control, 
e.g. a security gate, or a reactive control, e.g. a security alarm? 
Continue to step 2. 
b. If the strategy is transfer or avoidance, continue to step 2. 
c. If the strategy is termination, no exposure response procedure is 
required. 
2. Determine the first emergency reaction: 
a. For a preventative or reactive control: 
i. Assess the loss affected by the exposure.  
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ii. Inform the sponsor of the exposure and request 
authorisation of the risk appetite for recovery of the loss. 
b. In the case of transfer: 
i. Inform the sponsor of the exposure and request 
authorisation of the risk appetite for recovery of the loss. 
ii. Contact the transferee for recovery of the appetite used. 
c. In the case of avoidance, inform the sponsor of the exposure and 
request authorisation of the risk appetite for recovery of the loss. 
3. Review the strategy for adaptation:  
a. For a preventative control, strengthen the control. 
b. For a reactive control, add a preventative control. 
c. In the case of transfer, consider the application of a control. 
d. In the case of avoidance, consider the application of a control, 
transfer or termination. 
The strategy was recommended in Table 9.1. A risk that has been 
recommended for control should never be demoted to termination or 
avoidance if the applied control is not effective. The control must be 
strengthened. 
9.5.4 The Escalation Procedure 
The escalation procedure works hand in hand with the exposure response 
procedure. The staff resources that are responsible for the assets (as captured 
in the asset register) and the hierarchy leading up to the board or senior 
management forum must be included in the action plan. 
The sponsor is always the first contact once an exposure has been discovered. 
Based on the exposure response procedure for each risk, the escalation path 
would include, for example, insurers for transfer and the board for authorising 
the use of the appetite amount. 
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9.5.5 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that an action plan be completed for each 
top and 80/20 rule risk (refer to Table 9.14). The action must be completed in all 
parts. 
Table 9.14: Mitigation checklist 3 
Mitigation Activities 
          
Step Three  Create action plan      
  1 For each risk, complete an action plan    
               
9.5.6 Risk Action Plan/Register 
The updated risk register containing the action plan for the top risks and 80/20 
rule risks should be presented to the board before continuing with the 
monitoring step in the risk management process (refer to Table 9.15). 
Table 9.15: Risk action plan 
Risk Action Plan 
            
Risk Mitigation Solution Control CES Mitigation Date Resources
Exposure 
Response 
Procedure 
Escalation 
Procedure
            
                    
9.6 Conclusion 
The risk management team is now prepared to mitigate risks and reduce the 
risk values on the risk profiles of the information assets. The action plans have 
been created that schedule the implementation of controls and other mitigation 
strategies. 
This chapter has achieved the goals as stated. The goals are summarised 
below. 
The chapter has provided the methods for identifying mitigation strategies by 
considering them against a table of impacts and probabilities of the risks. This 
table provides a logical approach to the selection of the strategy. 
 182
The method for selecting controls has been created to consider the cost benefit 
of the controls identified, as well as the cost of exposure saving. These two 
factors create a clear distinction for the selection of controls. These amounts 
are submitted to the board for approval. Pareto analysis has been used to 
determine whether there are lower valued risks that may be inadvertently 
mitigated by the implementation of a control. The CES is calculated to 
determine the saving of the control when implemented for multiple risks. The 
CES value presents the board with a conceptual win should they choose to fund 
the mitigation of the 80/20 rule risks. 
Based on the approval of the board, action plans are created for the 
implementation of approved controls and strategies, including the 
implementation dates, exposure response procedures and escalation plans. 
The exposure response procedure and escalation plans prepare the 
organisation for the advent of a risk exposure in the case of a transferred or 
avoided risk. The lack of a strong control is also managed and room is created 
for improving the strategy and control of the risk. 
The chapter has also provided checklists ensuring that all tasks are completed 
before continuing with risk monitoring. 
The information compounded in risk mitigation should provide the board with 
enough information to make an informed decision for approval of the budget for 
the launch of risk monitoring. 
Chapter 10 continues with the methodology of risk monitoring. 
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C10 10 Risk Monitoring 
10.1 Introduction 
Risk monitoring, as the last step in the risk management process, is by no 
means the end of risk management. Risk management, as a governance 
responsibility, is a continuous function of the organisation and runs in a cyclical, 
step-based process. 
Risk monitoring - as the name suggests - is a more passive step in the process 
when compared to identification, assessment and mitigation. It is also the most 
important step in the process. Risk monitoring is that business interest where 
the fluctuation of risks is monitored and controls put in place are watched for 
improvement of the risk register of the organisation. 
Risk monitoring is also longer in duration when compared to the other steps, as 
there is no definite end to the step. Risk monitoring moves again to preparation 
after a predetermined period has passed. This period for the total cycle, as 
governance allows, is usually a calendar year [KING 2002]. This means that the 
full risk management process should be conducted on an annual basis. 
The objective of this chapter is to present the Peculium methodology for risk 
monitoring. 
The goals of the chapter are: 
1. The method for including risk management and specifically monitoring in 
the day-to-day activities of staff 
2. The method for maintaining the risk register with updated action plans 
and new assets 
3. The method for measuring performance of the risk management process 
and the action plans using the key performance indicators identified in 
preparation 
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4. The method for monitoring measurement to determine the success of the 
monitoring phase 
5. The method for maintenance of the business continuity plans inserted 
into the action plans 
6. Checklists for the completion of the deliverables 
The goals are based on the requirements listed in Chapter 5. The collective 
achievement of the goals constitutes the achievement of the objective. 
The chapter begins with an overview of risk monitoring, with the remainder 
structured in the order of the deliverables listed above, except for the checklists 
that are presented throughout. 
10.2 Overview of Risk Monitoring 
Monitoring, as the ultimate state in risk management, is under-emphasised in IT 
governance and the security standard ISO 17799 (refer to the gap analysis 
performed in Chapter 5).  
The current habits of the organisation are changed to improve security, and the 
systems architecture of the organisation is changed to accommodate the 
controls selected. Such changes are difficult to implement successfully without 
due emphasis of this step in the risk management process. 
This change control and management is therefore the purpose of placing the 
incorporation of risk awareness into day-to-day activities as the first deliverable 
for risk monitoring. It is, for the operational levels of the organisation, almost the 
extent of risk monitoring, as the remaining deliverables are at a strategic level. 
The familiarisation of the BCPs also involves staff. 
The growth of risk awareness, assurances to the board of implementation of 
controls and the awareness of BCPs all have impacts on the risk register of the 
organisation. For this reason, risks have to be reassessed, new risks identified 
and, as an organisation may have targeted only a portion of its operations, risk 
profiles created for the whole organisation, and their subsequent mitigation 
(refer to Figure 10.1). 
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 Figure 10.1: Risk monitoring in the risk management process 
 
As reflected in Figure 10.1 above, the results of risk monitoring are used in both 
the preparatory activities and risk identification. The preparatory activities have 
to be revisited before continuing with identification. 
The deliverables of monitoring are: 
• Risk awareness included in day-to-day activities 
• Risk register maintained 
• Performance measured 
• Monitoring measured 
• BCPs maintained 
The deliverables are not interdependent and may be conducted independently, 
except for the performance assessments accessing the risk register for updated 
action plans, and the measurement of monitoring including the performance 
assessment. Apart from these, the remaining deliverables are also in no 
particular order, or duration. The deliverables are repetitive, as demonstrated in 
Figure 10.2. 
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Maintain risk register
Conduct performance 
measurement
Day-to-day activities
Monitoring Deliverables
Monitoring 
measurement
Maintain BCP
 
Figure 10.2: Order of completion of deliverables 
As presented above, the day-to-day activities are not specifically linked to the 
other deliverables and are continuous throughout the monitoring step. The risk 
register has to be maintained for adequate performance measurement, and 
subsequently monitoring measurement.  
The BCP has to be updated and maintained throughout the step as well. 
10.3 Include Risk Awareness in Day-to-day Activities 
The inclusion of risk awareness in the day-to-day activities of staff is a far 
greater challenge than what the title suggests. Any staff member is naturally 
opposed to change, unless the benefits outweigh the effort. 
The benefits of risk management may not seem to staff as if they concern them, 
as an assigned team conducts the process and the board discusses the 
findings behind closed doors. It is therefore of vital importance that staff be 
involved in the process and feel ownership of the risks that affect the assets 
they may use, and the changes that will affect them. 
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10.3.1 Tasks of Risk Management Team 
The risk management team should therefore work with the staff in the relevant 
risk management environment, and provide information on their progress as it is 
made. 
The risk management team is therefore tasked with completing the following for 
all staff within the environment selected for risk management: 
1. Conduct awareness training of the risks identified and their assessments.  
2. The staff members have to understand the threats and vulnerabilities 
facing the assets, as well as the mitigation strategy identified for the asset.  
3. The impact the mitigation strategy has on the operations of the 
environment must also be discussed and input requested from staff.  
4. The staff members must be well trained in the process assigned to the 
asset for business continuity. 
The risk management team and the staff members should also have regular 
sessions to ensure that the changes applied to the environment are welcomed 
and implemented and, if not successful, updated and communicated. 
It is vital that the staff members buy in to risk management, as the greater 
majority of risks assessed usually stem from within the organisation [ALBE 
2003]. 
The day-to-day activities do not cease with the end of the monitoring step; they 
continue unimpeded. The activities are implicit to every step of the process, 
although not indicated as a deliverable of each. This, of course, only applies 
after the first implementation of the risk management cycle. 
10.3.2 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that staff be trained in the day-to-day 
activities of risk management and review sessions be held to monitor this 
change (refer to Table 10.1). All checkboxes must be checked before 
continuing to step two. 
Table 10.1: Monitoring checklist 1 
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Monitoring Activities 
            
Step One  Include risk awareness in day-to-day activities     
  1 Conduct awareness training        
  2 Ensure that risk profile is understood by staff       
  3 Ensure that impact of mitigation strategy is understood      
  4 Conduct business continuity process training       
  5 Hold sessions to review day-to-day activities     
                    
10.4 Maintain Risk Register 
The risk register created with information from identification, assessment and 
mitigation is a working document and is never complete. It is an active 
document that moves between the risk management team and the board. 
The risk register, when last updated, contained the action plans for each of the 
top risks and the 80/20 risks. These action plans had due dates attached, as 
well as escalation plans, exposure responses and assigned resources. 
These factors of the plans have been communicated to the board and are 
expected to be executed, the controls selected are expected to be 
implemented, and mitigation strategies that do not involve controls are expected 
to be carried out. 
The plans also form a base for the performance assessments and monitoring 
assessments discussed later. It is vital that the risk register also be updated 
with new assets and their associated risks, as they are included in the 
environment. The new assets may not be set aside for assessment until the 
next iteration of the process, but must be assessed as soon as possible to 
ensure that the risks facing the highest valued assets are known across the 
environment. 
10.4.1 Tasks of Risk Management Team 
The risk management team is expected to maintain the risk register for the 
duration of the monitoring process. The tasks assigned to the team are as 
follows: 
1. Maintain the asset register. 
2. Maintain the risk profiles and create new profiles for new assets. 
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3. Maintain the risk register. Should new assets be at a higher value than 
those assets already being mitigated, continue the mitigation of assets by 
including the new assets. The top risks list can be expanded to include 
more risks. The mitigation of the initial top risks should not be abandoned 
for the new assets. The 80/20 rule should again be applied to any new 
controls that are selected for the new assets. 
4. Maintain the action plans with updated information regarding the due 
dates for implementation of controls and the other mitigation strategies.  
5. Communicate the updated register to the board, the environment’s staff 
and the organisation as a whole. The training provided to the 
environment’s staff, as shown in Figure 10.1, is not a once-off exercise, 
but continues throughout the monitoring step. 
The risk management sponsor is ultimately responsible for these activities. The 
risk management team members should, however, act as watchdogs for new 
assets and inform the sponsor of the addition of the associated information to 
the risk register. The sponsor then presents the updated risk register to the 
board, as expected. 
10.4.2 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that all profiles, registers and plans be 
maintained and communicated (refer to Table 10.2). All checkboxes must be 
checked before continuing to step three in the event of a new asset. The 
sponsor is responsible for ensuring that the checkboxes are left unchecked only 
if no new assets have arrived. 
Table 10.2: Monitoring checklist 2 
Monitoring Activities 
            
Step Two  Maintain the risk register       
  1 Update asset register        
  2 Update risk profiles         
  3 Update risk register         
  4 Update action plans         
  5 Communicate updates        
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10.5 Conduct Performance Measurement 
The performance of the risk management process to date should be measured 
in a manner which allows its continual updating based on the KPIs selected in 
the preparatory activities. 
An easy way to measure the performance of the process is to create a 
dashboard or scorecard system that presents all the KPIs and their statuses. 
Such a system should be updated whenever a change is made, control 
implemented or new asset acquired to ensure that the information portrayed is 
a real-time representation of the process. 
10.5.1 Risk Management Scorecard 
The risk management scorecard, based on the KPIs identified earlier, must 
contain all of the KPIs. The scorecard is constructed to present a real-time 
informative status model of all the top and 80/20 risks being monitored. 
The scorecard structure is recommended to be as follows: 
Table 10.3: Risk management scorecard 
Risk Management Scorecard 
     
Key Performance Indicator Due Date Status 
1 Achieve milestone at each step of the risk management process    
 1.1 Preparatory activities milestone achieved   
 1.2 Identification milestone achieved   
 1.3 Assessment milestone achieved   
 1.4 Mitigation milestone achieved   
 1.5 Monitoring milestone achieved   
2 Complete each deliverable at each step of the process    
 2.1 Preparatory activities deliverables achieved   
 2.2 Identification deliverables achieved   
 2.3 Assessment deliverables achieved   
 2.4 Mitigation deliverables achieved   
 2.5 Monitoring deliverables achieved   
3 Present milestone summary to the board     
4 Complete asset register at the end of risk identification    
5 Complete risk register at the end of assessment    
6 Complete risk strategy at the end of risk mitigation    
  6.1 Risk 1: Strategy A    
  6.2 Risk 2: Strategy B    
  6.3 Risk 3…5: Strategy C…E    
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Key Performance Indicator Due Date Status 
7 Complete action plan    
  7.1 Risk 1: Control A    
  7.2 Risk 2: Control B    
  7.3 Risk 3…5: Control C…E    
8 Complete assessment report    
9 Update business continuity plan    
      
 
Table 10.3 presents the KPIs selected for the process and their due date 
assigned, and allows a status for each. The due dates are based on the 
expected duration of each step in the process and those assigned for 
implementation of control and other mitigation strategies. 
The status of all the KPI defaults is not started at the beginning of the process, 
but should be updated as the steps are completed, and deliverables and 
milestones achieved. 
The statuses suggested for use are: 
• Not started: the KPI has not been attempted. 
• Started: the KPI is in progress. 
• Completed: the KPI has been successfully completed. 
Each of these statuses is dependent on the due dates assigned and the 
process of risk management. Those KPIs that apply to later stages in the 
process cannot be attempted earlier, and should not be viewed as behind 
schedule until such time as the dependency is completed. 
The statuses of the KPIs, although dependent on the due date, should not 
remain statically oblivious to the expiry of a due date. The statuses should 
therefore be colour-coded in the reports handed to the board: 
• Status not started and past due: red 
• Status started and past due: amber 
• Status completed and past due: green 
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These colours create a traffic light representation of the statuses and are easy 
to recognise. The colours only come into effect when the dependency has been 
completed. 
The scorecard should be available to the board in real time, i.e. accessible 
whenever required. The staff in the environment targeted must also be included 
in the communication of updates to the scorecard. 
The risk management team is expected to maintain the scorecard on a regular 
basis, i.e. as soon as a KPI has been started, or completed. Ultimately, the 
responsibility for an up-to-date scorecard lies with the sponsor. 
10.5.2 Determining Dependencies 
The dependencies within the scorecard affect the traffic light representation of 
the completion of the indicators. As such, the dependencies need to be 
configured accurately to prevent an inaccurate and potentially damaging report 
from being given to the board. The obvious dependencies are presented in 
Figure 10.3. The dependencies between controls need to be determined by the 
risk management team. 
 
 Figure 10.3: Dependencies in the risk management scorecard 
10.5.3 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the risk management scorecard be 
maintained and communicated (refer to Table 10.4). All checkboxes must be 
checked before continuing to the next iteration of the cycle. 
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Table 10.4: Monitoring checklist 3 
Monitoring Activities 
           
Step Three  Conduct performance measurement     
  1 Maintain risk management scorecard      
  2 Communicate updated scorecard      
                 
10.6 Measure Monitoring 
Monitoring, as the most important step in the risk management process, is not 
adequately represented in the risk management scorecard. The activities in 
monitoring, as presented above, create a circular reference if included within 
the scorecard.  
The performance of the activities within monitoring should be handed to the 
board separately to emphasise its importance, and ensure that it is given due 
consideration. 
10.6.1 Report 
The measurement of monitoring is therefore a compounded assessment report, 
including the following: 
• Input received from staff during the awareness training and regular 
review sessions. 
• The updated risk register, as and when updated with new assets, 
implemented controls and other tasks in the action plans. 
• The risk management scorecard, as available at real time showing the 
progress of the process and the action plans. This is a one-page 
progress representation of the more detailed risk register. 
This assessment report provides the board with the up-to-date information it 
requires to make a decision on the next iteration of the full process and the 
environment that will be selected for the process. The report is also a working 
document that must be updated regularly as the risk management scorecard is 
updated. 
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The board must, however, be aware that all controls and strategies 
implemented have to be reassessed in the next iteration of the process to 
determine to what extent the risks may have been reduced, and whether the 
return on investment was good. 
10.6.2 Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the assessment report be created 
and communicated (refer to Table 10.5). Both checkboxes must be checked 
before continuing to the next cycle. 
Table 10.5: Monitoring checklist 4 
Monitoring Activities 
           
Step Four  Measure monitoring      
  1 Create assessment report       
  2 Communicate assessment report     
                
10.7 Maintain Business Continuity Plans 
The exposure response procedures created in the action plans must always be 
easily accessible to the staff within the environment, and the plans well known 
to the staff, as included in their day-to-day activities. 
These procedures or plans must be maintained and kept up-to-date at all costs, 
as the exposure of the vulnerability of an asset that is not properly protected 
due to whatever strategy was implemented may negatively impact the 
organisation. This is especially true for the SMME that has opted to transfer or 
avoid the risk, rather than invest in a control. The training of these plans must 
also be ongoing to ensure that the staff are trained for the latest business 
continuity procedures, and not a legacy version. 
The risk management team is not responsible for creating the BCPs for the 
entire organisation. The exposure response procedures related to the specific 
risks identified for mitigation are added to an existing BCP. If no such plan 
exists, this task is changed to Maintain exposure response procedures. 
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Checklist 
The checklist for this deliverable asks that the BCP be maintained, 
communicated and trained (refer to Table 10.6). The first checkbox only 
becomes compulsory when changes are required. The second checkbox must 
be checked before continuing to the next cycle. 
Table 10.6: Monitoring checklist 5 
Monitoring Activities 
          
Step Five  Maintain BCP      
  1 Update BCP       
  2 
Communicate and provide training on 
BCP    
               
10.8 Conclusion 
Risk monitoring, as the final step in the risk management process, provides a 
firm link between the board or senior management forum and the progress of 
risk management in the organisation.  
The board or forum is provided with real-time information regarding the 
progress of action plans, performance reports of the mitigation of risks and the 
revelation of new risks, as well as an overall picture of the organisation’s risk 
register. 
In short, risk monitoring provides the board or forum with all the information 
required to make the preparatory activities in the next iteration easier. They 
have a clearer understanding of information security risk, a clear report on the 
mitigation of the highest rated risks and the data available to determine the 
return on the investment made in the mitigation strategies. 
In the next iteration, the board will be able to adapt their objectives, key 
performance indicators, risk environment and team to generate improved 
information and risk management. The board will become more at ease with the 
process with every new iteration, and will have the power to assess and 
mitigate risks across the organisational business units. 
The goals of this chapter have been achieved as follows: 
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• Risk awareness has been included in the day-to-day activities of staff by 
first training the staff, and then ensuring that they buy in to the changes 
required to increase the success of the changes. 
• The risk register has been allowed to include new assets, threats, 
vulnerabilities and risk values. The risks, if at a high level, are added to 
the mitigation list, and no other high risks are moved off. This increases 
the cost of risk monitoring, but decreases the overall organisational risk. 
• A performance measurement scorecard has been created that the risk 
management team must update as progress is made. This scorecard 
provides the board with real-time progress reports of the process. The 
scorecard is based on the KPIs selected by the board in the preparatory 
activities. 
• A full assessment report is created that includes the scorecard, the 
updated risk register and all input received from staff related to the 
mitigation of risks. This information empowers the board even further 
with a real-time view of the detail of the process, as well as the staff 
acceptance of it. 
• The BCPs, through the exposure response procedures, are also updated 
on a regular basis and staff are trained on the updates as they happen. 
This ensures that the staff members in the targeted environment are 
always prepared should risks be realised. 
• Checklists have been created that ensure that all steps are completed 
before the process may reiterate. The assessment report and scorecard 
also graphically reflect when the steps have not been completed fully. 
This chapter brings to an end the risk management process conceptually, 
although it has been made clear that the process should never end, but be 
reiterated annually. The process also becomes easier with each iteration as 
staff have increased awareness of risk and controls, and this reduces the 
vulnerabilities and threats from an internal human source and the duration of 
the initial steps of the process. 
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This concludes the Peculium Model in its presentation. A test of the model is 
presented in Appendix 5, which provides a step-by-step demonstration of the 
model in a real-world based SMME.  
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C11 11 Conclusion 
11.1 Revisiting the Problem Statement 
The problem stated in Chapter 1 that led to the writing of this dissertation is the 
lack of enforced regulatory standards in the South African small, medium and 
micro enterprise environment.  
This lack leads to ill-governed enterprises with a high failure rate and a low 
awareness of IT governance and information security risk management. 
South Africa is also faced with the challenge of being a developing country, and 
thus may lack the high quality regulatory standards required to ensure success. 
As a further burden, those standards available to developed countries are not 
guaranteed to be applicable in South Africa, nor SMMEs in South Africa. 
This poses a great challenge to SMMEs that have management with a goal of 
growing the business by applying good corporate and IT governance. 
11.2 Steps to prove the Hypotheses and provide the Required 
Methodology 
Through the dissertation hypotheses were articulated and challenges made to 
determine whether the problem statement was in fact valid and, if so, to provide 
a solution to the problem. 
The first hypothesis stated was that South African SMMEs are distinctly 
different from those of other countries. 
The second hypothesis challenged the applicability of existing corporate and IT 
governance standards to South African SMMEs. 
If both of the hypotheses are true, and based on the ill fit of developed 
countries’ methodologies, the last challenge was to create a model that would 
provide the necessary governance and yield viable results. This model had to 
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conform to the regulatory requirements of local governance standards and still 
provide a workable model for SMMEs. 
The hypotheses results and achievement of the last challenge are described 
below. 
11.2.1 Hypothesis One: South African SMMEs are Unique 
The hypothesis regarding the definition of South African SMMEs was found to 
be proven. The method employed for proving the hypothesis included the 
following: 
• Drawing a sample of developed and developing countries for comparison 
• Obtaining the legal definitions of small enterprises in the samples 
• Obtaining economic data for comparison in the samples 
• Comparing South Africa’s SMME definition and economic data to those 
of the sampled countries 
The South African SMME definition was found to be very similar to the 
European Union’s definition as used by the United Kingdom. There was, 
however, a distinct difference in the economic data. This information, together 
with the rest of the sample data from developed countries, reflected that small 
enterprises in the developed countries are economically more successful, and 
thus different from South African SMMEs, with their high failure rate and high 
figures of survivalist enterprises. 
The developing countries, however, posed a different comparison of data. It 
was discovered that the developing countries do not have such stable economic 
development as was found in the developed countries. The countries also 
posed very different sets of inflation and GDP data from those of South African 
SMMEs. This again made it impossible to find common ground. South African 
SMMEs were thus found to be unique to the developing countries sample as 
well. 
This led to the hypothesis that the applicability of these developed countries’ 
regulatory standards to SMMEs as local standards is not appropriate. 
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11.2.2 Hypothesis Two: The Applicability of Corporate and IT 
Governance Standards to the SMME 
This hypothesis was also proven that the corporate and IT governance 
standards applied to developed countries cannot be applied directly to South 
African SMMEs. 
The proof followed a step-by-step process consisting of the following: 
• Examining the local corporate governance standard, the King II Report of 
2002, against the Australian corporate governance standard to 
determine its quality and international acceptance.  
• Further examination of King II for usability in SMMEs. 
• The examination of the internationally accepted IT governance standard, 
CobiT, for usability by SMMEs. 
• The examination of international ISRM methodologies used for small 
enterprises for fit to South African SMMEs and advantages of them. 
This proof forms a sizable part of the dissertation, known as Part 1, and 
provides a selection model and two frameworks for the examination as listed 
above. 
11.2.2.1 Examining King II against Australia’s Corporate Governance Standard 
The King II Report, as described in Chapter 3, is the second version of the 
South African corporate governance standard. It has been found to be the most 
successful standard used in Africa and the Middle East, as South Africa yields 
the highest number of sustainability reports in the region. Although the number 
of reports is lower than the developed countries sample used, it is higher than in 
developing countries sample counterparts. King II was also found to be the 
accepted corporate governance standard for NEPAD. 
King II was compared to the Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council’s standard. A comparison was made of major factors in both standards, 
with the greatest difference found in the enforcement of reporting. 
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Another comparison was made of the sections of the standards, and the 
compared quality of each. King II performed well and is at a good standard of 
quality when compared to that of a developed country. 
11.2.2.2 Examining King II for Usability in SMMEs 
Each section of King II was evaluated for feasible applicability to SMMEs. A 
simplified guide was provided that allows the governance measures to remain, 
but at a lower cost to the enterprise and with less disruption in organisational 
productivity. 
It is unfortunately a trait of corporate governance that effort has to be applied to 
reap the benefits. 
The noticeable conclusion from the simplified standard was that risk 
management is vital, and that SMMEs, as organisations that can so easily be 
nullified, are managing the risks facing the systems on which they are so 
dependent. 
11.2.2.3 Examining CobiT for Applicability to SMMEs 
CobiT, as the international standard for IT governance, has been accepted to 
be the local standard as well. CobiT consists of six books and is made up of 34 
control objectives. 
It is understood that these 34 control objectives are not all compulsory, but that 
they do add value when applied. The challenge for the SMMEs, however, is 
how to decide which control objectives are suitable to the environment. This is 
no simple task for the business owner lacking in management skills. The full 
standard is not feasible for SMMEs. 
For this purpose, a maturity model loosely based on the CobiT Capability 
Maturity Model was created which determines the maturity of the organisation’s 
IT. Based on the result of this exercise, the organisation is guided in which 
controls should be applied.  
The organisation with a very simple IT infrastructure would begin with an IT 
plan. This IT plan must correlate with the growth plans of the enterprise. 
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The levels of maturity, as they increase, eventually lead to an almost complete 
implementation of CobiT. This does, however, rest on the assumption that the 
enterprise already has certain controls in place, thus creating the maturity level. 
The controls selection framework also allows room for movement as the 
standard suggests. 
11.2.2.4  Examining International ISRM Methodologies for Use by SMMEs 
The examination of an internationally successful ISRM methodology is not a 
simple task. For this reason, a framework for evaluating these methodologies 
was created using information collected in previous chapters. 
This framework was created in such a manner that SMMEs may use it for 
evaluating other undertakings as well. The framework was generically 
structured around three dimensions: the elements, their factors and their 
weights. 
The elements of the framework were based on the definition of an SMME in 
South Africa, the regulatory requirements of corporate and IT governance, as 
well as the monetary cost of the undertaking, which is a major concern for any 
SMME. 
Two methodologies were evaluated using the framework, and found to offer 
mediocre results. These methodologies were: 
• The OCTAVE-S methodology specifically formulated for the small 
enterprise and based on the American OCTAVE methodology  
• The CRAMM V Express software tool as a scaled-down, more 
affordable version of the CRAMM V Expert tool based on the British 
CRAMM methodology 
The effectiveness or quality of the methodologies has not been questioned. 
The fit of the methodologies to South African SMMEs based on the framework 
dimensions was found to be lacking. 
This proved the second hypothesis, and as a result required that a new 
methodology be created to conform to all the requirements created thus far, as 
well as offer a solution to the problem statement. 
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The evaluation did, however, offer a benefit as there are distinct advantages to 
both methodologies. These were used to create a requirements framework as 
the structure for the new methodology. The requirements framework was also 
supplemented with the regulatory requirements of corporate and IT 
governance. As a whole, the requirements framework provides a faster test for 
future evaluations of foreign methodologies. 
11.2.3 The Peculium Model 
The Peculium Model was based on the requirements framework as mentioned 
above and was structured to conform to the regulatory requirements included in 
the framework. 
The Peculium Model has been divided into five steps of the risk management 
process, contrary to the existing norm of four. This was done to emphasise the 
importance of preparation for the active process, as the SMMEs are assumed 
not be highly skilled in the process or methodology of ISRM. These steps are: 
• Preparation 
• Risk identification 
• Risk assessment 
• Risk mitigation  
• Risk monitoring 
Each step is summarised below. 
11.2.3.1 Preparation 
The preparatory activities included in the first step of the process guide the 
organisation in obtaining all the required information, resources and training for 
the active steps of the ISRM process. Many of the activities are as a result of 
the influence of corporate governance on the requirements framework. 
Major areas of interest in the step are the use of the balanced scorecard for 
standardising the representation of organisational objectives, the method for 
selecting a good representative team size for the undertaking and the training 
method of both full course and refresher training. 
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The first iteration of the process requires the preparatory activities to be 
completed fully. Next iterations will reduce the time requirement of the step as 
the board will already understand their role in preparing a team for the active 
steps of the process. 
11.2.3.2 Risk Identification 
The identification step in ISRM allows the risk management team to identify the 
environment for which the process is being performed, as well as the 
information assets present in the environment. 
These assets may, however, be great in variety and number; as such, the 
assets undergo a weakness evaluation to determine those assets that are most 
suitable for a risk assessment and subsequent risk management. The 
evaluation also allows the SMME to reduce the cost of the process 
implementation by only continuing with those information assets that pose the 
greater threat to the environment. 
The identification step provides the organisation with an asset register of the 
environment which includes the weakness values for future reference. This 
asset register forms the basis of the risk register that is used throughout the 
remainder of the process. 
11.2.3.3 Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is performed to identify the threats to and vulnerabilities of the 
assets selected for the process in risk identification. These threats and 
vulnerabilities provide the necessary information for the risk management team 
to measure the impact of the threat, determine the probability of the exposure of 
the vulnerability and finally, based on this information, calculate the risk value of 
the threat to the information asset. 
The methods employed for the various measures, calculations and 
determinations are a mixture of numerical qualitative and subjective qualitative 
methods. Subjective qualitative methods are used to determine the probability 
of the threat exposing the vulnerability of the asset. Numerical qualitative 
methods are employed to measure the impact of the exposure. 
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Impact is measured in such a manner that it considers not only financial loss 
due to the exposure, but also replacement cost, productivity loss and damage 
to the organisation’s reputation. Reputation is very important to the SMME as it 
is a highly competitive market space. 
The impact measurement employs calculations using financial and numerical 
figures. The results of these calculations determine the total qualitative 
representation of the impact considering the three areas as described above in 
equal measures. 
The calculation of the risk values allows for numerical associations with the 
impact and probability measures. The standard formula for risk calculation, 
impact multiplied by probability, is used, resulting in numbers that are easily 
sorted for prioritisation of the risks that are planned for mitigation. The board of 
the organisation may decide whether they are satisfied to continue with a top 
five list of risks, or more. 
All of the above information is added to the risk register, consisting of a risk 
profile for each of the information assets selected for the step. 
11.2.3.4 Risk Mitigation 
Risk mitigation consists of the identification of the mitigation strategy for the top 
risks nominated by risk assessment, selection of the controls for each and the 
planning of the actions that are taken to mitigate the risks. 
The selection of the mitigation strategy is based on a recommendations 
framework that proposes the strategy most suited to the severity of the impact 
and probability of the risk. 
Controls are selected using cost benefit analysis of the controls available to 
mitigate the risk. The cost benefit analysis considers the reduction in impact the 
control would facilitate, the cost of the control in cash, as well as the cost to 
productivity for the implementation of the control. 
An additional function has been included, allowing the team to perform a Pareto 
analysis of the list of risks. This analysis allows the team to discover any other 
risks that may inadvertently be mitigated by those controls proposed for 
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mitigation of the top risks. The benefit of the implementation for the top risk and 
risks discovered through Pareto analysis is that it conceptually reduces the cost 
of the control. 
This information allows the board to make a decision based on not only the 
monetary impact of the control, but also the return on investment in impact 
reduction. The risk management team may not continue with action plans for 
the risks until the board is satisfied with the strategies and controls selected. 
The action plan for each risk includes the implementation of the strategy or 
control selected, and offers exposure response and escalation plans in the 
event that the risk is exposed before or after control implementation. 
Acceptance of these plans launches risk monitoring. 
11.2.3.5 Risk Monitoring 
Risk monitoring, as the longest step in the process, is more focused on 
maintaining the risk register and improving organisational awareness of risk 
than active tasks by the risk management team. 
It is, however, the most important step in the process. It is in this step that the 
board can monitor whether the strategies and controls approved in risk 
mitigation are implemented as noted in the action plans, and that the risks are 
thus reduced. 
The step also calls for the proactive maintenance of the risk register with any 
new assets that may have been acquired for the environment. These assets 
must also be assessed and mitigated, without the exclusion of any existing 
action plans. As such, the business continuity plan must also be updated. 
The measurement of the success against key performance indicators identified 
in the preparatory activities is done using a scorecard system providing the 
board with real-time updates on the progress of the implementation of the 
action plans. The scorecard reflects whether the tasks are not started, started 
or completed, and uses colour-coding for schedule control. 
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This step in the process continues until the board calls for the second iteration 
of the process, albeit in the same environment or another. The information 
collected throughout the process is used as input into the new iteration. 
11.3 Advantages and Limitations 
The Peculium Model as described above is distinctly different from, but also 
similar to, other ISRM methodologies. 
The Peculium Model, although following the basic structure of ISRM, allows the 
small organisation’s board of directors or senior management to have control 
over the decisions made in the process, as well as receive periodic proof of 
progress. 
This ensures that corporate governance is practised in the Model, but also that 
the board has buy-in and supports the process (refer to Figure 11.1). This 
support sets a good example to the staff of the small enterprise. 
Board/senior management 
forum
Risk management 
sponsor 
Risk management 
team 
Preparatory 
activities
Risk identification Risk assessment Risk mitigation Risk monitoring
Asset register Risk register Action plans Assessment report
Regular risk 
management 
reporting
Approvals/ 
rejections
The Peculium Model
 
Figure 11.1: The Peculium Model 
 
The Model also allows for simplified means of reaching values like the asset 
weakness value, the impact measurement and the risk values. The Model 
provides the scorecard for measurement against the key performance 
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indicators in an at-a-glance format, allowing the board easy access to a 
progress report. 
Checklists ensuring the completion of all deliverables are also provided, 
controlling the completeness of the process. The Model has been created in a 
manner which eases each implementation by retaining the information gathered 
in the risk register for future use. 
However, the Model has only been tested in a scenario environment and no 
certainty on the success of the Model in a real-world implementation is assured. 
The Model also rests on the completion of each deliverable before the next is 
attempted; the success of the Model lacking deliverables cannot be guaranteed. 
The Model rests on the participation of the board or senior management forum. 
The lack of the participation of senior management in the support of the findings 
of the process and decision-making throughout the process is not tested for the 
purposes of the dissertation, and goes against the regulatory requirement. The 
lack of senior management participation will impede the process to a significant 
extent. 
The Model has been created specifically to fit the South African regulatory and 
SMME environment, and as South African SMMEs are so unique, this Model 
cannot be guaranteed to be applicable to a small enterprise in another country. 
11.4 Research Value 
The literature study performed for the purposes of this dissertation has 
uncovered valuable findings regarding the economic stance of SMMEs in South 
Africa, as well as the quality of the corporate governance standard King II when 
compared to its Australian counterpart. 
The angle of investigation, from the perspective of the small organisation, has 
opened new avenues for future research, specifically regarding the provision of 
regulatory standards for smaller enterprises, as well as the enhancement of 
methodologies that strengthen the organisations. 
This dissertation has provided a model for investigating the fit of an undertaking 
to the small enterprise, providing the small enterprise owner with a tool to 
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determine whether the undertaking is a suitable one for the business. SMMEs 
have never before enjoyed such generic guidance tools in their business 
decision-making. 
The Peculium Model has also provided SMMEs with a simple, yet focused 
solution to identifying the risks facing information assets in the SMME and 
methods for reducing them, without incurring huge costs. 
As a whole, the dissertation notifies the academic community that SMMEs are a 
large untapped research environment where research projects can lend great 
assistance to the strengthening of SMMEs. 
11.5 Future Research 
As stated in the limitations, this dissertation did not include in its scope the 
testing of the Peculium Model in a real-world enterprise. Such a test could 
provide interesting research value that may improve the Model, or support the 
structure as is. 
A further avenue for research would be to determine a version of the Peculium 
Model that is country-independent and that may be applied to any country’s 
version of a small enterprise. Such a challenge would require an in-depth study 
of best practice on a global scale for both the regulatory side of the 
requirements framework and the methodology for ISRM. 
A shortcut to the above would be the testing of the Model in various countries to 
determine whether it is successful in its current format, and to tabulate the 
challenges and shortcomings into a new requirements framework. 
11.6 Closing Note 
This is the end of a long journey that has allowed the growth and development 
of the author, as well as a great knowledge fount of learning regarding South 
African regulation and SMMEs. 
The author thanks the academic community for their support and assistance. 
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A1 12 Appendix 1: An evaluation of King II 
The evaluation of the King II Report is provided in the section format of the 
report. The sections that are evaluated are: 
• Introduction and Background 
• Boards and Directors 
• Risk Management 
• Internal Audit 
• Integrated Sustainability Reporting 
• Accounting and Auditing 
• Compliance and Enforcement 
12.1 Introduction and Background 
The introduction begins with the background of the King Report, which started 
with the King Committee in 1992. The first report was released in 1994 with the 
primary purpose of promoting the highest standards of Corporate Governance. 
The first report was groundbreaking in the sense that it emphasized the 
importance of the triple bottom-line, which encompasses economic, 
environmental and social aspects of the organisation [KING 2002].  
The introduction continues with taking an important stance on the difference 
between accountability and responsibility. The report states that a director is 
accountable and must be able to justify an action. Responsibility is phrased as 
being liable to account to stakeholders. The term “responsible” has been added 
to the second report as the term “accountable” did not suffice in its previous 
role. 
As an inclusive to the triple bottom-line, King II has enforced the consideration 
of customers, employees, suppliers and the community as stakeholders in the 
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organisation. As such, the purpose of the company must be defined, the values 
identified, and then communicated to these stakeholders. The concept of the 
community stakeholders also echoes in the sustainability reporting discussed 
later. 
The concepts of Entrepreneurship and Enterprise are evaluated and recognised 
as factors driving business. It is presented that entrepreneurs are traditionally 
risk-takers and initiative thinkers. It is also warned though, that stakeholders 
should be considered and profitability balanced with enterprise. At the same 
instance, a balance should also be sought between enterprise and constraints. 
Due diligence to governance will allow the balance, thus promoting growth and 
profitability. 
The next noticeable information transferred is more academic. It notes the 
organisational characteristics of the three corporate sins. These are listed as 
sloth, greed and fear. 
• Sloth is the loss of flair, the enterprise gives way to administration 
• Greed dictates decisions based on the short term for bonuses 
• Fear is the sin of being subservient to investors, ignoring drive for 
sustainability and enterprise 
The further academic content presents the characteristics of good Corporate 
Governance. 
• Discipline: Correct and proper behaviour 
• Transparency: Ease with which an outsider is able to make meaningful 
analysis of: 
o Company’s actions 
o Economic fundamentals 
o Non-financial aspects pertinent to business 
o Measure of how good management is at making necessary 
information available in candid, accurate and timely manner (audit 
data, general reports, press releases). This is another valuable 
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statement. There are still many organisations that find it difficult to 
share information with operational level staff. The symptom of ‘do 
it because I say so’ is becoming less acceptable as staff are 
realising their right to have a stake in an issue that involved their 
daily working environment.  
• Independence: The extent to which mechanisms are put in place to 
minimise potential conflicts of interest, such as dominance by a strong 
chief executive or large shareowner. 
• Accountability: Individuals or groups in a company who make decisions 
and take actions need to be accountable for their decisions. Mechanism 
must exist and be effective to allow for accountability. They provide 
investors with means to query and assess actions of the board. 
• Responsibility: Behaviour that allows for corrective action and for 
penalising mismanagement. The board is accountable to the company, 
must act responsively to and with responsibility towards stakeholders. 
• Fairness: Rights of various groups have to be acknowledged and 
respected. 
• Social responsibility: Placing high priority on ethical standards. A good 
corporate organisation is seen to be non-discriminatory, non-exploitative 
and responsible to environment and human rights. The organisation 
might experience improved productivity and good corporate reputation. 
The characteristics, when applied should accompany the following outcomes of 
a well-governed organisation: 
• Having clear majority outsiders on board, no management ties 
• Holding formal evaluations of directors 
• Directors with significant stakes, large portion of pay as stock options 
• Being responsive to investor requests 
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The failure of Corporate Governance is presented to stem from: 
• Weak legal and regulatory systems 
• Poor banking regulation practices 
• Inconsistent accounting and auditing standards 
• Improperly regulated capital markets 
• Ineffective oversight by corporate boards 
• Scant recognition of rights of minority owners 
The introduction conveys the concept of leadership for efficiency, probity and 
responsibility that is transparent and accountable. 
12.2 Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct 
The Code provides the guidelines of responsibility for the application of each of 
the sections in the report. 
12.2.1 Boards and Directors 
This section describes the composition of the board, highlighting the balance of 
executive and non-executive directors, which encompasses a majority if 
independent directors to protect the shareowners from bias. The creation of a 
nomination committee is promoted for the appointment to the board. This 
committee is also tasked with regularly evaluating board members for 
appropriate skills, experience and diversity. 
The division of power between a chairperson and CEO is discussed, 
emphasizing that the CEO should not be chairperson, but that the chair be held 
by an independent party. 
A very clear distinction is made between the concept of an executive director, 
non-executive director, and an independent non-executive director. The 
description of the independent director is on par with the Australian definition 
and is encouraged as majority of the board [ACCA 2004]. 
The report encourages fair remuneration of all executives on the board. A 
remuneration committee is suggested as the vehicle that evaluates the 
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framework of remuneration and the possibilities of share options and profit 
share. 
12.2.2 Risk Management 
It is immediately stated that the board is responsible for the total process of risk 
management as well as the evaluation of its effects. The board should 
implement risk management strategies in conjunction with management to 
ensure the day-to-day activities are integrated into the organisation. 
Actual and potential risks should be identified, and each risk effectively 
managed. The Code makes no mention of avoiding risk. The board is 
responsible for disclosing its accountability for the process of risk management, 
that it is ongoing, that there is an internal control system in place to mitigate 
risks, and that any additional information required will be published in the 
annual report. 
12.2.3 Internal Audit 
The report emphasizes that the internal audit function is separated from 
external audit. An audit committee should be established with majority 
independent directors that evaluate the extent of the audit function. 
12.2.4 Integrated sustainability reporting 
The report once again takes into consideration the triple bottom-line in 
reporting. The annual reporting should include financial, social and 
environmental reports. The board determines that information which is 
disclosed. The reports are expected to include workplace conditions, the 
strategies in place to address and manage HIV/AIDS, environmental impact of 
the organisation, social investment and human capital development. 
12.2.5 Accounting and Auditing 
As stated previously, the audit committee should be in place to consider audit 
functions, and recommend the external auditor. The application of the 
committee should ensure an independent, impartial audit. 
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A2 13 Appendix 2: A Summary of CobiT 
 
13.1 Definitions 
13.1.1 Control 
“Control is defined as the policies, procedures, practices and organisational 
structures designed to provide reasonable assurance that business objectives 
will be achieved and that desired events will be prevented or detected and 
corrected.” 
This definition is complete in its description, although somewhat lengthy and 
heavily laden with terminology. 
13.1.2 IT Control Objective 
“IT Control Objective is defined as a statement of the desired result or purpose 
to be achieved by implementing control procedures in a particular IT activity.” 
This definition is not applicable to all the control objectives in the standard. The 
phrasing of the control objectives is more aligned with tasking, than stating a 
desired result or purpose, for example 
• “Obtain Independent Assurance”, or 
• “Develop and Maintain Procedures” 
The definition might have been more apt if phrased to reflect that the control 
objective as a whole is a statement of purpose, and thus clears the confusion 
between control objective title, and the actual control objective. 
13.1.3 Principles 
The Framework principles rest on the requirements for information to support 
business requirements or objectives. Information is said to be a result of IT 
resources that are managed by IT processes. 
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13.2 Business Requirements of information 
Quality requirements are listed as the quality, cost and delivery of the 
information. Fiduciary requirements apply to all information, and are listed as 
effectiveness and efficiency of operations; reliability of information; and 
compliance with laws and regulations. Security requirements are the standard 
elements of confidentiality, availability and integrity. 
CobiT uses 7 principles, which are deduced from the abovementioned, some of 
which overlap [COBI01 2000]. These are: 
• Effectiveness 
• Efficiency 
• Confidentiality 
• Integrity 
• Availability 
• Compliance 
• Reliability of information. 
The entire above are defined adequately. They comprise the criteria with which 
all information should be evaluated for prioritisation. Any classification of data 
can also be based on which of the criteria it encompasses. 
IT Resources 
The following are defined as those resources that are used by IT processes in 
one form or another. Not all resources apply to all processes, and vice versa. 
The IT Resources are [COBI01 2000]: 
• Data 
• Application Systems 
• Technology 
• Facilities  
• People 
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These are also defined adequately. 
13.3 Domains 
The four domains of CobiT are grouped together to conform to the standard life 
cycle of most processes, being the plan-do-check-act cycle. This was created to 
enable management to fit IT Governance into the regular flow of the other 
processes and governance methods. 
13.3.1 Planning and Organisation 
The Planning and Organisation domain covers any planning that goes into 
establishing IT Governance in the organisation. This includes drafting of 
policies, plans and such to enable the organisation to achieve their business 
objectives through their IT. 
13.3.2 Acquisition and Implementation 
This is the ‘do’ element of the cycle, where those policies and plans created in 
the ‘plan’ phase are put into practise. IT solutions are created to achieve the 
plans made. 
13.3.3 Delivery and Support 
In this domain, IT solutions are used to achieve the goals identified when 
drafting the IT strategies and plans. These solutions are supported for security, 
optimisation and others as required by the controls. 
13.3.4 Monitoring 
As with any monitoring phase, those steps taken have to be assessed for 
efficiency and effectiveness and decisions made as to whether the solutions in 
place work, or whether they need to be upgraded and/or altered. 
These domains are comprehensive in the control objectives available, and no 
organisation is expected to make use of all the control objectives. There lies the 
challenge of determining which control objectives are functional for the 
organisation, keeping time and budget constraints in mind. 
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13.4 Control Objectives 
There are 34 major control objectives that form part of CobiT. These control 
objectives are distributed over the domains mentioned previously. The 
organisation making use of CobiT may use its discretion in determining which 
control objectives are applicable to the organisation, but this decision can be 
time consuming, as all control objectives must be considered before making an 
informed decision.  
13.4.1 Planning and Organisation 
The Planning and Organisation domain consists of 11 control objectives, these 
are discussed below. 
PO1. Define a Strategic IT Plan 
1. Definition 
Defining a strategic information technology plan to strike an optimum balance of 
IT opportunities and IT business requirements as well as ensuring its further 
accomplishment. 
It is enabled by a strategic planning process undertaken at regular intervals 
giving rise to long-term plans; the long term plans should periodically be 
translated into operational plans setting clear and concrete short-term goals. 
2. Critique 
As with many facets of CobiT, the definition of a component is usually heavy in 
terminology, and lacking in visual accompaniment.  
The understanding that can be obtained from the abovementioned is that 
several plans, and thus documents are created that ultimately form part of the 
business strategy. These plans are drilled down from high-level strategic plans, 
to operational plans with specific goals attached, to be achieved in a holistic 
deliverable for review at the next iterative strategic planning process. 
As a result, much time is spent on the creation of these plans, and some energy 
must be put towards monitoring the execution of said plans. There is no specific 
reference made to these plans in the other domains concerning implementation 
or monitoring. The other domains are concerned with specifics and lose sight of 
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the holistic plan. The realisation that that CobiT is the holistic plan that is 
executed by the specific control objectives requires management cognisance. 
PO2. Define the Information Architecture 
1. Definition 
Defining the information architecture of optimising the organisation of the 
information systems. 
It is enabled by creating and maintaining a business information model and 
ensuring appropriate system are defined to optimise the use of this information. 
2. Critique 
This control objective concerns the technical composition of information as used 
by the organisation. The information architecture, as described here, is of a 
security concern, and must not be avoided at all. 
PO3. Determine technological direction 
1. Definition 
Determining technological direction to take advantage of available and 
emerging technology to drive and make possible business strategy. 
It is enables by creation and maintenance of a technological infrastructure plan 
that sets and manages clear and realistic expectations of what technology can 
offer in terms of products, services and delivery mechanisms. 
2. Critique 
This control objective is in a peculiar position, as the very first control objective 
listed details the creation of a strategic IT plan. Determining the organisation’s 
strategic IT direction should form part of the holistic strategic IT plan. If an 
organisation should blindly follow the CobiT model without previous study, 
repetition of management counsel would be required to follow this step. It 
becomes therefore imperative that any organisation considering CobiT should 
study the whole, before attempting the elements, and as a result implement it in 
its own manner (which is suggested at the very beginning). 
This control objective is however extremely valuable when taking the role of IT 
Governance into consideration. The purpose of IT Governance is once again 
reflected here in stating that emerging technology drives the business strategy. 
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It is so important that organisation’s carefully consider their technological 
options when discussing their business strategy. 
PO4. Define IT Organisation and Relationships 
1. Definition 
Defining the IT organisation and relationships to deliver the right IT services. 
It is enabled by an organisation suitable in numbers and skills with roles and 
responsibilities defined and communicated, aligned with the business and that 
facilitates the strategy and provides for effective direction and adequate control. 
2. Critique 
The control objective define here should not form part of a process, or a step 
following another, but should instead be a set policy in place when considering 
processes or steps. 
Any organisation defines roles and responsibilities of its staff, whether formally 
or informally. The definition of IT roles and responsibilities should follow 
logically. This is also a task expected of every organisation to perform, both for 
its value in task ownership, and succession planning. 
An organisation that has a stored record of all the roles and responsibilities of 
its staff, IT or otherwise, can more valuably map their disaster recovery 
processes due to the easy access to competency definitions. The document 
also provides the organisation with accountability Figures in any situation. 
PO5. Manage the IT Investment 
1. Definition 
Managing the IT investment to ensure funding and control disbursement of 
financial resources. 
It is enabled by a periodic investment and operational budget establishment and 
approved by the business. 
2. Critique 
This control objective is very clear in its entirety. Any businessman understands 
the importance of managing any investment. What is important here is that it is 
clear that IT is an investment, and not just a tool, or purchase. IT must be 
handled as a strategic part of business that undergoes justification studies for 
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cost and benefit. The definition of the control objective provides enough 
information for the business to proceed with it. 
PO6. Communicate Management Aims and Direction 
1. Definition 
Communicating management aims and direction to ensure user awareness and 
understanding of those aims. 
It is enabled by policies established and communicated to the user community; 
furthermore, standards need to be established to translate the strategic options 
into practical and usable use rules. 
2. Critique 
This is probably the most important control objective of all. There is no question 
whether any organisation should not communicate that which concerns the 
other stakeholders in the organisation. 
Senior management buy-in is often emphasized, but equally important is 
operational staff buy-in. Revenue generating staff should be included in any 
business decisions that affect them, as they would be the most likely 
implementers or users of new business systems. 
One method of formal communication that can be applied is the creation of 
policies and procedures surrounding the business change/ addition. It is 
however imperative that an organisation does not place full trust in such a 
passive mechanism. Measures should be in place to actively transfer 
knowledge to staff, considering options such as public address, awareness 
training and other methods. 
PO7. Manage Human Resources 
1. Definition 
Managing human resources to acquire and maintain a motivated and 
competent workforce and maximise personnel contributions to the IT process. 
It is enabled by sound, fair and transparent personnel management practices to 
recruit, line, vet, compensate, train, appraise, promote and dismiss. 
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2. Critique 
This control objective seems strangely out of place in an IT Governance 
standard, as it should rather form part of Corporate Governance standard. It 
applies to the organisation as a whole, and not just to parts of the organisation 
involved in governing IT, or managing IT. 
This control objective does however contain valuable guides as to managing 
the human resources of an organisation. No organisation owner/ senior 
manager should disregard its value. 
PO8. Ensure Compliance with External Requirements 
1. Definition 
Ensuring compliance with external requirements to meet legal, regulatory and 
contractual obligations. 
It is enabled by identifying and analysing external requirements for their IT 
impact, and taking appropriate measures to comply with them. 
2. Critique 
This control objective, strangely enough encompasses the role of this report. 
There are many standards of compliance in the industry, and requires an 
experienced auditor to determine the applicability of the standards to the 
organisation, and consequently audit the organisation for compliance. The 
mention of privacy, intellectual property and e-commerce sparks many flames 
of concerns for regulatory legislative compliance. An organisation should seek 
legal counsel when attempting e-commerce, and when claiming intellectual 
property. 
PO9. Assess Risks 
1. Definition 
Assessing risks of supporting management decisions through achieving IT 
objectives and responding to threats by reducing complexity, increasing 
objectivity and identifying important decision factors. 
It is enabled by the organisation engaging itself in IT-risk identification and 
impact analysis, involving multi-disciplinary functions and taking cost-effective 
measures to mitigate risks. 
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2. Critique 
This is an excellent control objective to form part of an IT Governance standard. 
It not only brings to light the facets of risk management, but also begins the 
detailed control objectives by aligning business risks associated with IT with the 
organisation’s business objectives. By performing this step, the organisation 
realises how an exposure to risk may debilitate the business achieving an 
objective. 
The terms assessment and identification are used loosely, with no clear 
differentiation between the two. This could prove to be confusing to the CobiT 
novice (refer to the clarification in Chapter 2). 
The risk action plan suggested advises the reader to draft a plan which lists the 
risks and any means of mitigating exposure to the risks. It also makes it clear 
that the measures should be cost-effective. A risk analysis and consequent 
mitigation plan should never exceed the return on investment (ROI), as the 
organisation would lose faith in the practise, and not continue with 
reassessments.  
It is also made clear that the controls implemented to mitigate the risks 
identified should be prioritised by maximum impact, and maximum ROI. 
PO10. Manage Projects 
1. Definition 
Managing projects to set priorities and to deliver on time and within budget. 
It is enabled by the organisation identifying and prioritising projects in line with 
the operational plan and the adoption and application of sound project 
management techniques for each project undertaken. 
2. Critique 
Project management is becoming an increasingly important function in any 
business as the benefits of detailed planning; deliverable identification and 
objective declarations have increased the success of new ventures, added 
organisational functions, implementation of new systems and general due 
diligence. 
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Many organisations are applying project management techniques to various 
facets of the business, and are becoming more aware of the organisation’s 
business objectives through researching what the projects are aimed to 
achieve.  
There are many facets to project management, as identified in the PMBoK 
[PMBO 2004]. How these are presented here is quite different. The order of the 
detailed control objectives is once again rather confusing, as risk management 
is discussed after phase approval. A project should not be launched if the risks 
are too great to be effectively mitigated. 
It is however a good sign that post-implementation review is discussed, as this 
is a tool of governance that allows perpetual enhancement of methods applied. 
The core areas of project management, being cost, schedule quality, and 
integration, are not emphasized enough, as these are the ultimate purpose of 
extensive planning. The extent to which planning is performed determines 
whether the constraints are abided by in the long run.  
PO11. Manage Quality 
1. Definition 
Managing quality to meet IT customer requirements. 
It is enabled by the planning, implementing and maintaining of quality 
management standards and systems providing for distinct development phases, 
clear deliverables and explicit responsibilities. 
2. Critique 
This is a very extensive control objective, as it covers various areas of quality 
assurance, including various tests and system development life cycle features. 
It is a very important part of IT Governance, as it creates control over IT in the 
organisation. IT creates control over the development of systems to ensure they 
are quality systems. Governance is control. Quality assurance therefore 
embodies the success of IT Governance. 
Quality assurance is resource intensive, and requires a lot of input form various 
parties to ensure it works. Quality control standards (ISO series) might also be 
considered for assured implementation of the quality standards. 
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13.4.2 Acquisition and Implementation 
The Acquisition and Implementation domain of six control objectives, these are 
discussed below. 
AI1.   Identify Automated Solutions 
1. Definition 
Identifying automated solutions to ensure an effective and efficient approach to 
satisfy the user requirements. 
It is enabled by an objective and clear identification and analysis of the 
alternative opportunities measured against user requirements. 
2. Critique 
This objective expects the organisation to research, compare and propose 
solutions for automation. An organisation may not be empowered with 
reasonable knowledge of IT systems to conduct such research effectively. The 
organisation may need to approach a knowledgeable third party. 
AI2.   Acquire and Maintain Application Software 
1. Definition 
Acquiring and maintaining application software to provide automated functions 
which effectively support the business process. 
It is enabled by the definition of specific statements of functional and 
operational requirements and a phased implementation with clear deliverables. 
2. Critique 
This objective provides some guidelines to the implementation of the solution 
identified in AI1 as most suitable. It again allows a project based introduction of 
the system to the users, and also emphasizes that the system should be 
acquired based on specific requirements of users. This could be a challenge, as 
users should be made aware that their requirements have to be all 
encompassing and specific to ensure they receive a system that provides all the 
services they require. 
AI3.   Acquire and Maintain Technology Infrastructure 
1. Definition 
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Acquiring and maintaining technology infrastructure to provide the appropriate 
platforms for supporting business applications. 
It is enabled by judicious hardware and software acquisition, standardising of 
software, assessment of hardware and software performance and consistent 
system administration. 
2. Critique 
The implementation of this control objective should be performed by an IT 
professional, as it clearly requires knowledge of hardware and software 
standardisation. The IT professional is held responsible for recommending 
standards for the systems, and upon management approval, implementing 
those standards. 
AI4.   Develop and Maintain Procedures 
1. Definition 
Developing and maintaining procedures to ensure the proper use of the 
application and the technological solutions put in place. 
It is enabled by a structured approach to the development of user and 
operations procedure manuals, service requirements and training materials. 
2. Critique 
This control objective requires collaboration between management and the IT 
professional to ensure that the procedures are technologically correct, and their 
use supported by management. The procedures and manuals need to be 
transferred to users in an active manner to ensure application and justification 
of the time spent of creating the manuals. 
AI5.   Install and Accredit Systems 
1. Definition 
Installing and accrediting systems to verify and confirm that the solution is fit for 
the intended purpose. 
It is enabled by the realisation of a well-formalised installation migration, 
conversion and acceptance plan. 
2. Critique 
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The requirements obtained during AI1 circumvents this control objective if 
performed with due diligence. If, however, the realisation is reached that AI1 
was not performed effectively, this control objective becomes helpful. 
AI6.   Manage Changes 
1. Definition 
Managing changes to minimise the likelihood of disruption, unauthorised 
alterations and errors. 
It is enabled by a management system which provides for the analysis, 
implementation and follow-up of all changes requested and made to the exiting 
IT infrastructure. 
2. Critique 
The management of change, or change control should be mapped early in the 
strategic IT process. Change management procedures need to be 
communicated to staff before a change is required. This control objective is 
placed in a ‘do’ domain, but should have been included in planning as well. It 
does bode well for CobiT that it has been included. 
13.4.3 Delivery and Support 
The Delivery and Support domain of 13 control objectives, these are discussed 
below. 
DS1.  Define and Manage Service Levels 
1. Definition 
Defining and managing service levels to establish a common understanding of 
the level of service required. 
It is enabled by the establishment of service-level agreements which formalise 
the performance criteria against which the quantity and quality of service is 
measured. 
2. Critique 
This control objective as it stands fits very much into the corporate environment 
of the large organisation with a large IT department handling various requests 
from staff. Regarding IT Governance, it is rather operational, but still creates a 
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level of control with regards to user expectations and services offered to the 
users. 
DS2.  Manage Third-Party Services 
1. Definition 
Managing third-party services to ensure that roles and responsibilities of third-
parties are clearly defined; adhered to and continue to satisfy requirements. 
It is enabled by control measures aimed at the review and monitoring of existing 
agreements and procedures for their effectiveness and compliance with 
organisation policy. 
2. Critique 
Management of third-party services could easily have been included in the 
previous control objective, as service level agreements should be created in 
conjunction with third-party providers if they are present. The creation of service 
levels should not be done before the third-party providers have been qualified 
and selected. Once again the need of complete study of CobiT is required to 
ensure no duplication of effort is expended. 
DS3.  Manage Performance and Capacity 
1. Definition 
Managing performance and capacity to ensure that adequate capacity is 
available and that best and optimal use is made of it to meet required 
performance needs. 
It is enabled by data collection, analysis and reporting on resource 
performance, application sizing and workload demand. 
2. Critique 
This is a definite control mechanism where the service levels are tested for 
performance, and the systems in place are tested for performance versus 
demand. This exercise can also shed light on the standardisation of hardware 
and software performed in planning and organisation. The results of this 
analysis can be used to adapt the standards at the next cycle of IT Governance. 
This is a valuable control objective that provides tangible information for 
budgeting and strategic planning related to IT. 
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DS4.  Ensure Continuous Service 
1. Definition 
Ensuring continuous service to make sure IT services are available as required 
and to ensure a minimum business impact in the event of a major disruption. 
It is enabled by having an operational and tested IT continuity plan which is in 
line with the overall business continuity plan and its elated business 
requirements. 
2. Critique 
This control objective is glaringly out of place in this domain. An IT continuity 
plan should most definitely not be drafted during the delivery of IT services. The 
continuity plan should be created and tested during planning. 
The operational implementation of disaster recovery might have been a more 
apt description for placing a control objective of this nature in delivery and 
support. 
DS5.  Ensure Systems Security 
1. Definition 
Ensuring systems security to safeguard information against unauthorised use; 
disclosure or modification; damage or loss. 
It is enabled by logical access controls which ensure that access to systems, 
data and programmes is restricted to authorised users. 
2. Critique 
This control objective is also out of place. A control objective in acquisition and 
implementation, develop and maintain procedures, can easily be used as 
vehicle for security procedures. The mechanisms identified in acquisition and 
implementation allows for the creation of the security procedures or policies, as 
well as their implementation and maintenance. The workload of the two control 
objectives can be combined and as such and the required communication 
reduced. 
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DS6.  Identify and Allocate Costs 
1. Definition 
Identifying and allocating costs to ensure a correct awareness of the costs 
attributable to IT services. 
It is enabled by a cost accounting system which ensures that costs are 
recorded, calculated and allocated to the required level of detail and to the 
appropriate service offering. 
2. Critique 
This control objective is very closely linked to the planning and organisation 
objective of strategic IT planning. Steps should be taken throughout the fiscal 
year to record cost of IT against the budget identified, and managing of any 
unforeseen expenditure. These recordings will assist management in creation 
of the next IT Strategy by basing the continuing costs on those recorded, and 
basing strategic additional costs on the unforeseen costs recorded. 
DS7.  Educate and Train Users 
1. Definition 
Educating and training users to ensure that users are making effective use of 
technology and are aware of the risks and responsibilities involved. 
It is enabled by a comprehensive training and development plan. 
2. Critique 
This control objective has significant ties with procedural communication and 
business continuity/ disaster recovery planning. Any procedures or plans 
created have to be transferred to each user, either by awareness training or by 
involvement in creating the plans. 
This objective is of utmost importance and should be applied by any 
organisation. 
DS8.  Assist and Advise Customers 
1. Definition 
Assisting and advising customers to ensure that any problem experienced by 
the user is appropriately resolved. 
It is enabled by a helpdesk facility which provides first-line support and advice. 
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2. Critique 
This objective is also out of place as the definition confuses a customer with a 
user. It is assumed that the user becomes the customer of the helpdesk 
described. 
The functions of the helpdesk should have been included in the control 
objective determining the service levels. It does have its slot in this domain due 
to its support nature. This connection to the service levels should be identified 
to prevent redundancy. 
DS9.  Manage the Configuration 
1. Definition 
Managing the configuration to account for all IT components, prevent 
unauthorised alterations, verify physical existence and provide a basis for 
sound change management. 
It is enabled by controls which identify and record all IT assets and their 
physical location and a regular verification programme which confirms their 
existence. 
2. Critique 
This control objective creates a firm tie with the auditing and accounting 
function described in Corporate Governance. Maintenance of an asset register 
is required by external auditing to justify IT spend with the assets identified and 
use of those assets. The responsibility of maintaining these registers should 
however be delegated to an individual knowledgeable of the IT systems in 
place, but reported in a language accessible by the external auditor. 
DS10. Manage Problems and Incidents 
1. Definition 
Managing problems and incidents to ensure that problems and incidents are 
resolved, and the cause investigated to prevent any recurrence. 
It is enabled by a problem management system which records and progresses 
all incidents. 
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2. Critique 
This control objective also connects to the service levels and assistance of 
customer concepts. The operational resolution of problems will be allocated 
through the helpdesk. Adequate systems should also be provided to the 
helpdesk to record and progress incidents. A further suggestion is the use if a 
knowledge management system that allows searchable recording of problem 
solutions for future use. 
DS11.  Manage Data 
1. Definition 
Managing data to ensure that data remains complete, accurate and valid during 
its input, change and storage. 
It is enabled by an effective combination of application and general controls 
over IT operations. 
2. Critique 
This control objective allows for the cognisance of the integrity of data, one of 
the information security services. It does not however recognise availability or 
confidentiality, which is rather alarming. 
This control objective does however highlight the accuracy and validation of 
data during its creation and storage. Proof of successful measures that allow 
this protects the reporting portion of Corporate Governance, and lends 
credibility to the reporting mechanisms. 
DS12.  Manage Facilities 
1. Definition 
Managing facilities to provide a suitable physical surrounding which protects the 
IT equipment and people against man-made and natural hazards. 
It is enabled by the installation of suitable environment and physical controls 
which are regularly reviewed for their proper functioning. 
2. Critique 
This control objective would be more suited to both planning and organisation 
and acquisition and implementation. Decision of which infrastructural controls 
are required should be considered with business continuity planning and the IT 
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strategy. An organisation cannot plan its physical controls for protection of its IT 
after the budgets have been assigned. 
The testing of controls and subsequent installation should then form part of 
other acquisitions and implementations. 
DS13.  Manage Operations 
1. Definition 
Managing operations to ensure that important IT support functions are 
performed regularly and in an orderly fashion. 
It is enabled by a schedule of support activities which is recorded and cleared 
for the accomplishment of all activities. 
2. Critique 
Operational implementation of service levels should not be defined this far into 
IT Governance. The creation of service levels should include the scheduled 
functions that are to be performed, and the frequency that is decided upon. The 
execution of those operations is in the correct domain, but not the creation of 
the operations and their schedules. 
13.4.4 Monitoring 
The Monitoring domain contains 6 control objectives, these are discussed 
below. 
M1.  Monitor the Processes 
1. Definition 
Monitoring the process to ensure the achievement of the performance 
objectives set for the IT processes. 
It is enabled by the definition of relevant performance indicators, the systematic 
and timely reporting of performance and prompt acting upon deviations. 
2. Critique 
This is an excellent inclusion and should be applied throughout the IT 
Governance cycle. It allows the creation of measures in the planning process, 
and creates the room for reporting and resolving shortcomings throughout the 
cycle. 
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M2.  Assess Internal control Adequacy 
1. Definition 
Assessing internal control adequacy to ensure the achievement of the internal 
control set for the IT processes.  
2. Critique 
This control objective could have been included in the previous, more global 
objective, by identifying internal control as a process, which it is. 
It has however been separated to emphasize and ensure that internal controls 
are included and do not disappear into a multitude of processes and is not 
afforded due diligence. 
M3.  Obtain Independent Insurance 
1. Definition 
Obtaining independent insurance to increase confidence and trust among the 
organisations, customers ad third-party providers. 
It is enabled by independent assurance reviews carried out at regular intervals. 
2. Critique 
This measure allows the accreditation and certification of an organisation as 
being compliant with the regulations in place. Such regulations can be supplied 
by government or international bodies. Examples of such regulations are those 
of the ISO 17799, the ECT Act, and CobiT itself. 
The only confusion in this objective is the use of the tem customer. In this 
instance it seems to relate to external parties making use of the organisations 
services or products. 
M4.  Provide for Independent Audit 
1. Definition 
Providing for independent audit to increase confidence levels and benefit from 
best practise advice. 
It is enabled by independent audits carried out at regular intervals. 
2. Critique 
The functions described in this control objective link very closely with the 
previous. It is suggested the two are combined. 
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A3 14 Appendix 3: CobiT Control Objectives Selection Guidelines 
14.1 Control Objective Selection Guidelines 
The following guidelines have been created to assist in identifying the scale of 
requirement for IT Governance, or alternatively put, the control objectives that 
should be implemented. A framework loosely based on the CobiT Capability 
Maturity Model is used to answer questions pointed at the IT Governance 
attitude of the organisation and the availability of its resources [COBI04 2000]. 
The guidelines follow a 4-step process to determine the organisation’s IT 
Governance maturity level. 
14.1.1 Identify the Organisation’s IT Resource Management 
Maturity 
By identifying the organisation’s maturity an understanding can be reached of 
the scope of control objectives required. If an organisation is mature at level 5, 
a smaller contingent of objectives would be required and visa versa. 
Has the organisation identified that there is a requirement for IT 
Governance? 
0 No The organisation is not concerned with managing its IT as a 
resource. 
1 Initial The organisation is aware of a lack of control of their IT resources. 
2 Repeatable The organisation has investigated the process of establishing 
control processes. 
3 Defined The organisation has defined control processes and has trained its 
staff. 
4 Managed The organisation measures the performance of the control 
processes and re-evaluates a process after the problem has been 
addressed. 
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5 Optimised Control processes are formally defined and do not have any 
defects. IT resources are effectively managed and used. 
14.1.2 Identify the level of authority by organisation owners or 
managers 
The level of authority of business owners or managers would determine the 
amount of staff buy-in that may be obtained. An organisation unaccustomed to 
authority may not be easy to convince of an organisational shift in regard of IT 
resources. 
Does the organisation have a formal management structure? 
0 No The organisation is not formally controlled and does not invite 
potential expansion. 
1 Initial The organisation practices basic management principles such as 
staff meetings and capital expense control and harbours potential 
for growth. 
2 Repeatable The organisation has a management team that monitor 
organisational performance and investigates opportunities for 
growth. 
3 Defined The organisation has a formal management forum that is 
accountable for the organisation’s development. This forum is the 
authority on growth decisions. Staff has awareness of the role of the 
forum and are notified of significant happenstance. 
4 Managed The organisation measures the performance of the management 
forum. Management might be supplemented by independent 
advisors/ directors that monitor the performance of the organisation. 
The management forum produces formal documentation of the 
financial standing of the organisation which is presented to the 
directors/ shareholders.  
5 Optimised The organisation has a clearly defined hierarchy of management 
that encourages staff participation in organisational shifts, as well as 
the delegation of organisation management. The senior managers 
are highly skilled and competent. Staff opinions are valued and 
addressed. Formal documentation is produced presenting the 
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financial, social and environmental standing of the organisation. 
14.1.3 Level of technological sophistication in the organisation 
The level of technology used in the organisation will affect the control required 
of the systems in place. The greater the sophistication, the lower the resources 
required to control them. 
What is the level of technological sophistication? 
0 None The organisation does not make use of technology as a resource. 
1 Initial The organisation makes use of technology is its simplest form and 
can continue manually if required. 
2 Repeatable The organisation has simple system in place managing its data. The 
systems do not have a continuity solution but does have paper-
based alternative. 
3 Defined The organisation has systems specifically developed for the 
organisation and uses machines that can cope with the 
requirement. 
4 Managed The organisational systems have a structured maintenance cycle 
and are of a high standard. The machines are regularly maintained 
and have room for technological expansion if so required. 
5 Optimised The organisational systems are well maintained and have a strict 
level of standard. The organisational data is stored in a secure 
manner with a defined recovery procedure. The machines are of the 
highest standard and are rotated regularly to manage productivity 
requirements. 
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14.1.4 Technology/Information Risk Profile 
The awareness of a risk profile may increase the consideration of decisions 
made and steps taken concerning the risk area. In the case of technology/ 
information risk, awareness may create carefulness with data storage as an 
example. 
Is the organisation aware of a technology/ information risk profile? 
0 No The organisation has not considered risk to its technology/ 
information. 
1 Initial The organisation is aware that risks may exist but have identified a 
profile. 
2 Repeatable The organisation is aware of the risk profile but has not taken any 
mitigating steps. 
3 Defined The organisation is aware of the steps that need to be taken to 
mitigate some risks in the risk profile. 
4 Managed The organisation mitigates its risks and regularly updates the risk 
profile. 
5 Optimised The organisation invests resources into a formal risk evaluation, 
mitigation and management process and documents the process for 
publishing. 
The model used above is now used to tabulate the control objective application 
ranges used to identify those control objectives most suited to the organisation 
range. The range is reached by adding the model values selected in each of the 
4 questions above. 
Table 14.1: The control objectives applicability ranges 
Range Range Definition 
0 This range includes organisations that are not dependent on IT 
resources and are not expecting growth in the organisation. 
These organisations are excluded henceforth. 
1 – 8 These organisations are aware that more focus on its IT 
resources are required, and that actions and not intentions bear 
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results. 
9 – 12 These organisations have made progress in their IT Governance 
and needs formalisation of the outcomes of their efforts. 
13 - 20 These organisations have well-defined and structured control 
processes in place and are in an overall control phase. 
The control objectives identified as applicable were selected considering the 
following assumption: 
• Any control objective attempted should be done in a workshop 
environment allowing staff participation. As control objectives do require 
resources, buy-in becomes paramount. 
The growth of the organisation from one maturity level to another should follow 
the “define process, implement sophistication, monitor process” route as 
demonstrated in Table 14.1. 
The maturity levels16 of define process, implement sophistication; monitor 
process can be expanded as follows: 
• Define process selects the initial control objectives required for 
formalise the organisation’s intended use of IT, assessing the risks the 
organisation faces, managing those resources required, developing 
service levels, formalising change and incident response structures and 
monitoring these initial steps during the process 
• Implement sophistication creates room for the organisation to improve 
the policies and procedures already in place. This includes the 
acquisition of improved systems, higher levels of service delivery, more 
control over IT resources and improved monitoring of IT. This step 
involved the largest requirement of resources, as it lifts the organisation 
from acceptable control to sophisticated control. 
                                                 
16 The terms maturity level and ranges are interchangeable as follows: 
• Maturity level 1 is range 1 – 8 
• Maturity level 2 is range 9 – 12 
• Maturity level 3 is range 13 - 20 
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• Monitor process is the maintenance of the sophistication reached in the 
previous level. An organisation rated at this level already may require 
some backtracking if some of the sophistication markers are not in place. 
This level is least resource intensive, but may require increased 
resources if the required input for maintenance is not upheld. 
The control objectives selected for the levels were chosen using judgment of 
the flow of sophistication. Some control objectives may seem controversial in 
their applicability to the maturity level. An example of such a controversy is the 
inclusion of Manage Projects in the first level. This control objective has been 
included as a defining control, as much of the implementation of control 
objectives requires management of resources, time, cost and integration into 
the existing organisation. These are the main themes of project management 
[PMBO 2004]. A controversial exclusion example is the exclusion of Assist and 
Advise Customers from the first level. This has been excluded as application of 
the grouped define controls should be done internal to the organisation. 
Inclusion of customers into changed control should only be considered once 
internal control has stabilised. 
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Table 14.2: Recommended use of CobiT by an SMME 
Control Objective 1- 8 9 – 12 13 - 20
Planning and Organisation 
Define a strategic IT plan ● ● ● 
Define the information architecture  ●  
Determine technological direction ● ●  
Define the IT organisation and relationships ● ●  
Manage the IT investment  ● ● 
Communicate management aims and direction ● ● ● 
Manage human resources ● ● ● 
Ensure compliance with external requirements  ● ● 
Assess risks ● ● ● 
Manage projects ● ● ● 
Manage quality  ● ● 
Acquisition and Implementation 
Identify automated solutions  ●  
Acquire and maintain application software  ●  
Acquire and maintain technology infrastructure  ●  
Develop and maintain procedures ●   
Install and accredit systems  ● ● 
Manage changes ● ● ● 
Delivery and Support 
Define and manage service levels ● ●  
Manage third party services ● ●  
Manage performance capacity ● ●  
Ensure continuous service ● ● ● 
Ensure system security ● ● ● 
Identify and allocate costs ● ● ● 
Educate and train users ● ●  
Assist and advise customers  ●  
Manage the configuration   ● 
Manage problems and incidents ● ● ● 
Manage data ● ● ● 
Manage facilities  ● ● 
Manage operations ● ● ● 
Monitoring 
Monitor the processes ● ● ● 
Assess internal control adequacy ● ●  
Obtain independent assurance  ● ● 
Provide for independent audit  ● ● 
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A4 15 Appendix 4: ISO 17799 threats and vulnerabilities lists 
15.1 ISO 17799 Threats List 
The ISO 17799 threats list has been reordered to the categories as defined in 
Chapter 8. 
External human 
• Bomb attack 
• Communications infiltrations 
• Damage to cabling 
• Eavesdropping 
• Industrial action (strike) 
• Masquerading of user identity 
• Network access by unauthorised persons 
• Theft 
• Traffic analysis 
• Wilful damage 
 
External system 
• Malicious software 
• Misrouting or rerouting of messages 
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Internal human 
• Communications infiltrations 
• Damage to cabling 
• Illegal software 
• Illegal use of software 
• Industrial action (strike) 
• Maintenance error 
• Misuse of resources 
• Network access by unauthorised persons 
• Operational support staff error 
• Repudiation 
• Staff shortage 
• Theft 
• Traffic analysis 
• Unauthorised use of software 
• Unauthorised use of storage media 
• Use of network facilities in unauthorised manner 
• Use of software by unauthorised users 
• Use of software in unauthorised manner 
• User error 
• Wilful damage 
Internal system 
• Air conditioning failure 
• Deterioration of storage media 
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• Failure of network components 
• Hardware failure 
• Software failure 
• Traffic overloading 
• Transmission errors 
 
Other 
• Airborne particles/ dust 
• Earthquake 
• Environmental contamination 
• Extreme temperatures 
• Failure of telecoms services 
• Failure of water supply 
• Failure of power supply 
• Fire 
• Flooding 
• Lightning 
• Power fluctuation 
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15.2 ISO 17799 Vulnerabilities List 
The ISO 17799 list of vulnerabilities is as follows: 
Personnel security 
• Absence of personnel 
• Unsupervised work by external staff, e.g. cleaning staff 
• Insufficient security training 
• Lack of security awareness 
• Poorly documented software 
• Lack of monitoring mechanisms 
• Lack of policies for the correct use if information assets and 
telecommunications 
• Inadequate recruitment procedures 
Physical and environmental security 
• Inadequate or careless use of physical access control to building, rooms 
and offices 
• Lack of physical protection for the building, rooms and offices 
• Location in an area susceptible to flood 
• Unprotected storage 
• Insufficient maintenance of storage media 
• Lack of periodic equipment replacement schemes 
• Susceptibility of equipment to dust  
• Susceptibility of equipment to temperature variations 
• Susceptibility of equipment to voltage variations 
• Unstable power grid 
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Computer and network management 
• Unprotected communication lines 
• Poor joint cabling 
• Lack of identification and authentication mechanisms 
• Transfer of passwords in clear text 
• Lack of proof when sending or receiving messages  
• Dial-up lines 
• Unprotected sensitive traffic 
• Single point of failure 
• Inadequate network management 
• Lack of care at disposal 
• Uncontrolled copying 
• Unprotected public network connections 
System access control, development and maintenance 
• Complicated user interface 
• Disposal or reuse of storage media without proper erasure 
• Lack of audit-trail 
• Lack of documentation 
• Lack of effective change control 
• Lack of identification and authentication mechanisms 
• No logout when leaving a workstation 
• No or insufficient software testing 
• Poor password management 
• Unclear or incomplete specification for developers 
• Uncontrolled downloading and using software 
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• Unprotected password Tables 
• Well-known flaws in software 
• Wrong allocation of user access rights 
 248
 
A5 
16 Appendix 5: Scenario 
Implementation of the Peculium 
Model 
16.1 Introduction 
A scenario implementation was performed on a real-world based non-for-profit 
organisation (NPO) called Muckleneuk Books. The scenario is based on the 
Peculium Model and follows all the steps provided. 
Muckleneuk Books is an established NPO raising funds for charity through the 
sale of motivational books, CDs and DVDs. The media are specially 
manufactured at a reduced cost by a supplier to increase the funds raised. The 
funds are donated to a set list of approved charities. Muckleneuk Books has a 
stable client base ranging from individuals to franchise bookshops. Table 16.1 
provides a summary of the organisation. 
Table 16.1: A summary of Muckleneuk Books 
Staff 15 
Departments 
Bookstore 
The bookstore holds examples of all the items in the stock list and 
is open to the public on specific dates and times. 
Ordering 
Operators in the ordering department conduct sales through 
telecommunications. 
Warehouse 
The warehouse houses the stock for sale and processes the 
orders for picking and shipment. 
Finances 
The financial department includes IT, debtors, creditors and 
general bookkeeping. 
Senior 
management 
The management team includes the managing directorship, 
operational directorship and financial management. 
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Organisational chart 
 
Figure 16.1: Simple organisational chart 
Information 
assets 
• Codes are provided for the assets using the abbreviations 
S for systems, IF for information assets and IS for 
infrastructure assets. 
Systems 
• Legacy ordering system (S1). The operators in the 
ordering department capture all the order details into this 
system. The system generates invoices that are passed to 
the warehouse and Finance for processing. 
• Workflow management system (S2). The workflow 
management system is used to manage the turnaround 
time of the orders and imports all order data automatically 
from the legacy system. 
• Pastel (S3). Muckleneuk Books makes use of Pastel for 
processing debtors, creditors and salaries.  
Information 
• Order information (IF1). The daily orders are housed in a 
batch flat file on the legacy system. The system is not 
backed up and is experiencing considerable reliability 
problems. 
• SQL database of workflow data (IF2). Dates on which 
orders are placed and stock is picked and shipped are 
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captured into the SQL database through the workflow 
system. The data is backed up on a daily basis. 
• Stock database (IF3). The stock list is held in an Excel 
spreadsheet format. The file is backed up daily. 
• Exchange information store (IF3). Contact details of 
clients, although stored in Pastel, are not accessible in the 
ordering department. Exchange is used to store contact 
information and emailed orders. The information store is 
backed up on a daily basis. 
• Pastel data is backed up using the Backup Exec v8 
software and LTO Backup tapes (IF4). 
Infrastructure 
• Legacy system hardware (IS1). The hardware of the 
system is showing increasing signs of collapse. 
Replacement hardware is not available. 
• Domain controller server (IS2). The server is relatively new 
and carries enough power for the management of the 
domain, exchange and workflow systems. The server runs 
on a Microsoft SBS 2003 operating system. 
• Pastel server (IS3). The Pastel server is a PC that is used 
to house the Pastel system and its data. 
• Desktop PCs (IS4). The organisation makes use of two 
separate groups of PCs: 
o Thin client workstations (IS4a). The operators and 
warehouse personnel make use of thin clients as 
they are dependent on server-based applications. 
o PCs (IS4b). The management staff makes use of 
PCs as more individualised use is required. These 
staff members also have access to the Internet. 
• Switch (IS5). A routing switch is also on the network 
directing traffic to the required destinations. 
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The organisation has never before conducted a risk assessment or 
management process. 
16.2 The Peculium Model applied to Muckleneuk Books 
The Peculium Model, as described in chapters 6 to 10, was applied to the 
organisation and the output from each step of the process is presented below. 
16.2.1 Preparatory Activities 
The preparatory activities have been performed. Table 16.2 offers the results. 
Table 16.2: Preparatory activities 
Confirm 
organisation is an 
SMME 
Staff complement of 15 
Obtain senior 
management 
involvement 
Project Sponsor: Operations Director 
Roles and responsibilities signed 
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Organisational Objectives 
 
Figure 16.2: The Muckleneuk Books balanced scorecard 
Appetite for risk R100 000 
 
Identify key 
performance 
indicators 
The minimum required list has been signed in as the full list. 
Assemble risk 
management team  
Team size: 3 
Team members: 
a. One team member from Ordering 
b. One team member from the warehouse 
a. One team member from Finance 
Roles and responsibilities have been delegated. 
The warehouse team member is not keen on the process, 
and has asked to be replaced. A fellow warehouse staff 
member has been approached, and has agreed to 
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participate. 
Conduct training 
None of the team members had any of the skills required. 
The team has been fully trained. 
The team has been assessed. The team member from 
Ordering has been found lacking in mitigation skills. This 
team member has been retrained and reassessed. 
 
The preparatory activities have been completed. The following checklists prove 
the completion of these. 
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Completed Checklists 
Table 16.3: Preparatory activities completed checklist 
Preparatory Activities 
            
Step One  Confirm organisation is an SMME    
  1 
Is the staff complement between the numbers of 1 and 
200?   
                    
            
Step Two  Obtain senior management involvement      
  1 Sponsor appointed by the board or management forum   
 2 Explain the sponsor roles and responsibilities to the sponsor  
  3 Sign off sponsor roles and responsibilities   
        
         
Step 
Three  Identify objectives     
  1 Explain use of balanced scorecard for standardising objectives   
  2 Complete balanced scorecard  
        
           
Step Four  Identify appetite for risk     
  1 
Include risk appetite as an agenda item at the next meeting of the 
board   
  2 Decide on appetite amount  
        
       
Step Five  Identify KPIs    
 1 Include additional KPIs to minimum required KPI list provided  
  2 Enter final KPI list  
         
      
Step Six   Assemble risk management team   
  1 
Include team assembly as an agenda item at the next meeting of the 
board   
  2 Explain role of the risk management team and size  
  3 Elect risk management team  
  4 Obtain elected members’ buy-in  
        
      
Step 
Seven  Conduct training   
 1 Provide the required training to the risk management team  
  2 Assess the team to ensure that it is prepared for the process  
        
 
The preparatory activities are now complete and risk identification may 
commence. 
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16.2.2 Risk Identification 
The risk identification activities have been performed. Table 16.4 offers the 
results. 
Table 16.4: Risk identification activities 
Identify environment Ordering and warehouse departments 
Team members 
verified 
All members have been verified and remain in the team. 
The team member from Finance remains as she has 
strong analytical skills. 
All team members have been offered an additional three 
leave days for participating. This will be granted on 
completion of the process. 
Responsibilities 
distributed 
Ordering will conduct the identification of ordering assets, 
threats and vulnerabilities. 
Warehouse will conduct the identification of warehouse 
assets, threats and vulnerabilities. 
Finance will conduct the calculation of probability, impact 
and risk. 
The team will workshop mitigation together. 
The sponsor will own monitoring. 
Identification of assets 
Asset Register 
      
  Properties 
Asset Business Unit Access Route Users CIA 
S1 Ordering Switch Operators IA 
S2 Warehouse Server Stock clerks CIA 
IF1 Ordering Legacy system Operators IA 
IF2 Warehouse Server Stock clerks CIA 
IF3 Ordering Switch, Server Operators CIA 
IF4 Ordering Switch, Server Operators IA 
IS1 Ordering N/A Operators A 
IS2 Both N/A Operators, stock clerks IA 
IS4a Both N/A Operators, stock clerks A 
IS5 Both N/A Operators, stock clerks A 
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Evaluate Assets against  Weakness Value Scale 
The asset properties are not repeated due to space restrictions. The assets have 
already been ranked according to highest weakness value.  
All assets but one are above 30%. 
Asset Register 
  
  
 
Properties 
Asset Business Unit CIA 
Weakness Value 
  
S1 Ordering CIA 100.00% 
S2 Warehouse A 100.00% 
IF1 Ordering IA 66.67% 
IF2 Warehouse A 66.67% 
IF3 Ordering A 66.67% 
IF4 Ordering CIA 55.56% 
IS1 Ordering CIA 55.56% 
IS2 Both IA 33.33% 
IS4a Both CIA 33.33% 
IS5 Both IA 16.67% 
   
 
The sponsor has selected the top five risks as the highest weakness value risks 
that will continue in the process. 
Completed Checklists 
Table 16.5: Risk identification completed checklists 
Identification Activities 
            
Step One  Identify the environment/scope of risk management    
  1 Identify business units    
  2 Identify environment      
  3 Approve identified environment    
  4 Document environment    
                    
             
Step Two  Distribute responsibilities        
 1 Verify team members     
  2 Determine responsibilities     
  3 Assign responsibilities to the team members  
  4 Document assigned responsibilities     
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Step Three  Identify assets    
  1 Create list of all systems, information, hardware and infrastructure   
  2 Complete asset register with properties  
                   
            
Step Four  Evaluate assets against weakness value scale   
  1 Calculate weakness values   
  2 Capture weakness values to asset register     
  3 Reorder register according to weakness value  
  4 Identify highest weakness value assets   
                   
 
All risk identification activities have been completed. Risk assessment may now 
commence. 
16.2.3 Risk Assessment 
The risk assessment activities have been performed. Table 16.6 offers the 
results. 
Table 16.6: Risk assessment activities 
Identify threats 
IF1 
Malicious software 
Deterioration of storage media 
Network access by unauthorised persons 
Wilful damage 
IS1 
Airborne particles 
Fire 
Hardware failure 
Maintenance error 
Power fluctuation/failure 
Theft 
S1 
Malicious software 
Software failure 
Unauthorised use of software 
User error 
IS4a 
Failure of network components 
Failure of power supply 
Hardware failure 
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Maintenance error 
Theft 
IS5 
Extremes of temperatures 
Failure of power supply 
Hardware failure 
Wilful damage 
Identify vulnerabilities 
The vulnerabilities have already been matched to threats. Any threats that have no 
corresponding vulnerability have been removed. The CIA exposed by the vulnerability 
is also reflected. 
Asset Threat  Vulnerability CIA 
Malicious software Unprotected storage A 
Deterioration of storage media 
Lack of periodic replacement 
schemes 
A 
Network access by unauthorised 
persons 
Unprotected password tables I 
IF1 
Wilful damage Lack of physical protection IA 
Airborne particles Susceptibility of equipment to dust A 
Fire Lack of physical protection A 
Hardware failure Lack of replacement schemes A 
Maintenance error Insufficient maintenance A 
Power fluctuation/failure Unstable power grid A 
IS1 
Theft Lack of physical protection A 
Failure of network components Insufficient maintenance A 
Failure of power supply Unstable power grid A 
Maintenance error Insufficient maintenance A 
IS4a 
Theft Lack of physical protection A 
Failure of power supply Unstable power grid A IS5 
Hardware failure Insufficient maintenance A 
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Wilful damage Lack of physical protection A 
Calculate likelihood of occurrence 
The likelihood of occurrence (P) is qualitatively estimated and assigned the values 3, 6 
or 9 based on the low, medium or high value, respectively, as explained in Chapter 8, 
section 5. 
Asset Threat  P 
Malicious software M = 6 
Deterioration of storage media H = 9 
Network access by unauthorised persons M = 6 
IS1 
Wilful damage L = 3 
Airborne particles L = 3 
Fire L = 3 
Hardware failure M = 6 
Maintenance error M = 6 
Power fluctuation/failure M = 6 
IF1 
Theft M = 6 
Failure of network components L = 3 
Failure of power supply M = 6 
Maintenance error M = 6 
IF4a 
Theft M = 6 
Failure of power supply M = 6 
Hardware failure L = 3 IF5 
Wilful damage L = 3 
Impact measurement 
All impact values have already been calculated using the average method 
demonstrated in Chapter 8, section 6. The appetite for risk ranges are R0 – R15 000 
as low, R16 000 – R45 000 as medium and R46 000 to R100 000 as high. An example 
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of the calculation follows this list. 
 
Asset Threat I 
Malicious software H = 7 
Deterioration of storage media M = 5 
Network access by unauthorised persons M = 5 
IF1 
Wilful damage H = 8 
Airborne particles H = 7 
Fire H = 7 
Hardware failure H = 8 
Maintenance error M = 6 
Power fluctuation/failure M = 5 
IS1 
Theft H = 9 
Failure of network components L = 3 
Failure of power supply L 3 
Maintenance error M 5 
IS4a 
Theft H 9 
Failure of power supply L 3 
Hardware failure L 3 IS5 
Wilful damage M 4 
 
The impact value of IF1 threatened by malicious software is used for this 
example. The batch file is corrupted and cannot be recovered. 
• The batch file cannot be replaced. No revenue can be obtained in this 
period required to recreate the data. This carries a high impact. 
• The productivity of the ordering and warehouse departments will come to 
a standstill as it will take five days to contact all clients and retrieve 
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possible orders. The formula provides a result of R9 000. The impact is 
low. 
• The customers affected will have serious doubts about supporting 
Muckleneuk Books again. The impact is high. 
• The average impact is high. 
Calculate risks 
The risks have already been calculated and are presented below. The method used is 
discussed in Chapter 8, section 7. 
Asset Threat P I R 
Malicious software 6 7 42 
Deterioration of storage media 9 5 45 
Network access by unauthorised persons 6 5 30 
IF1 
Wilful damage 3 8 24 
Airborne particles 3 7 21 
Fire 3 7 21 
Hardware failure 6 8 48 
Maintenance error 6 6 36 
Power fluctuation/failure 6 5 30 
IS1 
Theft 6 9 54 
Failure of network components 3 3 9 
Failure of power supply 6 3 18 
Maintenance error 6 5 30 
IS4a 
Theft 6 8 48 
Failure of power supply 6 3 18 
Hardware failure 3 3 9 IS5 
Wilful damage 3 4 12 
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Muckleneuk Books have elected the following top five risk values to continue to risk 
mitigation: 
Risk 1: Theft 6 9 54 
IS1 
Risk 2: Hardware failure 6 8 48 
IS4a Risk 3: Theft 6 8 48 
Risk 4: Deterioration of storage media 9 5 45 
IF1 
Risk 5: Malicious software 6 7 42 
 
Risk Assessment Completed Checklists 
Table 16.7: Risk assessment completed checklists 
Assessment Activities 
         
Step One  Identify threats     
  
  
  1 Select threats      
  2 Add threats to risk profile     
  3 Add descriptions and CIA affected to risk profile   
                  
            
Step Two  Identify vulnerabilities       
  1 
Identify the vulnerabilities applicable to the 
assets    
  2 Map the vulnerabilities to the threats     
  3 Capture all information to the risk profile     
                   
            
Step Three  Calculate likelihood of occurrence (P)      
  1 Assign likelihood values    
  2 Add likelihood values to risk profile  
                  
            
Step Four  Perform impact measurement (I)       
  1 Assign impact values   
  2 Add impact values to risk profile   
                 
            
Step Five  Calculate risks      
  1 Calculate risk values      
 2 Add risk values to risk profile    
 3 Sort risk register by risk value    
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  4 Select top risks    
                    
16.2.4 Risk Mitigation 
The mitigation activities have been completed. Table 16.8 offers the results. 
Table 16.8: Risk mitigation results 
Identify mitigation strategy 
The mitigation strategies have been identified for each top five risk. 
Risk Mitigation Strategy 
Risk 1 Mitigation 
Risk 2 Transfer 
Risk 3 Mitigation 
Risk 4 Transfer 
Risk 5 Mitigation 
Two threats have been elected to be transferred as the legacy hardware cannot be 
replaced, but they have a high impact when exposed. The legacy system will not 
remain with Muckleneuk Books much longer (refer to balanced scorecard). 
Select the controls 
Risk Mitigation Strategy Control 
Risk 1 Mitigation Burglar bars, security alarm 
Risk 2 Transfer  
Risk 3 Mitigation Burglar bars, security alarm 
Risk 4 Transfer  
Risk 5 Mitigation 
Alternative storage and anti-virus 
software 
Backup device 
The physical control of burglar bars or a security alarm should reduce the risk of theft 
of both the legacy hardware and the thin clients. 
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The installation of anti-virus on the legacy hardware is not possible. As such, the batch 
file must be backed up to a different location and the location protected by anti-virus. 
16.2.4.1 Cost Benefit Analysis 
The cost benefit analysis of the three risks and associated controls as noted 
above has been performed. The following resulted from the analysis: 
Theft of the Legacy System 
Impact as measured in risk assessment: High 
Impact after implementation is as follows: 
Table 16.9: Impact after implementation for risk 1 
Controls Burglar Bars Security Alarm 
Monetary 
loss 
The bars are damaged in the 
attempt and need to be 
repaired. 
Impact is low. 
The hardware of the system is 
damaged and irreplaceable. The 
entire system would need to be 
replaced. A new ERP system 
requires a capital investment. 
Revenue loss is expected. 
Impact is high. 
Productivity Productivity is unaffected. 
Impact is low. 
The wait for a new ERP system could 
be weeks. A manual process would 
be required to continue working. The 
ordering department would work at 
half productivity for at least 3 weeks.  
I(Pr) = Days × Payroll 
I(Pr) = 15 × 45017  
I(Pr) = R6 750 
Impact is low. 
Reputation  No customers are affected. 
Impact is low. 
Customers’ orders are delayed 
through the manual system. 
Muckleneuk Books’ reputation will be 
                                                 
17 Payroll for Ordering is at R900 per day. Half productivity lost per day is R450. 
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damaged. 
Impact is medium. 
 
Impact after implementation of burglar bars = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3: Low 
Impact after implementation of security alarm = 3 + 1 + 2 = 6: Medium 
The cost of the implementation is as follows: 
Table 16.10: Cost of implementation for risk 1 
Control Burglar Bars Security Alarm 
Purchase cost 
R4 000 including purchase 
and installation 
R8 000 including purchase, 
installation and fees 
Productivity loss None None 
Total R4 000 R8 000 
 
The implementation of burglar bars both reduces the impact after 
implementation and presents a lower cost for implementation. Burglar bars are 
the recommended control. 
Theft of the Thin Clients 
Impact as measured in risk assessment: High 
The impact after implementation is as follows: 
Table 16.11: Impact after implementation for risk 3  
 
Controls Burglar Bars Security Alarm 
Monetary 
loss 
The bars are damaged in the 
attempt and need to be 
repaired. 
Impact is low. 
Two of the thin client devices have 
been stolen. Replacement can be 
made at a low cost and within 4 days. 
Revenue for the 4 days is reduced. 
Impact is low. 
Productivity Productivity is unaffected. The wait for two thin clients has 
reduced the ordering department to 
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Impact is low. two-thirds productivity for 4 days.  
I(Pr) = Days × Payroll 
I(Pr) = 4 × 60018  
I(Pr) = R2 400 
Impact is low. 
Reputation  No customers are affected. 
Impact is low. 
Customers’ orders are delayed 
through the reduced productivity but 
not noticeably by the customer.  
Impact is low. 
 
Impact after implementation of burglar bars = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3: Low 
Impact after implementation of security alarm = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3: Low 
The cost of the implementation is as follows: 
Table 16.12: Cost of implementation for risk 3 
Control Burglar Bars Security Alarm 
Purchase cost 
R4 000 including purchase 
and installation 
R8 000 including purchase, 
installation and fees for the 
first year 
Productivity loss None None 
Total R4 000 R8 000 
Both controls offer the same reduction in impact after implementation. The 
burglar bars are at a lower cost and are therefore recommended. If both the 
legacy hardware and thin client theft are approved for mitigation, this cost is 
reduced. 
Malicious Software Attack of the Batch File 
Impact as measured in risk assessment: High 
The impact after implementation is as follows: 
Table 16.13: Impact after implementation for risk 5 
                                                 
18 Payroll for Ordering is at R900 per day. Two-thirds productivity lost per day is R600. 
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Control Alternative Storage and Anti-virus Backup Device 
Monetary 
loss 
The legacy system cannot be used; 
a manual process must be used that 
slows the revenue intake. A 
specialist is required for the anti-
virus removal. 
Impact is medium. 
The legacy system cannot be 
used; a manual process must 
be used that slows the 
revenue intake. A specialist is 
required for the anti-virus 
removal. 
Impact is medium. 
Productivity Productivity is reduced for the 
manual process. The wait for 
specialist anti-virus removal is 3 
days. 
I(Pr) = (Days × Payroll) + Specialist 
I(Pr) = (3 × 450) + 2 000  
I(Pr) = R3 350 
Impact is low. 
Productivity is reduced for the 
manual process. The wait for 
specialist anti-virus removal is 
3 days. 
I(Pr) = (Days × Payroll) + 
Specialist 
I(Pr) = (3 × 450) + 2 000  
I(Pr) = R3 350 
Impact is low. 
Reputation  Customers’ orders are delayed 
through the reduced productivity but 
not noticeably so by the customer.  
Impact is low. 
Customers’ orders are 
delayed through the reduced 
productivity but not noticeably 
so by the customer.  
Impact is low. 
Impact after implementation of storage location and anti-virus = 3 + 1 + 1 = 5: 
Medium 
Impact after implementation of backup device = 3 + 1 + 1 = 5: Medium 
The cost of the implementation is as follows: 
Table 16.14: Cost of implementation for risk 5 
Control 
Alternative Storage and 
Anti-virus 
Backup Device 
Purchase cost R5 000 for developer to 
create the automatic 
R12 000 including purchase 
and installation of the backup 
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movement of the batch file to 
an alternative location; and 
purchase of the anti-virus. 
device and automatic process 
allowing the storage of the 
batch file on the backup 
device. 
Productivity loss 
3 hours technical staff for 
installation of anti-virus and 
developed application. 
R187,50 
1 hour technical staff for the 
installation of the developed 
application. 
R62,50 
Total R5 187,50 R12 062,50 
 
Cost is the deciding factor once again as the impact after implementation for 
both are identical. The recommended control is the alternative storage and anti-
virus. 
Table 16.15: Pareto analysis 
Identification of the 80/20 Rule Risks 
An electronic version of the risk register was searched for the threats that have already 
been targeted for control implementation. No additional risks were identified. The risk 
of theft to the assets IS1 and IS4a is, however, treated as an example to demonstrate 
CES. 
 Description CES 
Risk 1 
Recommended control is burglar 
bars at R4 000 
CES = IA (H) – Cost of control 
CES = 46 000 – 4 000 
CES = 42 000 
Risk 3 
Recommended control is burglar 
bars at R4 000 
CES = IA (H) – Cost of control 
CES = 46 000 – 4 000 
CES = 42 000 
The CES value for both is acceptable and the cost of the control justifiable. The 
amount resulting from the calculation is very high. The strengthening of the control of 
burglar bars with an additional security alarm has the following result: 
IS1 CES = IA (H) – Cost of controls 
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IS4a CES = 46 000 – (4 000 + 8 000) 
CES = 34 000 
The CES value is still positive and high. An assumed 80/20 rule control is assumed for 
the calculation of the cumulative impact appetite and cost of control. 
IS(1&4a) 
CES = Σ IA (H) – Cost of controls 
CES = 92 000 – 12 000 
CES = 80 000 
 
The implementation of both controls for both risks does not increase the cost, 
but improves the cost of exposure saving. The implementation of both controls 
for these risks is recommended. 
The board is impressed with the results of the mitigation step of the risk 
management process, as the cost required by the implementation of the 
controls is at a total of R17 187,50. The board is satisfied with the calculations 
and approves the continuation of the process with the strategies elected and 
controls recommended. 
16.2.4.2 Updated Risk Register 
The information collected to date has been added to the risk register. 
Table 16.16: Updated risk register 
Risk Register 
        
Risk Top Risk Mitigation Solution Control CES 
IS1-Theft Y Mitigation Gates & alarm R42 000,00 
IS1-Hardware failure Y Transfer   
IS4a-Theft Y Mitigation Gates & alarm R42 000,00 
IF1-Deterioration Y Transfer   
IF1-Malicious software Y Mitigation Anti-virus & application R40 812,50 
 
16.2.4.3 Created Action Plans 
The risk management team has created the action plans for each top risk. As 
the same control applies to two risks this step was completed faster than 
expected. The action plans are presented below. 
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Table 16.17: The risk action plans 
 
Vendors for the mitigation controls have been established. The vendor for the 
transfer of risk to an insurance firm is HD Insurance. 
As an example, Exposure Response Procedure ERP1 and EP1 are expanded. 
Exposure Response Procedure ERP1 
The exposure response procedure for the risk of theft of the legacy system is as 
follows: 
1. Assess the loss of the asset, i.e. is the complete asset lost, or portions of 
the asset? 
2. Contact the Financial Manager and inform her of the extent of the loss. 
3. Review the security gates and alarm. Have the controls been damaged? 
Did the controls offer any resistance to the theft? Can additional strength 
be added to the controls to prevent a similar attack? 
Escalation Procedure EP1 
The escalation procedure for the risk of theft of the legacy system is as follows: 
1. First point of contact: Financial Manager (informing of the exposure) 
2. Second contact: Operations Director (informing of the exposure) 
3. Third contact: The board chairperson (authorisation for improvement of 
control) 
Risk Action Plan 
           
Risk Mitigation Solution/ Control 
Mitigation 
Date Resources
Exposure 
Response 
Procedure 
Escalation 
Procedure 
Risk 1 Gates & alarm 03/01/2006 Boma Security ERP1 EP1 
Risk 2 Transfer 01/12/2005 HD  Insurance ERP2 EP2 
Risk 3 Gates & alarm 03/01/2006 Boma Security ERP2 EP1 
Risk 4 Transfer 01/12/2005 HD  Insurance ERP3 EP3 
Risk 5 Anti-virus & development 01/02/2006 MQS ERP4 EP4 
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16.2.4.4 Risk Assessment Completed Checklists 
Table 16.18: Risk mitigation completed checklists 
 
All risk mitigation activities have been completed. Risk monitoring may now 
commence. 
16.2.5 Risk Monitoring 
The risk monitoring activities have been performed. Table 16.19 offers the 
results. 
Table 16.19: Risk monitoring activities 
Include risk management in day-to-day activities 
The risk management team has hosted workshops and informed all members of staff of 
the risks they identified and how these risks will be mitigated. They have explained that 
the risks associated with the legacy system will be mitigated using short-term insurance, 
as the system replacement is already planned and in progress. 
The workshops also included awareness training of the exposure response procedures 
and escalation plans created for the risks. The team held interactive role-play sessions 
to ensure that the staff all understood the concepts of risks and mitigation and are 
prepared for exposure response. 
The risk management team has, with the cooperation of the staff, selected one Friday a 
Mitigation Activities 
            
Step One  Identify mitigation strategy       
  1 Assign mitigation strategy to each risk     
  2 Capture mitigation strategy to risk register     
                    
            
Step Two  Identify mitigation solution       
  1 Select control for each mitigation risk     
  2 Apply 80/20 rule to risk register     
  3 Create 80/20 rule control report      
 4 Capture controls to risk register      
  5 Risk register acceptance by the board      
                  
          
Step Three  Create action plan      
  1 For each risk, complete an action plan   
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month for risk management training which will include progress reports and notification 
of any new risks discovered. Attendance of these training sessions is mandatory. 
Maintain risk register 
The risk management team, as representatives of their respective departments in the 
environment, hold the responsibility of calling a team meeting whenever a new asset 
arrives. The team is fully prepared for the arrival of the replacement ERP system and will 
include a full assessment into the risk register one week after installation is completed. 
Risk management scorecard 
The risk management scorecard has been updated at most one day after progress thus 
far. The scorecard to date is as follows: 
Risk Management Scorecard 
     
Key Performance Indicator Due Date Status 
1 Achieve milestone at each step of the process    
 1.1 Preparatory activities milestone achieved  Completed 
 1.2 Identification milestone achieved  Completed 
 1.3 Assessment milestone achieved  Completed 
 1.4 Mitigation milestone achieved  Completed 
 1.5 Monitoring milestone achieved 28/02/2006 Started  
2 Complete each deliverable at each step of the process    
 2.1 Preparatory activities deliverables achieved  Completed 
 2.2 Identification deliverables achieved  Completed 
 2.3 Assessment deliverables achieved  Completed 
 2.4 Mitigation deliverables achieved  Completed 
 2.5 Monitoring deliverables achieved 28/02/2006 Started 
3 Present milestone summary to the board  28/02/2006 Started 
4 Complete asset register at the end of risk identification  Completed 
5 Complete risk register at the end of assessment  Completed  
6 Complete risk strategy at the end of risk mitigation   
  6.1 Risk 1: Mitigation  Completed  
  6.2 Risk 2: Transfer  Completed  
 6.3 Risk 3: Mitigation  Completed  
 6.4 Risk 4: Transfer  Completed  
  6.5 Risk 5: Mitigation  Completed  
7 Complete action plan    
  7.1 Risk 1: Burglar bars and security alarm 03/01/2006 Started 
  7.2 Risk 2: HD Insurance  Completed 
 7.3 Risk 3: Burglar bars and security alarm 03/01/2006 Started 
 7.4 Risk 4: HD Insurance  Completed 
  7.5 Risk 5: Anti-virus and application 01/02/2006 Started 
8 Complete assessment report 01/03/2006 Started  
9 Update business continuity plan  N/A  
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Measure monitoring 
The risk management team is making regular additions to the assessment report as 
progress is made. A draft is submitted to the board at each meeting and presented by 
the sponsor. The report includes the minutes of the workshops held to train staff and 
staff feedback sheets completed at the end of the workshops. 
The report includes the risk register, which has not been changed significantly since the 
completion of the mitigation step. 
The risk management scorecard as at the day of the meeting is also included. 
 
Risk Monitoring Completed Checklists 
Table 16.20: Risk monitoring completed checklists 
Monitoring Activities 
            
Step One  Include risk awareness in day-to-day activities     
  1 Conduct awareness training       
  2 Ensure that risk profile is understood by staff   
  3 
Ensure that impact of mitigation strategy 
is understood     
  4 
Conduct business continuity process 
training     
  5 Hold sessions to review day-to-day activities    
                    
            
Step Two  Maintain the risk register       
  1 Update asset register       
  2 Update risk profiles        
  3 Update risk register        
  4 Update action plans        
  5 Communicate updates       
                  
 
 
Maintain business continuity plan 
The exposure response procedures have not been changed for the assets. A procedure 
will be created when the replacement ERP system is in place. 
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The monitoring step as reflected here works on the assumption that it is not yet 
complete, but will end at the end of the financial year, with the new iteration 
starting with the Muckleneuk Books’ financial year. This has been proposed by 
the board and will be so for at least three years. 
This completes the scenario test of the Peculium Model. 
           
Step Three  Conduct performance measurement     
  1 Maintain risk management scorecard     
  2 Communicate updated scorecard     
                 
           
Step Four  Measure Monitoring      
  1 Create assessment report       
  2 Communicate assessment report     
                 
          
Step Five  Maintain BCP      
  1 Update BCP       
  2 
Communicate and provide training on 
BCP    
                
 275
 
A6 17 Appendix 6: A paper published for the ISSA 2005 Conference 
 
The paper listed below was published in the proceedings of the ISSA 
(Information Security South Africa) 2005 conference held at the Balalaika Hotel 
in Sandton, South Africa, from 29 June to 1 July 2005. 
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ABSTRACT 
The South African economy has grown considerably in the last 10 years, with black 
empowerment being supported by the state and investors to develop previously 
disadvantaged communities. Government has also targeted small, medium and micro 
enterprises (SMMEs) for development.  
SMMEs are not directly affected by corporate or IT Governance, and as a result 
80% of SMME failures are attributed to lack of management knowledge. This lack of 
knowledge extends to the management of information security risk. 
This article evaluates information security risk management methodologies 
available to international small businesses for fit to the South African SMME to 
discover whether they may be used to reduce the failure rate. The evaluation framework 
provides a tool that may forewarn the lack of fit of a methodology.  
KEYWORDS 
Information security risk management; SMME; small business; OCTAVE-S; CRAMM 
V Express 
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A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING INFORMATION 
SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGIES 
FOR SMMEs 
1 Introduction 
Small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) form a sizable portion of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) in South Africa. The SMME market portion contributes 42% 
to the GDP [South Africa, Business Guidebook], but comprises an estimated 99% of the total 
number of enterprises in the economy [National Treasury].  
The information security risk management (ISRM) methodologies commercially 
available to SMMEs were created in developed countries, and for different types of 
small businesses to that of the South African SMME. These methodologies require 
evaluation for a South African SMME before they can be recommended as an 
organisational improvement tool. 
This article presents the creation of a framework for this evaluation, and the 
subsequent evaluation of two internationally available methodologies for small 
businesses. 
The framework was created considering the requirements of Corporate 
Governance and IT Governance, as well as the constraints experienced by SMMEs, 
time and resources. 
The article first presents the framework, followed by a summary of the 
methodologies of OCTAVE-S and CRAMM V Express. Each are evaluated using the 
framework before a conclusion is drawn. 
2 Framework for the evaluation of ISRM 
methodologies 
The framework has been created out of the characteristics of an SMME, as well the 
benchmark of procedural order required by corporate and IT Governance. The 
characteristics were devised from the most pertinent constraints faced by the SMME, 
being cost, resources and business knowledge. 
Corporate and IT Governance both require a process including planning, 
execution and control or monitoring of risk management as a cyclical process [King 
Commission on Corporate Governance; IT Governance Institute]. This creates continual awareness 
of risk, and the management thereof.  
A further requirement is the fit of the methodology to the definition of the South 
African SMME, as it is unique compared to that of other countries. These requirements, 
coupled with the constraints mentioned above, create the major elements of the 
framework. 
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17.1 The Framework Explained 
The framework in Figure 1 that has been created for evaluation of SMME 
methodologies is three-dimensional, comprising the following: 
Dimension 1. Elements. There are 4 elements in the framework: availability, cost, 
regulatory fit and SMME fit. 
Dimension 2. Factors. The elements consist of factors, and in some cases, sub-
factors. The constraints and requirements mentioned above are 
multi-faceted and cannot be represented fairly in one dimension. 
Dimension 3. Weights. All of the elements and factors have associated 
quantifiable weights assigned. The weights create a quantitative 
measure for the framework, allowing comparisons of 
methodologies after evaluation. 
 
Figure 1: The three-dimensional framework 
The elements based on the constraints faced by an SMME and the requirements of 
corporate and IT Governance are: 
17.1.1 Visibility 
Visibility pertains to the ease with which the ISRM approach may be obtained, 
specifically by an SMME. This includes whether the full methodology is obtainable 
with ease, or whether only promotional material is available. The objective of visibility 
is to measure whether the interested party within the SMME can reasonably obtain an 
understanding of the methodology and thus make an informed decision of whether to 
proceed with the ISRM methodology. 
17.1.2 Cost 
The cost of implementing the methodology is an estimated measure, as the true cost of 
any exercise can only be determined after the fact. Cost is, however, a relative term, as 
there are many facets to a methodology that may be added as a cost, even though no 
direct spending was involved. Cost is therefore split into these factors: 
• Purchase cost is the requirement of cash spend on the methodology, 
whether it is an upfront cost, or expenditure throughout the methodology 
for obtaining the methodology. 
• Organisational involvement is attributable to the human resources 
involved in the methodology, through various channels. These channels, 
known as sub-factors, are: 
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o Knowledge requirement. All training required by the organisation, 
or elected individuals. 
o Senior management buy-in. The involvement of senior 
management in a methodology is an expensive factor, as senior 
management time is at a higher premium than an operational 
employee’s. 
o Self-directed or consulted. The nature of the methodology also 
impacts the cost of the implementation. A self-directed approach 
may be higher in organisational involvement cost, but lower in 
purchase cost. The inverse applies to a consulted approach. The 
purchase cost may be higher, but organisational involvement is 
less. The duration of the methodology, as prescribed by the nature 
of the methodology, must also be considered. 
The duration of a consulted approach may be shorter, as the 
schedule is managed by a third party. The duration of a self-
directed approach is self-led, and thus may be prone to operational 
delays. 
17.1.3 Regulatory Fit 
The regulatory fit refers to the process being of a cyclical nature and including 
both planning and monitoring phases. This would create fit to the corporate and IT 
Governance standards of King II and CobiT, respectively [King Commission on Corporate 
Governance; IT Governance Institute]. 
17.1.4 Fit to the South African SMME 
The South African SMME has been determined to be unique when compared to 5 other 
nations’ definitions, and this should be considered before implementing a methodology 
created for the SMME of a different nation. 
The fit to the South African SMME is evaluated contrariwise against the 
following factors: 
• Horizontal or vertical industry. The methodology should not promote 
or be aligned with a horizontal or vertical industry. There should be no 
restriction on the industry of the SMME. 
• The size of organisation. The South African SMME is defined as 
ranging from 1 staff member to 200 [South Africa]. The methodology 
should not be focused on a number excluding parameters of this range.  
• The type of organisation. Any structure of small businesses should be 
allowed, especially when considering the existing lack of business 
skills. There should be no restriction on structure. 
To summarise, the only restriction that is endorsed is the maximum allowance of 
200 employees. 
The framework is summarised in Figure 2.  
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Methodology
Visibility
Cost
Organisational 
Involvement
SMME Fit
Regulatory Fit
Free vs Promotional
Purchase Cost
Horizontal/ Vertical
Size
Organisational Type
Knowledge 
Requirement
Senior 
Management  Buy-
in
Self-directed/ 
Consulted
Fit to Corporate and 
IT Governance
 
Figure 2: The framework, its elements and factors 
The framework has thus far been explained in two dimensions. The third 
dimension, the weighting, is assigned as follows. 
17.2 The Weighted Dimension 
Weights have been assigned to each element, factor and sub-factor. The weights have 
been assigned, based on estimated importance of the element. 
Cost has been assigned the highest weight due to the cost-focus of SMME’s. A 
high purchase cost alone, could dissuade the SMME owner or decision maker from 
implementing a methodology. However, cost is not the only consideration. Lack of 
SMME or regulatory fit will result in a very low return on investment, even though the 
cost is low. 
Visibility also carries a great importance. The remaining weights become of no 
consequence if the decision maker cannot obtain an initial understanding of the 
methodology. Avoidance of visibility would create a ‘blind’ implementation of the 
methodology. 
The remaining weights are also go/ no-go weights. If the methodology scores low 
on SMME and regulatory fit, the organisation can be assured that, for their enterprise, it 
will not be the optimum solution. A score of zero in both are immediate dismissals. 
As the result of these arguments, the highest weight is assigned to cost, as the 
primary concern for the SMME owner, with equal distribution of weight over the 
remaining elements. 
The total of the weights when added will provide a score out of 100. This is then 
easily compared to other evaluations for decision making. Should two options score 
equally, the elements themselves should be compared, using go/ no-go decision blocks. 
Tables 1-4 present the elements, factors and sub-factors with their assigned 
weights. A description of the assigning of weights for each factor is provided, creating 
guidance for quantification. Each elemental Table has a decision point. All decision 
points are also highlighted, providing the evaluator with the option to dismiss a 
methodology. The score for the element is calculated by selecting the rule (rules are in 
Italic font) in the Table with best fit to the methodology, and adding the rule weights for 
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an element score. The final decision is based on a framework score higher than a 
reasonably conservative 30. 
Table 1: The weights of visibility 
Element, factors and sub-factors  Assigned 
weight 
Visibility  20 
The  methodology is freely available and user-friendly 20  
Promotional information is freely available with details for further information 10  
No information is freely available 0  
SCORE  _____ 
 GO/NO GO DECISION – HIGH RISK OF FUTILE IMPLEMENTATION 
Table 2: The weights of cost 
Element, factors and sub-factors  Assigned 
weight 
Cost  40 
Purchase cost  20 
The  methodology is free 15  
The  methodology is free but has a tool that reduces organisational 
involvement  available at a cost 
5  
The methodology has a cost attributed 0  
The  methodology has a cost attributed that includes a tool that reduces 
organisational involvement 
5  
Organisational involvement  20 
Knowledge requirement  5 
The organisation is expected to already have all knowledge required 
for the methodology 
0  
There is training available for the organisation at a cost 5  
No previous knowledge is required 5  
Senior management buy-in  5 
The  methodology promotes senior management buy-in or 
sponsorship 
5  
The  methodology requires senior management execution 0  
The methodology does not promote or require senior management 
buy-in 
0  
Self-directed or consulted  10 
The methodology is self-directed 5  
The methodology is self-directed with consulting available 10  
The methodology is consulting based with no operational involvement 
from the organisation 
5  
SCORE  _____ 
GO/NO GO DECISION: IS THE COST TOO HIGH? 
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Table 3: The weights of regulatory fit 
Element, factors and sub-factors  Assigned 
weight 
Regulatory fit  20 
The  methodology conforms to the steps in Table 2 10  
The  methodology does not conform to the steps in Table 2, but does include at least 
planning and arranging 
5  
The methodology does not conform to the steps in Table 2 at all 0  
The methodology is cyclical and promotes reviewing 10  
The  methodology is not cyclical and does not promote reviewing  0  
SCORE  _____ 
GO/NO GO DECISION: HIGH RISK OF ANTI-REGULATORY SOLUTION 
Table 4: The weights of SMME fit, the final score 
SMME fit  20 
Horizontal/vertical  5 
The methodology is restricted to a horizontal or vertical industry 0  
The methodology is not restricted to any industry 5  
Size  10 
The  methodology restricts the size of the organisation to a range within the 
parameters of the South African SMME 
0  
The  methodology is restricted to the parameters of the South African SMME 10  
Organisational type  5 
The methodology is restricted to a specific type of organisation, e.g. 
hierarchical structure 
0  
The methodology is not restricted to a specific type of organisation 5  
SCORE  _____ 
GO/NO GO DECISION: HIGH RISK OF INAPPROPRIATE SOLUTION 
TOTAL SCORE  100 
GO/NO GO DECISION: IS THE SCORE HIGHER THAN 30? 
 
The framework has been established in all three dimensions. The following 
section uses the framework to evaluate the OCTAVE-S Information Security Risk 
Management methodology. 
3 OCTAVE-S Evaluated 
OCTAVE-S is discussed in summary to create the foundation from which information 
is extracted for the framework evaluation that follows later. OCTAVE-S is based on the 
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation) Approach 
[Alberts & Dorofee] designed specifically for the unique constraints experienced by small 
organisations [Software Engineering Institute]. OCTAVE-S was developed by the 
Technology Insertion, Demonstration and Evaluation program of the Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI). 
The framework of OCTAVE was retained, with simplified implementation of the 
detail. OCTAVE-S v0.9 is summarised below and subsequently evaluated. 
17.3 OCTAVE-S Summarised 
OCTAVE-S is a self-directed information security risk evaluation. It requires a 3- to 5-
member interdisciplinary team to lead the methodology, and also requires that these 
staff members have a broad insight into the organisation’s business and security 
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processes. The ultimate outcome of the methodology is an organisation-wide protection 
strategy and risk mitigation plans. 
The OCTAVE-S approach is divided into three phases. These phases are: 
1. Build asset-based threat profiles 
2. Identify infrastructure vulnerabilities 
3. Develop security strategy and plans 
17.3.1 Build Asset-based Threat Profiles 
The team uses this phase to create a set of criteria against which risks will later be 
evaluated. All organisational assets are identified and the existing security practice is 
defined. No external consulting is offered in this phase, as all operational tasks are 
completed by the team itself. 
A selection process is used to select 3 to 5 critical assets, on which the remainder 
of the evaluation will be conducted. 
Finally, security requirements are defined, and threat profiles created for each 
critical asset. The threat profile is based on 3 levels: the asset, followed by all connected 
aspects that may expose a threat and the outcomes if the threat is realised.  
17.3.2 Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities 
The team analyses the computing infrastructure in this phase, focusing on the access 
means to the critical assets, for example systems and data. The team also analyses 
which parties are responsible for the maintenance of these assets, in many cases with 
small businesses, an outsourced party. 
17.3.3 Develop Security Strategy and Plans 
This phase requires the team to identify risks to the critical assets and what may be done 
to mitigate these risks. Risks are measured on a qualitative scale of high, medium or 
low. All this information is collated into a protection strategy for the organisation’s 
critical assets, and mitigation plans to reduce the risks. The worksheets provided are a 
structured benchmark for creating these plans. No expectation of when these plans are 
executed is provided. 
17.3.4 Scope of Application 
OCTAVE-S is aimed at organisations ranging from 20 to 80 staff members. This 
excludes the majority of South African SMMEs (91%). The organisational structure is 
flat, with people from different departments being accustomed to interdepartmental 
projects. 
An organisation such as this is expected to be able to assign 3 to 5 people that 
have broad knowledge of the organisation and its security practices. 
OCTAVE-S is not recommended for an organisation that cannot create a team of 
knowledgeable staff members, for example an organisation that consists of independent 
business units, or dispersed groups of staff that do not interact much. 
The team members are expected to have problem-solving abilities, analytical 
skills, teamwork ethic and time, described as a few days. It is not indicated whether the 
few days are full days, or the total of various short sessions. 
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17.3.5 Preparation Guidelines 
OCTAVE-S provides a module containing all preparation activities that are suggested 
before kicking off the methodology. 
• The first notable preparation is senior management sponsorship. OCTAVE-S makes 
it very clear that senior management sponsorship is vital, but cannot clearly define 
how to obtain it. 
• The next preparation activity is selection and training of the team. The team should 
be made up of individuals with the skills listed above, containing at least one leader 
in the group, and a staff member with close links to IT, either through working 
closely with IT, or the third-party provider. 
• The use of managers on the team is encouraged, but managers should not be the 
majority of the team as this may restrict open communication. 
• Training of the team is addressed by promoting the training of at least one team 
member on OCTAVE-S.  
• Setting the scope of the evaluation allows the team to identify which areas of the 
organisation will be evaluated. A subset of the organisation’s business units may be 
selected. OCTAVE-S recommends at least 4 business units, one of which must be 
the IT department or IT management department.  
• The schedule for the methodology is created next. Worksheets are provided to offer 
guidelines of workshop durations, depending on the experience of the team. The 
duration of the methodology in phases ranges as follows: 
Table 5: Duration of OCTAVE-S 
Phase From To 
Preparation 4 days 8 days, 4 hours 
Build asset-based threat profiles 1 day 2 days, 6 hours 
Identify infrastructure vulnerabilities 3 hours 1 day 
Develop security strategy and plan 1 day 5 days, 1 hour 
Total 6 days, 3 hours 17 days, 3 hours 
The worksheets also provide a checklist at each process to ensure that all steps 
have been completed. Guidance is also provided on managing logistics for all 
workshops. 
17.3.6 Implementation Guidelines 
OCTAVE-S provides a set of guidelines for each process in each phase with step-
by-step instructions of what information is to be gathered and which worksheet is to be 
completed as well as definitions of any terminology used. 
17.4 OCTAVE-S Evaluation Outcomes 
The evaluation of OCTAVE-S based on the implementation guide is presented in the 
Table below. 
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Table 6: OCTAVE-S framework evaluation 
Elements, factors and sub-factors  Score 
achieved 
Visibility  20 
OCTAVE-S is freely available online and is easy to understand  20 
SCORE  20 
Cost  40 
Purchase cost   
OCTAVE-S is available at no cost  15 
Vulnerability tools may be obtained at a cost but are not required  5 
Organisational involvement   
There is training available for the organisation at a cost  5 
OCTAVE-S requires senior management buy-in or sponsorship  5 
OCTAVE-S is self-directed  5 
SCORE    35 
Regulatory fit  20 
OCTAVE-S does include at least planning and arranging  5 
SCORE  5 
GO/NO GO DECISION: HIGH RISK OF ANTI-REGULATORY SOLUTION 
SMME fit  20 
Horizontal/vertical   
OCTAVE-S is not restricted to any industry  5 
Size   
OCTAVE-S restricts the size of the organisation to 20 to 80 staff members  0 
Organisational type   
OCTAVE-S restricts the organisation to a flat hierarchy with more than 4 
business units 
 0 
SCORE    5 
GO/NO GO DECISION: HIGH RISK OF INAPPROPRIATE SOLUTION 
TOTAL  65 
OCTAVE-S achieves an average score on total, but ranks very low in the 
regulatory and SMME fit elements. It is a high risk methodology for ISRM. 
4 CRAMM V EXPRESS Evaluated 
CRAMM V Express is discussed in summary to create the foundation from which 
information is extracted for the framework evaluation that follows later. CRAMM V 
Express [Insight Consulting], similar to OCTAVE-S, is based on the large organisation 
version CRAMM V Expert. The software has been developed by Insight Consulting 
based on the CRAMM methodology. 
CRAMM V Express is a tool for rapid yet effective risk assessments that require 
limited time and human resources. 
17.5 The CRAMM V Express Tool 
The tool follows a very simple process for assessing the risks facing an organisation’s 
systems, and proposing mitigating controls, or as CRAMM describes them, 
countermeasures to reduce the risk. 
The tool presents user-friendly screens that allow input from a single user, with 
reporting available for review. The process followed by the tool is presented in Figure 
3. 
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Figure 3: The CRAMM V Express process 
17.5.1 Scope of Application 
The tool may be used for any system; there is, however, no distinction of which systems 
should be assessed. There is also no promotion of an organisation-wide assessment or 
assessment on departments or business units only. 
There is no guidance offered regarding who is responsible for managing the 
assessment, for example who is required to enter the information, and who is 
responsible for ensuring that the mitigating controls are applied. 
The tool does not offer any training on identifying threats, vulnerabilities, or 
assessing the level of vulnerability once the risk has been identified. The tool assumes 
that the user is knowledgeable of this specialist information, but still requires a tool to 
present the countermeasures. 
17.5.2 Preparation 
The tool itself does not require any preparation, but does assume that the user is aware 
of all systems that should be entered into the tool. The onus lies on the user to nominate 
which systems are to be assessed, and gain the assessment skill beforehand as well. 
17.5.3 Implementation 
Implementation of CRAMM V Express does not take place per se, as the use of the tool 
takes very little time, but no guidance is offered on when or how the proposed 
mitigating controls are to be implemented. The onus again lies on the user to make 
those decisions.  
17.5.4 Cost 
The CRAMM V Express tool is available at a cost of £1 500,00 excluding tax, with an 
additional annual licensing fee of £250,00. In Rand, this translates to a purchase cost of 
R17 205,00 excluding taxes, and R2 867,50 per year (calculated at the current exchange 
rate of R11,47 per British pound).  
This is not an extremely large sum of money, but may be contested if the tool is 
not used to its full potential. It is, however, fast to use and has low cost in organisational 
involvement. 
17.6 CRAMM V Express Evaluation Outcomes 
The evaluation of CRAMM V Express based on the implementation guide is presented 
in the Table below. 
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Table 7: CRAMM V Express framework evaluation 
Elements, factors and sub-factors  Score 
achieved 
Visibility  20 
Promotional information is freely available with details for further information  10 
SCORE  10 
Cost  40 
Purchase cost   
CRAMM V Express has a cost attributed that includes a tool that reduces 
organisational involvement 
 5 
Organisational involvement   
The organisation is expected to already have all knowledge 
required for the methodology 
 0 
The methodology does not promote or require senior management 
buy-in 
 0 
The methodology is self-directed  5 
SCORE  10 
GO/NO GO DECISION: IS THE COST TOO HIGH? 
Regulatory fit  20 
CRAMM V Express promotes reviewing by offering a record of countermeasures 
used and still to be implemented 
 10 
SCORE  10 
SMME fit  20 
Horizontal/vertical   
The CRAMM V Express is not restricted to any industry  5 
Size   
CRAMM V Express has no restrictions on organisational size at all  10 
Organisational type   
CRAMM V Express is not restricted to a specific type of organisation  5 
SCORE  20 
TOTAL  50 
CRAMM V Express scores below average and fails in the cost element. This is 
surprising as very little organisational involvement is required, although a purchase cost 
is attributed. The double edge of the sword is the lack of a requirement of senior 
management involvement. This has been stipulated by King II as vital, as well as 
CobiT, which also supports the low regulatory score. The high score in SMME fit is 
inconclusive, as CRAMM V Express does not specifically cater for small businesses, 
nor does it exclude them. 
The inference has to be made that although the above approaches may offer some 
benefits to a South African SMME, there are risks that they become difficult to apply 
and are abandoned before completion. There is no support available for either of these 
approaches should the organisation grow weary of self-direction. 
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5 Conclusion 
This article has presented a framework that may be used to evaluate any methodology 
by an SMME concerned with information security risk management. The framework 
focuses its greatest weight on the cost concern of the SMME, but also considers the 
visibility of the methodology, fit to the South African structure of an SMME, and fit to 
the regulations of the South African environment. 
The framework was applied to OCTAVE-S and CRAMM V Express. The 
framework has found that neither of these approaches is ideal for the South African 
SMME, with mediocre scores of 65% and 50%, respectively.  
The framework has provided a weapon in the SMME’s armoury for forewarning 
inappropriate implementation of a methodology that may cost the organisation 
resources it cannot afford, or provide a solution it cannot use. 
An outcome of these evaluations was the realisation that a new, South African 
SMME-based information security risk management methodology needs to be 
developed that scores high on the evaluation framework, and thus meets all the 
requirements of an SMME. 
It is however acknowledged that the framework is experimental and has not been 
tested on all information security risk management methodologies for small businesses 
and that further research into methodologies is planned for the future. Further research 
is also planned into the abovementioned creation of the methodology for the South 
African SMME. 
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